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1. Introduction
Perhaps some of the most interesting findings reported in
the neuropsychological literature concern patients who can
successfully recognize some categories of objects but not
others. JBR, who suffered temporal lobe damage following
herpes simplex encephalitis, was able to give fairly precise
descriptions of nonliving artefacts, but could only give very
impoverished responses for living things (Warrington &
Shallice 1984). JBR described a compass as “tools for telling
direction you are going” and a briefcase as “a small case
used by students to carry papers,” but when asked to de-
scribe a parrot he said “don’t know” and he described a snail
as “an insect animal.” Category specific recognition impair-
ments for living things have been documented on numer-
ous occasions in the neuropsychology literature (Basso et al.
1988; De Renzi & Lucchelli 1994; Forde et al. 1997; Sar-
tori & Job 1988; Sheridan & Humphreys 1993; Silveri &
Gainotti 1988; Warrington & Shallice 1984), and there are
also a few reports of patients with impairments for nonliv-
ing things (Cappa et al. 1998; Hillis & Caramazza 1991; Sac-
chett & Humphreys 1992; Warrington & McCarthy 1983;
1987; 1994). Recent summaries of relevant cases are pro-
vided by Caramazza (1998), Forde (1999), Forde and Hum-
phreys (1999), and Saffran and Schwartz (1994). These
cases raise general and important questions about the na-
ture of our knowledge about objects, and its neural imple-
mentation. For example, does the brain represent knowl-
edge of specific categories in discrete areas? Alternatively,
does knowledge about categories take a distributed form,
with particular forms of information “weighted” for the
recognition of some but not other categories? Might even
distributed knowledge be structured in some way, with (for
example) item-specific perceptual knowledge being differ-
entiated from forms of conceptual and contextual knowl-
edge concerned with the relations between objects? Might
inter-object contextual knowledge be separate from knowl-
edge of the actions performed with objects? How might
such structural differences in knowledge representation af-
fect the recognition of particular classes of object? What
might be the implications for understanding what is of-
ten termed “semantic memory”? This paper is concerned
with these questions, addressed in the light of work on 
category-specific deficits for the living and the nonliving.1
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1.1. Category-specific confoundings
Before we embark on discussing the category-specific
deficits that emerge following brain damage, we need to en-
sure that any effects are indeed real and not an artefact aris-
ing from some other confounding variables. For instance,
one possibility is that category-specific deficits simply re-
flect the background of the person pre-morbidly. People
may have difficulty identifying animals because they knew
little about them in the first place and consequently these
items suffer most after brain damage; other people who
knew little about tools may present with a category-specific
impairment for nonliving things, and so on. A more elabo-
rated account along these lines is that the deficits reflect
differences in familiarity between objects. Living things are
often less familiar (as a category) than nonliving things
which we see and use every day, and so an apparent im-
pairment in accessing knowledge about living things may be
due to a more general impairment in retrieving information
about low familiarity items (Funnell & Sheridan 1992). An-
other possibility is that object recognition is more difficult
for more visually complex stimuli, taxing the limited visual
processing resources of some patients (Stewart et al. 1992).
Because living things are typically more visually complex
than nonliving things, patients may present with what ap-
pears to be a category-specific impairment for living things.
Investigators should rightly be concerned that any effects
they observe are not confounded by stimulus familiarity or
complexity, and it is the case that many of the early studies
did not control for such factors. Nevertheless, it seems un-
likely that these factors can account for all the dissociations
that have been observed. For example, some patients show
category-specific losses for objects that they are particularly
familiar with. We have observed a deficit in naming fruits
and vegetables in a patient who was a food expert and wine
connoisseur (Humphreys et al., in preparation), and Michel-
angelo, a patient with impoverished knowledge for living
things, was formerly an active member of the World
Wildlife Fund and could identify large numbers of animals
before his brain damage (Sartori & Job 1988; Sartori et al.
1993a; 1993b). Also, the deficits apparent in patients can
occur with objects that are highly familiar to average mem-
bers of the population (e.g., apples, dogs, cats) so it is diffi-
cult to attribute impairments with these objects to a lack of
familiarity. In addition, a simple effect of one variable (like
familiarity or visual complexity) cannot account for the dou-
ble dissociation between losses of knowledge for living and
nonliving things, and such dissociations still occur even
when items are matched for familiarity and complexity
across categories or when statistical measures are taken to
rule out such effects (Farah et al. 1996; Forde et al. 1997;
Kurbat 1997; Kurbat & Farah 1998; Sartori et al. 1993a;
1993b). We conclude that not all such deficits are due to
confounding factors, and thus the study of these category-
specific impairments can help inform us about the nature
of our stored knowledge and the way in which different ob-
jects are recognised.
Perhaps the most obvious account of category specific
deficits is that they reflect the categorical organization of
our underlying knowledge about the world, which is parti-
tioned according to whether stimuli are living or nonliving.
We will use this as the “default” account of the deficit, to be
held at the back of the reader’s mind while other “non-
categorical” accounts are reviewed, though we will recon-
sider it following these reviews. Prior to this, we will evalu-
ate whether the deficits reflect the loss of particular forms
of knowledge that are not categorical in nature (sect. 2) or
whether they reflect the interaction between perceptual
processes and the kinds of knowledge required to differ-
entiate between objects for different tasks (sect. 3). In sec-
tion 4, we return to the idea that stored knowledge might
be categorically organized. In section 5, we consider all the
above arguments in relation to function imaging studies that
have shown selective activation of neural areas functional
according to both the object being presented and the task.
In section 6, we outline a framework for understanding both
the psychological and the neuro-anatomical data which we
term the hierarchical interactive theory (HIT) of object
recognition and naming. The model is related to several ac-
counts that have previously been considered (e.g., Damasio
1989; 1990; Warrington & McCarthy 1987), but differs in
emphasising that object recognition proceeds through a hi-
erarchical series of stages and that re-entrant activation
plays a differential role in particular tasks (e.g., for naming
rather than for object recognition). We discuss the relations
between the model and others in the literature.
1.2. Defining semantic memory
Category-specific impairments have frequently been inter-
preted in terms of deficits in accessing semantic memory
for objects. Consequently, such deficits have been used to
argue about the nature of semantic memory (e.g., Warring-
ton & Shallice 1984). But what is semantic memory? In
Warrington’s (1975) seminal paper, which was the first sys-
tematic investigation of patients with selective impairments
of long-term stored knowledge about objects and their
properties, the term “semantic memory” was defined as
“that system which processes, stores and retrieves informa-
tion about the meaning of words, concepts and facts.” Con-
sistent with this, semantic memory is still considered by
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many to hold the information that allows us to give mean-
ing to the objects we see and the words we read and hear.
However, despite the general use of the term, or perhaps
because of it, there has been little attempt to provide a
more rigorous definition (though, see Caramazza et al.
1990). It is perhaps symbolic that semantic memory is rep-
resented as an under-specified “cloud” in many standard
models of cognition (e.g., see Morton & Patterson 1980,
Figs. 4.1–4.3). Now, our semantic representation of a dog
would generally be considered to include multiple facts
such as: it is an animal, it has four legs and a tail, it barks, it
likes to chase cats, it is a “man’s best friend,” it was once fea-
tured in a sentimental song by Elvis Presley and so on.
Thus, on this basis, semantic knowledge includes informa-
tion about the general category of the item, visual informa-
tion about its shape and parts, other sensory information
(e.g., about the sound it makes, what it feels like), the rela-
tionship between it and other items, and general contextual
knowledge abstracted even from any sensory information of
the object itself (e.g., that the ballad “Old Shep” refers to a
dog). Given the diversity of the information considered to
be “semantic,” and the fact that there are fundamental dif-
ferences in the nature of the knowledge involved (i.e., some
pertains to the sensory properties associated with an object
[e.g., it is brown and has floppy ears] and some reflects how
two or more objects relate to each other [e.g., dogs chase
cats], etc.), it is perhaps surprising that all of this informa-
tion is considered to be represented in one homogenous
“store.” Indeed, even when attempts have been made to de-
fine subsets of semantic knowledge, this has typically led to
dichotomous distinctions being made, such as between vi-
sual and verbal semantics (see Riddoch et al. 1988, for 
a review). One aim of this paper, through the review of 
category-specific deficits, is to argue that the concept of a 
“semantic system,” in any unitary sense, may be one of the
victims of an attempt to define the nature of our stored
knowledge in more detail. If the “semantic system” retracts
to no more than the form of knowledge recruited to per-
form a particular task – with this knowledge differing across
tasks, then the “system” becomes a fiction. For instance,
there may be little more in common between different
forms of semantic knowledge than there is between, say,
different forms of sensory knowledge (visual, auditory). It
may be more fruitful to specify the different forms of
knowledge than to seek out some unifying principle across
what turn out to be separable knowledge stores. However,
because the notion of a unified semantic system has been
at the heart of much of the research, we set out by using this
term when we discuss the work. In this initial usage, se-
mantic memory may be defined as the central knowledge
store for all input and output modalities that contains in-
formation about the meaning of objects – much like a
multi-modal dictionary that can both be accessed and can
express itself in a variety of different ways (from print,
speech, and visual images as input, to print, speech, and ac-
tion as output).
2. The loss of particular forms of knowledge:
Sensory and functional knowledge
2.1. The sensory/functional distinction
Warrington and Shallice (1984) reported four case studies
of patients who had particular problems in identifying liv-
ing things. For example, the patient we described in the 
Introduction, JBR, was able to give precise definitions of
nonliving things (compass and briefcase) but very poor def-
initions of living things (parrot and snail). In addition to his
poor definitions of living things, JBR was only able to pro-
duce descriptions indicating identification for 6% of pic-
tures of living things, but 90% of nonliving things. A second
patient, SBY, named no pictures of living things but could
produce correct descriptions for 75% of the pictures of
nonliving things. Warrington and Shallice suggested that
since the patients were impaired at accessing information
from both words and pictures, the locus of their impairment
must be within the semantic system, rather than a lower
level visual recognition problem. They also noted that their
patients were poor at defining some nonliving things, such
as cloths and precious stones. An associated problem with
these particular nonliving things is difficult to understand 
if the patients’ problems are confined to living things. In-
stead, Warrington and Shallice proposed that the deficits
reflect loss of some but not all forms of semantic knowledge
about objects – notably loss of sensory semantic knowledge.
They argued that, in order to identify living things (fruit,
vegetables or animals), retrieval of fine-grained sensory in-
formation was necessary. For example, they suggested that
to distinguish between a raspberry and a strawberry, de-
tailed information about color, size, shape, and texture was
necessary. In contrast, they suggested that recognition of
nonliving things “depends crucially on determination of its
functional significance” (p. 849). What is actually meant
here by functional significance is not clear. Our knowledge
about the function of an object could include information
about how an object is acted upon (e.g., by turning the
wrist, for a spanner) or about how the object itself operates
(e.g., a car operates by consuming petrol). As we hope to
show, authors have used the term “functional” in a variety
of ways when referring to our stored knowledge of objects.
The different forms of functional information, however,
need not be equivalent, and may themselves be repre-
sented in contrasting ways.
Warrington and Shallice proposed that two independent
systems may have evolved: one storing “functional” infor-
mation important for identifying nonliving objects, and the
other storing sensory information important for identifying
living things. They suggested that patients like JBR and
SBY have an impairment to the visual/perceptual semantic
system which leads to particular problems naming living
things (see Fig. 1). However, since the source of the prob-
lem is in a store specifying sensory rather than category-
specific knowledge, the problem can also generalize to non-
living things that also depend on the retrieval of sensory
knowledge for their identification – cloths and precious
stones perhaps being two examples.
Warrington and Shallice also noted that their patients
tended to be either consistently correct or consistently in-
correct when trying to identify stimuli and suggested that
such a consistent deficit reflected degenerate semantic
knowledge. Interesting to note, the items that the patients
were consistent on in one modality (say, with pictures) were
not necessarily the same as those for which they were con-
sistent in other modalities (say, when defining a word).
From this they concluded that semantic knowledge is par-
titioned not only into independent modules for sensory and
functional knowledge, but also for input modality. Thus
there may exist sensory semantics for visual objects (pic-
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tures and real objects) and sensory semantics for verbal 
input (written and spoken words). Since these semantic sys-
tems are distinguished by input modality as well as by the
information represented, there may well be duplication 
of sensory and functional knowledge within the modality-
specific systems (e.g., the fact that a bee has yellow and
black stripes will be represented in both the visual and ver-
bal semantic systems specifying the sensory properties of
objects) (see Fig. 1; also McCarthy & Warrington 1994;
Warrington & McCarthy 1994). We return to this issue of
modality in the general discussion (sect. 6.5).
Warrington and McCarthy (1987) presented a rather dif-
ferent view of this sensory/functional dichotomy, which
they discussed in terms of a distributed model of semantic
memory. They drew upon ideas of how objects might be
recognized put forward originally by Lissauer (1890). Lis-
sauer suggested that
the recognition of an object can only occur when at the time of
its perception a number of ideas are evoked which relate to that
object. These bring into consciousness those characteristics
which the mind has learned to associate with it and those con-
ditions in which it has been previously experienced . . . memo-
ries laid down through different sensory modalities contribute
to these associations but it is only when they are brought into
awareness and linked with the percept that the recognition of
an object becomes complete.
Warrington and McCarthy (1987) suggested that these
“memories laid down through different sensory modalities”
would not be stored in a homogenous semantic store or
“module” but in modality congruent “channels.” For exam-
ple, visual information would be stored in a visual channel,
“functional” information in a motor channel, information
about the sound an object makes in an auditory channel,
and so on. Warrington and McCarthy suggested that these
channels could be relatively fine-grained so that visual in-
formation might actually be stored in a number of sub-
channels (e.g., for colour, size, shape). Furthermore, differ-
ent channels of sensory or motor information would have
different degrees of importance for different items. For ex-
ample, as initially proposed by Warrington and Shallice
(1984), perceptual/sensory information would be impor-
tant for the identification of many living things whereas
“functional” information, defined to include motor actions,
may be crucial for the identification of nonliving things. The
specialization of different parts of the system for particular
objects would lead to a quasi-categorically organised knowl-
edge base.
This account predicts that quite fine-grained category-
specific impairments may occur because different cate-
gories within the living and nonliving groups (e.g., animals,
tools, fruit, clothing) would have different patterns of
weighting across the channels. For example, they suggested
that accessing colour knowledge might be important for
recognizing fruit (e.g., distinguishing between a raspberry
and a blackberry) but accessing shape information may be
relatively more important for distinguishing between two
flowers (e.g., a daffodil and a tulip). Thus patients may have
deficits with subsets of living or nonliving things, for exam-
ple, with fruit and vegetables but not animals, or with tools
but not clothing. These more selective patterns of deficit
have been observed (e.g., Hart et al. 1985, for a deficit with
fruit and vegetables; Caramazza & Shelton 1998 and Hart
& Gordon 1992, for a deficit with animals; McCarthy &
Warrington 1987, for a deficit with tools). Also, patterns of
association are expected between the loss of certain forms
of knowledge and deficits with particular objects. For ex-
ample, if a patient had a specific impairment in naming
fruit, this ought to be accompanied by an impairment in re-
trieving the colour of objects from memory, since colour
knowledge is likely to be important for distinguishing be-
tween different fruit (see Price & Humphreys 1989, for ev-
idence with normal subjects). However, Luzzatti and Da-
vidoff (1994) reported two case studies of patients who had
a marked impairment at retrieving the color of objects, but
no particular problem in naming fruit and vegetables. Luz-
zatti and Davidoff argued that an impairment in retrieving
object-colour knowledge did not necessarily impair naming
performance for categories of living things, such as fruit and
vegetables.
An attempt to capture some of the properties of the 
sensory-functional distinction in a more formal model was
made by Farah and McClelland (1991). They simulated se-
mantic representations using a distributed associative
memory system (cf. McClelland & Rumelhart 1985). Items
were represented in terms of patterns of activation across
processing units corresponding to either the perceptual-
sensory or functional properties of objects. The number of
sensory units assigned a non-zero value in the coding of a
stimulus, relative to the number of functional units, dif-
fered for living and nonliving things. For living things,
about seven times more sensory than functional features
were active; for nonliving things, there were equal propor-
tions of active sensory and functional units. This differ-
ential weighting of the representations of living things was
based on the number of properties generated by subjects
when asked to mark the visual and functional attributes in
dictionary definitions, and far more visual attributes than
functional attributes were marked. In contrast, roughly
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Figure 1. A model which distinguishes knowledge stores for
sensory and functional knowledge, separately for visual and verbal
input (after Warrington & Shallice 1984). Note that, according to
this account, patient JBR (Warrington & Shallice 1984) – who has
problems with living things when given both visual and verbal in-
put – has functionally independent impairments in the visual/sen-
sory and verbal/sensory semantic systems.
equal numbers of visual and functional attributes were
marked for nonliving things. The model was then trained
to associate the sensory and functional properties of ob-
jects with representations of their visual attributes and
names. Performance on object naming was tested by giv-
ing the visual attributes as input and seeing whether the
correct name was generated as output. The model was also
lesioned, with sensory or functional units being differ-
entially affected. Lesions affecting the sensory units lead
to marked impairments in identifying living things; lesions
affecting the functional units affected non-living things
more than living things. In addition, because of the distrib-
uted nature of the semantic system, lesions of the sensory
units also produced some loss in retrieving the functional
properties of stimuli, with living things being affected
more severely.
Farah and McClelland’s simulation provides an existence
proof that a model of this form, with distributed sensory and
functional knowledge about objects, can produce apparent
category-specific deficits when lesioned. It also shows that
a form of double dissociation can be generated, with either
living or nonliving things being affected – depending on
which form of knowledge is impaired. We consider this ar-
gument further in our discussion of category-specific
deficits for nonliving things. However, such an existence
proof does not demonstrate that the same underlying ar-
chitecture exists for the stored knowledge of objects in hu-
mans. Also, Farah and McClelland’s procedure for estimat-
ing the sensory and functional properties of objects has
been criticised (see Caramazza & Shelton 1998). Farah and
McClelland asked subjects to mark the functional attributes
of objects by asking the questions: “What does the item do
or what is it used for?” Caramazza and Shelton suggest that
this question is biased to nonliving things and leads to un-
derestimates of what might be termed the functional prop-
erties of living things (here Caramazza & Shelton refer to
nonsensory properties such as “lives in a desert,” and “car-
nivore”). When all nonsensory properties are noted in dic-
tionary definitions then the bias for more sensory proper-
ties for living things is greatly reduced (Caramazza &
Shelton 1998; Moss et al., in press).
In the distributed associative memory framework used
by Farah and McClelland, category-specific deficits for liv-
ing things should generalise to include poor retrieval of the
nonsensory properties of these items (although this prob-
lem should be less severe than the impairment in retrieving
sensory properties). We run into two difficulties. First,
there are patients whose problems in the retrieval of non-
sensory attributes of living things is at least as severe as their
problems in retrieving sensory properties (Caramazza &
Shelton 1998; Laiacona et al. 1993; Sheridan & Humphreys
1993). Indeed, this pattern of an equal deficit for sensory
and nonsensory knowledge of living things was observed in
one of the original Warrington and Shallice cases, when re-
examined by Funnell and de Mornay-Davies (1996). Sec-
ond, there are some patients who show extremely good
(normal) retrieval of the nonsensory properties of living
things whilst being impaired at retrieving their sensory
properties (Forde et al. 1997; Hart & Gordon 1992;
Humphreys et al. 1997; Riddoch & Humphreys 1993). This
pattern, in which nonsensory knowledge can be affected to
as severe a degree, to a less severe degree or not at all, sug-
gests that the sensory and non-sensory (“functional”) prop-
erties of living things are not as tightly coupled as in Farah
and McClelland’s architecture. The results also have impli-
cations for accounts of category-specific deficits in terms of
correlated sensory and functional features (sect. 2.2) and in
terms of a semantic system that is truly categorical in nature
(Caramazza & Shelton 1998) (sect. 4).
2.2. Correlated sensory and functional features
We have suggested that a simple distributed memory ac-
count, which separates sensory from non-sensory knowl-
edge fails to capture the full pattern of deficits for these two
forms in patients. Other investigators have suggested that
the difference between living and nonliving categories lies
not in the relative importance of perceptual or functional
attributes for identification per se, but in the links between
them. For example, for nonliving things, the connection be-
tween shape and action is not arbitrary, since the shape of
the item is typically constructed in a way that will best per-
form the action intended. De Renzi and Lucchelli (1994)
argued that this link between visual and functional (in the
sense of action) properties for nonliving things makes these
items less vulnerable when stored sensory information is
degraded. They outlined a case study of a patient who had
difficulty in recognising living things and in performing ob-
ject decisions, drawing and describing the perceptual dif-
ferences between living things. Also interesting, their pa-
tient also had problems with nonliving things when the
tasks involved retrieving the colour of items and naming ob-
jects from sound. De Renzi and Lucchelli proposed that the
naming impairment for living things resulted from a gen-
eral failure to retrieve the perceptual features of objects
from every category (and not just the category of living
things). However, for nonliving things this deficit may be
compensated for by the close links between visual attri-
butes and function, which provide an alternative route to
accessing the representation of the object. De Renzi and
Lucchelli acknowledged that “it remains to be explained
how the function of an object can be inferred from its vi-
sual appearance, if this has not been recognized or retrieved
from memory” (p. 19, emphasis ours). However, they sug-
gested that for nonliving things, a sensory and a functional
semantic store could interact. Thus, in visual object identi-
fication, functional cues could “help specify hypotheses on
the nature of the stimulus that were left undefined by visual
processing” (p. 20). For living things they proposed that this
route would be unavailable because, for these items, they
assumed there to be few links between perceptual and
functional attributes. In addition, they suggested that the
retrieval of colour knowledge and identification via sound
would be impaired for all categories because these percep-
tual properties have no direct functional associations.
Another account that stresses the importance of the in-
teraction between sensory and functional properties of ob-
jects is the OUCH model of semantic memory (Caramazza
et al. 1990). This model does not differentiate between dif-
ferent types of stored knowledge; both perceptual and
functional (action-related) properties are said to be stored
within a single semantic system. OUCH states that, during
visual object processing, salient parts of objects directly ac-
tivate corresponding perceptual and functional attributes in
semantic memory. For example, salient parts of a fork (e.g.,
the tines and handle) directly activate corresponding se-
mantic knowledge (i.e., about tines and handles in general)
and this pattern of activation could then be used to gener-
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ate hypothesis about what the object might be. This direct
activation of action-related information from the parts of
the object leads to privileged access to semantic memory
for objects relative to words (cf. Potter & Faulconer 1975).
According to this account, damage to semantic memory
may lead to a more severe impairment for living relative to
nonliving things, if nonliving things can benefit from a
higher degree of correlation between their sensory and
functional features.
Both De Renzi and Lucchelli’s account and the OUCH
model emphasise the importance of correlations between
sensory and functional properties of objects. Other authors,
however, stress that the correlations within sets of sensory
and/or sets of functional features may also play a predictive
role in retrieving information from semantic memory.
McRae et al. (1997) had subjects list the features of objects
from categories of both living and nonliving things. They
found that, whilst sensory properties were listed with
roughly equal frequency for living and nonliving things,
there were significantly more nonsensory features (e.g.,
used for carpentry, worn by women) for nonliving things
(supporting Warrington & Shallice’s [1984] model of se-
mantic memory). Furthermore, living things tended to
have more correlated features than nonliving things (11%
of feature pairs, relative to only 6% of feature pairs for non-
living things). Living things were more densely represented
across the correlated feature pairs – so that a smaller set of
common features captured more of the properties of living
things. They suggested that correlated features play a dif-
ferential role in recovering information about living and
nonliving things; for living things, correlated features could
lead to robust recovery of a common set of core attributes
(e.g., is animate, eats, breathes) but greater difficulties in
individuating objects. This proposal can account for some
patterns of degenerative performance found in patients
with Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Gonnerman et al. (1997) re-
ported that in the early stages of AD, living things could be
identified better than nonliving things, but as the disease
progresses the pattern reverses and living things are rela-
tively more difficult to identify (see also Devlin et al. 1998).
The greater number of correlated features for living things
may help to protect the identification of these items from
small amounts of generalised brain atrophy (as in the early
stages of AD). With more widespread damage though, fea-
tures are lost and performance with living things may de-
crease catastrophically, as the lost features contribute to
many exemplars within the category. Nonliving things, hav-
ing relatively fewer correlated features, are vulnerable to
damage on a more individual basis, but then show a less cat-
astrophic loss as the disease progresses. This differential
pattern of decline was simulated by Devlin et al. using a
neural network with interconnected semantic units that
tended to “push” an input pattern into a stable activation
state. Interestingly, in this model, category specific deficits
emerged even with random non-selective damage – as
might be assumed to occur in AD (though see Perry 1999,
for a discussion of the limitations of the model). In models
such as that of Farah and McClelland (1991) lesions had to
affect either the sensory or functional features differentially
to generate a category-specific effect.
However, the data on patients with AD are not clear cut.
For example, Silveri et al. (1991) found that AD patients
with moderate deficits were worse with living than with
nonliving things (see also Garrard et al. 1998; Guistolisi et
al. 1993) – the opposite result to that reported by Devlin et
al. (1998) and Gonnerman et al. (1997). Gonnerman et al.
in fact found a consistent deficit for living things in one pa-
tient even when identification performance for nonliving
things remained at a high level, which is not consistent with
their group study. It is not clear that accounts in terms of
correlated features will be able to provide a framework for
these disparate results. Garrard et al. (1998) also query how,
in neural terms, inter-correlations between representations
might protect features from degenerative decay. They sug-
gest that the differences between the majority of degener-
ative patients who have problems with living things, and 
the minority who can be found with deficits for nonliving
things, related to differences in the initial area of neo-
cortical involvement. In the majority of cases there is trans-
fer of the disease from the transentorhinal region to tem-
poral neocortex. In the minority there may be bi-parietal in-
volvement. The contrast between the two sets of patients
may reflect the storage of perceptual features in temporal
cortex and more action-based (functional) features in fronto-
parietal regions (see also Gainotti et al. 1995).
An extension to the proposal that correlated features are
important has been made by Moss, Tyler, and colleagues
(Durrant-Peatfield et al. 1997; Moss et al. 1997; 1998; Tyler
& Moss 1997). They point out that, for living things, many
of the correlated perceptual features are associated with
common biological functions (such as breathing, eating,
and reproducing). The distinctive perceptual features of
living things, however, are not strongly correlated with this
kind of functional information (e.g. a tiger’s stripes; see Keil
1987). It is in this last respect that living and nonliving
things differ. Nonliving things have distinctive perceptual
features that are correlated with their function in terms of
action (e.g., the serrated edge of a saw, the tines of a fork).
This last point is similar to the argument made by De Renzi
and Lucchelli and the OUCH model (see above), the dif-
ference being that Moss, Tyler, and colleagues highlight
that, for living things, common (intercorrelated) perceptual
features are associated with functional properties whilst for
nonliving things, functional attributes are associated with
distinctive perceptual properties. After brain damage, the
features strongly associated to the functional properties of
objects may be better preserved than those with weak as-
sociations. This will have different consequences for living
and nonliving things. For living things, information about
biological function will be recovered from the linked, com-
mon perceptual features. However, this will not help the
identification of individual stimuli, for which distinctive
features are important. For nonliving things, distinctive vi-
sual features are correlated with function; identification of
individual items is thus better. Durrant-Peatfield et al.
(1997) report simulations of these patterns in a feedforward
connectionist model trained to associate an input pattern
corresponding to “perceptual” and “functional” properties
of objects to a matching output pattern (“auto-associative”
learning). The training set was varied so that, for living
things, common perceptual features co-occurred with com-
mon functional properties; for nonliving things, distinctive
perceptual features co-occurred with distinctive functional
properties. When connections between input and output
units were randomly disconnected, the identification of liv-
ing things tended to be more affected, though recovery of
their shared functional properties was relatively well pre-
served.
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The account put forward by Moss et al. is able to explain
why information about biological function can be pre-
served in patients with poor identification of living things
(Moss et al. 1997; Tyler & Moss 1997). For example, in one
case reported by Moss et al. (1998) a patient with impaired
naming of living things was nevertheless able to group
these items according to their shared properties (does it
have legs? Does it lay eggs?). He was poor at retrieving dis-
tinctive properties of living things, whether visual or func-
tional (e.g., properties concerned with survival). Retrieval
of shared category properties for nonliving things was, if
anything, worse than retrieval of similar properties for liv-
ing things, perhaps because of an inherent advantage for
living things in such tasks (due to the shared functional
properties being based on shared perceptual properties, for
living things; see sect. 3.1). Indeed common information for
living things, whether concerned with biological function or
general category, is accessed rapidly also by normal subjects
(Humphreys et al. 1997; Tyler & Moss 1997).
We conclude that differences between shared and dis-
tinctive features, and the degree to which these features
correlate with the function of the object, are likely to be im-
portant contributing factors in category specific impair-
ments. However, as we hope to demonstrate, models need
to be elaborated further in order to account for the full pat-
tern of dissociations that have been documented. In partic-
ular, models need to have a more articulated structure,
specifying different forms of stored knowledge and differ-
ent stages of object identification. HIT, which differentiates
both the different forms of knowledge representation and
the contrasting stages of object identification, provides a
framework that can allow for a fuller account of the differ-
ent patients in the literature. This is described in section 6.
3. Interactions between perceptual processes 
and knowledge for particular tasks
3.1. The Cascade model
When normal subjects are asked to list the parts of objects,
living things tend to be listed as having proportionately
more shared parts than nonliving things. Similarly, when
the outline contours of standardised drawings of objects are
compared across category exemplars, living things tend to
have higher levels of contour overlap than do nonliving
things (see Humphreys et al. 1988). These different indices
provide an approximate measure of the similarities of the
perceptual structure of objects within their categories, with
living things having more similar structures than nonliving
things. Humphreys et al. (1988) termed this within-category
property “structural similarity.” Differences in structural
similarity between living and nonliving things may con-
tribute to the differences in identification that can be ob-
served between these categories of object. To illustrate,
consider the “Cascade” model of visual object recognition
outlined by Humphreys et al. (1988). This is composed of
several stages including visual recognition of an object’s
structure (access to stored structural descriptions), access
to semantic information, and access to the object’s name.
Stored structural descriptions are held to represent infor-
mation about the shape of objects but not to include other
information such as an object’s use or its association with
other objects.2 In this case, the term “semantic memory”
was reserved to apply only to the latter forms of (non-
perceptual) knowledge. If activation can be passed on to
one stage before processing at an earlier stage is completed
(i.e., if processing operates in cascade), then differences in
structural similarity will directly affect semantic access and
name retrieval when objects are presented visually. Struc-
turally similar objects will activate the structural represen-
tations of perceptual neighbours across their category. As a
consequence, functional and associative information com-
mon to the category is derived quickly, but there is then
increased competition between category exemplars for in-
dividual identification. Structurally dissimilar objects will
activate fewer perceptual neighbours, so that activation
of functional and associative information will be slower
and less widespread. Nevertheless, individual identification
should be more efficient (e.g., in a naming task), since com-
petition from perceptually and functionally similar neigh-
bours will be reduced (see Humphreys et al. 1988; 1997).
Note that this account of rapid access to common functional
and associative information, along with slowed access to
identity information owing to within-category structural
similarity for living things, is in many ways similar to the
proposals concerning common and distinctive features made
by Moss, Tyler, and colleagues. In the Cascade model, though,
these ideas are tied to an architecture specifying the differ-
ent stages involved in object identification. We will argue
that this provides important explanatory power in account-
ing for the variety of category specific deficits in patients,
and it remains a feature of the HIT approach which we out-
line in the final section.
The Cascade model predicts differences in performance
for living and nonliving things even in normal subjects.
Consistent with this, Humphreys et al. (1988) found that
normal subjects named pictures of living things more slowly
than pictures of nonliving things matched for familiarity
and name frequency (see also Lloyd-Jones & Humphreys
1997; Snodgrass & Yuditsky 1996). When access to stored
structural descriptions is measured using object decision,
the benefit for nonliving things remains but is reduced
(Lloyd-Jones & Humphreys 1997). According to the model,
the larger difference between living and nonliving things in
naming, relative to object decision, is a result of the small
differences in the efficiency of accessing structural de-
scriptions being exacerbated by competition accruing from
common (overlapping) functional and associative represen-
tations being activated. However, category decisions are
faster for living things compared to nonliving things
(Humphreys et al. 1999; Riddoch & Humphreys 1987a).
This advantage for living things is larger when stimuli are
presented as pictures rather than words, though it still ex-
ists with words (Job et al. 1992). Since the effect is larger
with pictures, we suggest that it is not simply due to cate-
gory information being more closely linked to living things;
rather there is privileged access to common semantic (func-
tional and associative) information from the visual proper-
ties of living relative to nonliving objects. Advantages for
identifying nonliving things over living things in fact occur
not only with normal human subjects but also with mon-
keys! Gaffan and Heywood (1993) trained monkeys to make
discrimination responses to pictures of living and nonliving
things. They found that the monkeys took longer to learn
the responses associated with living things, with the effect
increasing as the number of stimuli in the set increased.
This work provides converging evidence for the idea that
living things have high levels of perceptual overlap.
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A simulation of the results on human identification was
reported by Humphreys et al. (1995). They used an inter-
active activation and competition framework with pools of
units representing structural, semantic (functional and as-
sociative) and name information about objects (see Fig. 2).
Name units were further divided to represent either spe-
cific or superordinate category names. Input activations,
given to the structural descriptions, were based on the rated
perceptual similarity between items within their categories;
for example, a “dog” as input would maximally activate its
own structural description (activation 1), but it would also
activate the structural descriptions of other, similar items
(e.g., activating descriptions for a fox, a cat, a sheep, with
values of .6, .5, .3, etc.). Living things were rated as per-
ceptually more similar than nonliving things, and so shared
more activation values between their category members.
The net effect of this difference in shared activation values
was that there was rapid access to superordinate names for
living things but slowed access to individual names (due to
increased competition from multiple activations at a se-
mantic level). This model was also “lesioned” by having
noise added either to activations at a structural description
level or to the weights connecting structural to semantic, or
semantic to name representations. After lesioning, the
identification of living things was selectively disrupted rel-
ative to the identification of nonliving things; essentially this
occurred because of the increased structural and func-
tional/associative overlap generated during the visual pro-
cessing of living things. In contrast to the effects on identi-
fication there was relatively little effect of lesioning on
access to superordinate information; indeed, if anything,
the disruption affected performance with nonliving things
more. These data from the lesioned model match the re-
sults from many of the patients with category-specific
deficits with living things.
One of the interesting results in these studies of simu-
lated lesions was that the identification of living things was
impaired even when noise was only added to the connec-
tions between the semantic and name units (i.e., at the “out-
put” end of the model). In this last case, the impairment still
arose even when access to structural and semantic infor-
mation was intact (though there was still the natural in-
crease in competition for access to the names of living
things). This result is of interest because it matches the 
pattern reported in a few patients with category specific im-
pairments for living things. For example, Farah and Wal-
lace (1992) and Hart et al. (1985) have both reported pa-
tients with problems that seem confined to name retrieval.
In both cases, the patients could retrieve information about
living things once they were given their names, and Farah
and Wallace report that their patient could categorise fruit
and vegetables even though the naming of these items was
selectively impaired (see also Forde et al. 1997; Humphreys
et al. 1997). Such an apparent selective problem in name
retrieval is difficult to account for in models that do not
have a distinct (and dissociable) stage of access to name in-
formation following access to semantics. Nevertheless, de-
spite the success of the Cascade model in accounting for
such naming disorders, we shall reconsider the evidence on
this point in section 6, when we introduce the HIT model
of object identification.
3.2. Depth of processing within the structural
description system
The Cascade model predicts that category specific impair-
ments for living things can emerge following damage to the
structural description system, though this description sys-
tem itself is not categorically organised. According to the
model, damage to structural representations may lead to
problems in differentiating between living things because
these stimuli belong to categories with large numbers of
structurally similar exemplars. Category-specific impair-
ments at the level of the structural description do not re-
flect any functional distinction based on biological category
but emerge because of the different processing demands of
living and nonliving things. However, Sartori and Job (1988)
offered an alternative suggestion and proposed that the
structural description system might be categorically organ-
ised. They presented a case study of a patient, Michelan-
gelo, who was significantly worse at naming living compared
to nonliving things. In addition, Michelangelo performed
poorly on object decision for living things, though perfor-
mance with nonliving things was within normal limits. Ob-
ject decision is typically used to test the integrity of the
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Figure 2. The interactive activation and competition model of
object naming proposed by Humphreys et al. (1995). —t indi-
cates excitatory links and —l inhibitory links. This model incor-
porates two of the basic principles of the HIT framework: func-
tionally isolatable subsystems (e.g., separating perceptual
knowledge about objects [in the structural description system]
from other forms of stored knowledge), and interactive process-
ing (top-down as well as bottom-up). In a more detailed account,
the semantic representations specified here are further divided
and represented in a distributed form.
structural description system, because it only requires sub-
jects to assess whether or not they have seen a particular “vi-
sual pattern” before and does not require them to access
any further (functional or phonological information) infor-
mation. Consequently, Sartori and Job (1988) suggested
that Michelangelo’s category-specific impairment resulted
from damage to the structural description system. They
suggested further that the particular problem with living
things could arise because (1) the system was categorically
organised or (2) living things require more detailed pro-
cessing at this stage within the object recognition system (as
suggested in the Cascade model, Humphreys et al. 1988).
To distinguish between these two alternatives they asked
their patient to specify the important differences between
12 pairs of animals, 12 pairs of vegetables, and 12 pairs of
objects. Michelangelo scored at ceiling for objects but out-
side the control range for vegetables and animals.
Sartori and Job suggested that if Michelangelo had a
general impairment in accessing perceptual attributes
from stored structural descriptions he should have prob-
lems generating the important perceptual differences be-
tween objects, regardless of category. Since he only had
problems with living things, they argued that these must be
represented in a functionally independent compartment.
However, if living and nonliving things are represented in
terms of contrasting amounts of overlapping activation
within the structural description system, then we see no
reason why differences should not emerge between the
categories even when the system is addressed from the
spoken names. Increased overlap for living things should
still make their perceptual properties relatively difficult to
retrieve. Furthermore, both Michelangelo and controls
sometimes gave perceptual attributes and sometimes gave
functional attributes for items from all categories, when
contrasting the differences between stimuli. Controls
tended to give functional attributes for objects and per-
ceptual attributes for animals and vegetables. Conse-
quently, if Michelangelo had intact functional information
but poor perceptual information for all categories, he
would be able to score more highly with objects compared
to the other two categories, as Sartori and Job observed.
Stronger evidence for the idea that the structural descrip-
tion system is categorically organised would be reports of
patients who have impairments to the structural descrip-
tion system that selectively affect nonliving things; this pat-
tern remains to be documented.
More recently, Sartori et al. (1993) have used Marr’s
(1982) model of visual object recognition to account for cat-
egory-specific deficits for living things. According to this
model, structural descriptions of objects are represented in
a hierarchical form. At the top of the hierarchy, descriptions
correspond to general category exemplars, with the de-
scriptions becoming increasingly detailed further down the
hierarchy, eventually distinguishing items at a subordinate
level. Sartori et al. suggested that patients with category-
specific impairments for living things may have problems
accessing the lowest (most detailed) levels of these struc-
tural hierarchies, and argued that living things were most
affected because they have “deeper” representations than
nonliving things. Note that this idea is similar to the view
outlined by Humphreys et al. (1988), who also argued that
living things require more fine-grained or “deeper” process-
ing at the level of structural descriptions. For Humphreys
et al. (1988), “deeper” processing is an emergent conse-
quence of overlap between the structural descriptions of
stimuli.
3.3. Shape processing differences across categories
The Cascade model emphasizes the importance of percep-
tual overlap between exemplars within a category as a fac-
tor that can lead to processing differences between living
and nonliving things. However, the approach suffers from
a failure to specify in detail the nature of the perceptual
overlap that may be critical. Attempts to overcome this have
been made by Arguin, Bub, and colleagues (e.g., Arguin et
al. 1996; Dixon et al. 1997). They used computer generated
stimuli, derived from variations in elongation, tapering, and
bending, to resemble real objects. For example, a banana
can be described as having positive values on elongation
and bending, but a zero value on tapering; an orange would
have zero values on all of these dimensions. Arguin et al. re-
ported data from a patient, ELM, who showed a category-
specific deficit for living things. One task involved presen-
tation of four shapes, one in each quadrant of a display,
followed by presentation of one of the shapes at the centre.
ELM had to point to which of the four locations had been
occupied by the subsequent target. When the items on a
trial differed along a single dimension the patient per-
formed significantly better (29% errors) than when the
items varied along two dimensions simultaneously in the
conjunction condition (57% errors). Arguin et al. proposed
that ELM failed to extract information from two visual di-
mensions simultaneously, and tended instead to attend to
just one dimension (so performing better when stimuli only
varied along a single dimension).
Arguin et al. went on to show that this deficit in extract-
ing multiple visual dimensions combined with effects of se-
mantic similarity between items. ELM was required to la-
bel the same shapes either as particular fruit and vegetables
or (in another block) as nonliving things. With the semanti-
cally close living things, ELM again performed worse in a
conjunction condition relative to a single dimension condi-
tion. However, with a set of unrelated nonliving things,
there was no difference between performance with con-
junction and single feature sets. The deficit for learning
conjunction stimuli paired with semantically close living
items also generalized to faces (see Dixon et al. 1998). Ar-
guin et al. argued that visual processing deficits, concerned
with whether patients can extract several visual dimensions
simultaneously, can combine with semantic similarity be-
tween items to create problems in identifying particular ob-
jects. To link these problems to a deficit with previously
known living things, we must assume that living things,
more than nonliving things, share both semantic and visual
features; in addition, the visual features of living things may
also vary along more than one dimension simultaneously.
Support for this first assumption comes from data on nor-
mal picture naming under deadline conditions. Normal
subjects make a greater range of errors that are both se-
mantically and visually related to targets for living things
than for nonliving things (Vitkovitch et al. 1993). Greater
overlap in access to semantic as well as visual representa-
tions is also supposed by accounts that point out the im-
portance of correlated perceptual features for living things
(Gonnerman et al. 1997; Moss et al. 1998).
These results on learning feature and conjunction stim-
uli indicate that differential performance can be evoked
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with the same set of shapes, according to whether the
shapes map onto semantically close or distant representa-
tions. It is also possible that contrasts in visual similarity
within a set of items also contribute to performance differ-
ences, since the semantically close sets used are also very
often perceptually similar (e.g., Dixon et al. 1998 showed a
deficit for ELM when learning an association between con-
junction stimuli and labels for different makes of car – non-
living things within a perceptually close sub-ordinate cate-
gory). However, it remains an open question whether data
derived from a small set of shapes, and tasks that require
new learning rather than the retrieval of previously learned
information, can be generalised to account for deficits
across the broader class of living things. It may be that,
within this broad class, perceptual overlap (as well as co-
variance along multiple dimensions) combines with seman-
tic similarity to create particular problems in identification.
3.4. Visual processing deficits without 
loss of stored knowledge
As we will document in sections 4 and 6, many patients with
category-specific deficits seem to have impairments of
stored knowledge, with impaired access to associative and
functional (sect. 4) or perceptual knowledge (sect. 6) for the
affected items. However, category-specific deficits have
also been reported in patients for whom there is no appar-
ent loss of stored knowledge. For example, HJA is an ag-
nosic patient with severe difficulty in recognising many vi-
sually presented objects. The deficit is worse for living than
for nonliving things, even when these items are matched for
name frequency, familiarity, and visual complexity (Rid-
doch & Humphreys 1987b; Riddoch et al. 1999). Never-
theless, when initially tested HJA showed good stored
knowledge for living things, being able to provide detailed
definitions and drawings from memory. The only clear
problem in stored knowledge occurred when he was asked
to retrieve colour information, though this deficit occurred
for both living and nonliving things. In his case, it is diffi-
cult to attribute the category specific recognition deficit to
loss of stored perceptual or functional features; rather it ap-
pears to reflect a problem in differentiating between items
that have many close perceptual neighbours (i.e., living
things relative to nonliving things). This hypothesis fits with
the variety of other visual perceptual impairments in this
patient (Riddoch & Humphreys 1987b).
Interestingly, when retested some 16 years after the
stroke that generated the recognition problems, HJA
showed some deterioration in his stored knowledge for the
perceptual properties of objects. His drawings from mem-
ory were more difficult for independent observers to iden-
tify and his definitions listed fewer visual attributes; the de-
crease in the number of visual attributes listed was more
marked for living than for nonliving things (Riddoch et al.
1999). However, there was no general decrease in HJA’s
performance; he produced more non-visual attributes in his
definitions when retested. These data suggest that on-line
visual processes interact with memory processes to main-
tain stored representations of the visual features of objects.
Over the longer term, a visual processing deficit leads to
some degradation of these memory representations. This
may affect representations of living things more because
representations of visual attributes need to remain finely
tuned to differentiate between these (perceptually similar)
items and/or because visual attributes are strongly weighted
in our stored representations of living things (sect. 2).
Changes due to learning over time may also explain dis-
crepancies in the performance of one of the first patients re-
ported with category-specific deficits by Warrington and
Shallice (1984). In the original study, patient JBR did not
show a consistent pattern of deficit across modalities for
items probed with pictures and with words, though he was
consistently impaired on particular items within each modal-
ity. This result has implications for the issue of modality-
specific representation of stored knowledge, which we re-
turn to in section 6.6. Funnell and de Mornay Davies (1996),
however, found that JBR did show consistency across modal-
ities when re-tested some years later. Here learning may have
helped him re-establish links for certain items, though there
was not a general learning effect as he remained consistently
impaired on some items across modalities.
Several other studies, though, cast doubt on the neces-
sary relationship between impaired visual and/or structural
processing and category-specific deficits. For example,
Humphreys and Rumiati (1998) reported data from a pa-
tient with suspected Alzheimer’s disease, whose problem
seemed to reside in poor perceptual knowledge for objects.
Though this patient performed well at perceptual match
tasks, she was impaired at object decision and on tasks re-
quiring that objects be matched associatively. She also
made visual naming errors when objects were misidenti-
fied. Despite this, there was no evidence of a category-
specific deficit between living and nonliving things. Lam-
bon Ralph et al. (1998) also documented a patient with poor
ability to match objects to definitions stressing visual as op-
posed to functional properties of objects; in addition there
was impoverished production of perceptual features in her
own definitions. Lambon Ralph et al. found trends for these
problems with perceptual information to be worse for non-
living than for living things. Naming also tended to be worse
for artefacts. This patient did show good performance on
object decision, though, suggesting that there was a prob-
lem in interrogating perceptual knowledge from verbal in-
put rather than there being an impairment of perceptual
knowledge per se. Hart and Gordon (1992) too reported a
case with poor retrieval of perceptual knowledge from
names, along with good access from vision, though here the
problem was more pronounced for living things.
The contrast between patients who show a deficit for liv-
ing things due to impaired perceptual/structural knowl-
edge, and those who do not, may be due to differences in
the information the patients can draw upon to support per-
formance. The patient of Humphreys and Rumiati, for in-
stance, showed a priming effect on object naming when
presented with multiple stimuli from the same category.
This is consistent with partial activation of associative
knowledge which could boost impaired visual identifica-
tion when stimuli are presented in an appropriate context.
Humphreys and Rumiati proposed that structural descrip-
tions were activated below threshold level unless activation
was increased top-down from members of the same cate-
gory. For patients able to use such top-down activation, liv-
ing things may benefit owing to their inter-correlated com-
mon features; for some patients there may even be
relatively strong category activation when single objects are
presented, reducing any advantage for nonliving things.
Could this also lead to a reverse effect, with nonliving items
being the more difficult? Lambon Ralph et al. in fact re-
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ported a perceptual deficit along with poor matching and
production of definitions for nonliving things. In evaluating
this, though, it should be borne in mind that, in studies
measuring control performance, perceptual definitions of
nonliving things are often harder to identify than percep-
tual definitions of living things (see Humphreys et al. 1997).
This may be expected if perceptual information is weighted
less strongly than functional (e.g., action-related) infor-
mation in the stored representations of such stimuli. A pa-
tient may perform relatively worse on tests of this kind with
nonliving things, then, owing to a general rather than a 
category-specific decrease in their performance. A test such
as drawing from memory, where detailed perceptual infor-
mation must be retrieved, may enable an impairment with
living things to be detected (as indeed was reported by Hart
& Gordon 1992).
One other possibility, not tested to date, is that differ-
ences between the recognition of living and nonliving
things could reflect the ease with which patients can use
particular perceptual representations. For example, the ag-
nosic patient HJA has a perceptual deficit which still allows
him to derive global shape descriptions, but these repre-
sentations are not elaborated with local perceptual detail
(e.g., see Boucart & Humphreys 1992; Humphreys et al.
1985). Global shape information overlaps across many liv-
ing things, so that a patient using unelaborated global rep-
resentations may tend to find these objects especially diffi-
cult to identify. Other patients, however, may extract more
local detail about the parts of objects and not about the
global shape. The parts of nonliving things can have a func-
tional role in their own right (e.g., a wheel of a bicycle), and
a patient using local details with such stimuli may some-
times identify such parts as if they are the whole object: a
problem we have observed in patients with simultanag-
nosia. This tendency to identify parts as wholes may be re-
duced for living things, because either their parts are not
functional in their own right or they are diagnostic of the
whole (e.g., an animal’s head). Patients who “weight” parts
more than wholes may find identification more difficult for
nonliving than for living things.
As a final point, we note that the prediction, that im-
paired structural knowledge should necessarily disrupt liv-
ing things more than nonliving things, turns out not to be
straightforward – even not taking into account the distinc-
tion between global and local object coding. In simula-
tions of the HIT model, we have found that the form of 
lesioning itself is critical for predicting whether a category-
specific deficit emerges for living things after damage to
“early” stages of the model. We return to this point in sec-
tion 6.
3.5. Conclusions
The research reported in this section highlights the impor-
tance of visual factors, such as perceptual overlap and co-
variance in multiple visual dimensions, for at least some as-
pects of category specific identification impairments. These
visual factors may interact with stored representations of vi-
sual features (e.g., overlap within a structural description
system) and with the semantic retrieval process, to make
identification difficult for living things. According to the
Cascade model, the combined visual and semantic effects
can lead to identification deficits when lesions affect differ-
ent levels in the object recognition system (access to struc-
tural descriptions, access to associative and functional
knowledge, and access to object names; Humphreys et al.
1995). Visual deficits seem sufficient to produce “category
specific” impairments, but, at the same time, they may not
be necessary.
4. Category-specific knowledge
In sections 2 and 3, we have discussed evidence suggesting
that category-specific deficits reflect factors other than the
categorical nature of our stored knowledge (such as the im-
portance of visual or functional information for represent-
ing different categories, or differences in perceptual and se-
mantic overlap between categories). However, the most
straightforward account of such deficits is that they arise
because our stored knowledge is differentiated according to
category of object. We have reviewed Sartori and Job’s
(1988) claim that stored visual/perceptual knowledge
within the structural description system may be categori-
cally organised, and, although we concluded that there was
(currently) little empirical support for this idea, we have not
discussed the possibility that other types of knowledge are
categorically organised. According to the Cascade model,
visual/perceptual knowledge in the structural description
system is functionally independent of other types of se-
mantic information (e.g., functional information or inter-
object associations) and it is possible that this nonpercep-
tual knowledge is categorically organised. We now review
this hypothesis in more detail, asking whether this proposal
is necessary to account for at least some forms of category-
specific disorders.
4.1. Category-specific impairments for nonliving things
One argument for semantic knowledge being categorically
organised is that some patients can have deficits for nonliv-
ing things rather than living things. Nielsen (1946) first re-
ported this in a patient, CHC, who was able to recognise liv-
ing things, such as faces and flowers, but not nonliving
things, such as a car, a hat, or a telephone. More recently,
Warrington and McCarthy (1983; 1987; 1994) outlined
three case studies of patients who had particular problems
recognizing nonliving things. These patients performed sig-
nificantly better with living things compared to nonliving
things on matching to sample tasks. For example, in spoken
word/picture matching, patient VER was better with flow-
ers (93%) and animals (86%) compared to nonliving objects
(63%) (Warrington & McCarthy 1983); patient YOT was
better with animals (86%) and flowers (86%) compared to
nonliving objects (67%) (Warrington & McCarthy 1987);
patient DRS was better with animals (95%) compared to
nonliving objects (74%) (Warrington & McCarthy 1994).
Sacchett and Humphreys (1992) further demonstrated that
category-specific impairments for nonliving things can re-
main when confounding variables such as frequency and fa-
miliarity are controlled. Their patient, CW, was significantly
better at naming line drawings and at performing picture-
word matching tasks for living things (despite the fact that
they were less familiar, more visually complex and matched
on frequency to the nonliving things). Quite similar data
were reported by Hillis and Caramazza (1991), who showed
a double dissociation between naming living and nonliving
things using the same set of items with two patients. Silveri
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et al. (1997) also report data from a patient impaired at
naming nonliving things using the same stimuli as had been
used to elicit a deficit for living things in patient Michelan-
gelo, reported by Sartori and Job (1988). Such double dis-
sociations are consistent with a fractionation of semantic
knowledge between that required for the identification of
living things and that for the identification of nonliving
things.
However, other accounts can be offered for the deficits
with nonliving things. Warrington and McCarthy (1987),
for example, suggested that impairments could occur at a
finer-grained level than the living/nonliving dichotomy.
The patient documented in their paper, YOT, was particu-
larly poor at spoken word/written word matching for 
“small manipulable objects” (e.g., office utensils). They sug-
gested that this was consistent with the view that particular
forms of knowledge are needed for (or are differentially
“weighted” for) the identification of different objects (see
sect. 2). For instance, small manipulable objects might be
adversely affected if these items depend on the retrieval of
motor memories for their identification and if brain regions
supporting these memories were damaged. To account for
finer-grained deficits of this sort, we may need to make
more than a dichotomous distinction between sensory and
“functional” knowledge (cf. Farah & McClelland 1991;
Warrington & Shallice 1984). Different forms of both sen-
sory and functional knowledge need to be separated. Fur-
thermore, the “functional” knowledge used in the recogni-
tion of living things (e.g., as actors) may differ from that
used in the recognition of nonliving things (as instruments).
Now, although it seems intuitively plausible that func-
tional information plays an important role in the identifica-
tion of nonliving things, there has been surprisingly little
behavioural data on the topic (though see sect. 5.1 for cor-
relatory evidence from functional imaging studies). Some
direct empirical support comes from Humphreys and Rid-
doch (1999). They examined a child, JS, with learning dif-
ficulties due to a genetic abnormality and birth trauma. JS
was presented with pictures of artefacts along with either a
contextual scene or with an action (mimed by the experi-
menter). In the scene condition JS was told that “this is an
‘n’ and you find it in an ‘m’” (e.g., “this is a glass and you find
it on a table,” where the glass was shown alongside a pic-
tured table with a place setting). In the action condition she
was told “this is an ‘n’ and you do this with it” (“this” being
shown by the mime). JS was asked to repeat the object’s
name, and then the next learning trial began. Subsequently
she was presented with the individual objects in isolation
and asked to recall the names. Performance was better af-
ter learning with the actions than the contexts. The finding
is of some interest because it suggests that pairing an arte-
fact with an action is useful in establishing a stable link be-
tween the object and its name. Interesting: JS was better 
at naming nonliving things relative to living things. Hum-
phreys and Riddoch proposed that nonliving things might
benefit from having object-specific action pairings, which
can help name retrieval. In contrast, the actions performed
by living things will tend to be more similar and hence less
useful in supporting naming of the individual stimulus.
Note also that the actions performed by living things are
also different in kind from the actions performed on non-
living things. This also may be important for learning in
such a child.
Most studies of patients with deficits for nonliving things
have not clearly defined the stage in the recognition and
naming process at which the deficit might occur, using tasks
designed to “tap” structural, functional/associative (seman-
tic) or name knowledge. The patient reported by Cappa et
al. (1998), however, showed no effect of category when an-
swering probe questions, and they suggest that the problem
was in name retrieval for nonliving things. Other patients,
though, have shown a deficit in discriminating between
nonliving targets and semantic distractors (e.g., Sacchett &
Humphreys 1992), which is more suggestive of a deficit in
accessing associative knowledge. It may be, as with deficits
for living things, that we will need to account for impair-
ments arising at different levels of the object processing 
system.
4.2. Impaired functional knowledge for living things
Accounts that stress the importance of forms of functional
knowledge only for nonliving things have some difficulty
with the finding that some patients show impaired retrieval
of functional as well as visual/perceptual information about
living things. In contrast, the same patients may demon-
strate reasonably good functional knowledge about nonliv-
ing things (Caramazza & Shelton 1998; Funnell & de Mor-
nay Davies 1996; Laiacona et al. 1993; Samson et al. 1998;
Sheridan & Humphreys 1993). If functional knowledge is
differentially important for identifying artefacts, then loss
of this knowledge ought to lead to poor identification of
these items. Clearly this is not necessarily the case. The data
can be accommodated, though, by the idea of categorically
organised stored knowledge. For example, Caramazza and
Shelton interpreted the above pattern of data in terms of
there being separate semantic representations for living
and nonliving things, so that damage to the representations
for living things leads to poor retrieval of both stored per-
ceptual and functional knowledge for these stimuli. Cara-
mazza and Shelton (1998) suggested that this separation of
knowledge for living and nonliving things reflects evolu-
tionary pressures that highlight the importance of the cate-
gories animal, plant life, and artefact. They argued that, be-
cause of evolutionary gains in distinguishing between these
three types of object, categories for animals, plants, and
artefacts form the basis for the organisation of conceptual
knowledge. “The evolutionary adaptations for recognising
animals and plant life would provide the skeletal neural
structures around which to organise the rich perceptual,
conceptual, and linguistic knowledge modern humans have
of these categories.”
This view, that stored knowledge is organised by these
three basic categories, can account for some of the finer-
grained dissociations found between patients showing cat-
egory specific deficits. For instance, whilst some patients
seem particularly poor with fruits and vegetables (Farah &
Wallace 1992; Forde et al. 1997; Hart et al. 1985), others
have been reported with deficits only for animals and not
for fruit and vegetables (Caramazza & Shelton 1998; Hart
& Gordon 1992). This would be expected if knowledge
about animals and plant life is functionally (and anatomi-
cally) separate. For accounts that do not assume that stored
knowledge is categorically organised, such finer-grained
impairments could be attributed to the use of particular
forms of knowledge to identify particular objects; perhaps
shape information is more important for animals and colour
or texture for fruit and vegetables. Loss of information
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about shape or colour knowledge might selectively impair
recognition of animals or fruit/vegetables, respectively (see
sect. 4.1 above).
Consistent with Caramazza and Shelton’s hypothesis,
Keil (1987) has argued that the underlying conceptual
structures for living and nonliving things are qualitatively
different, and will be affected in qualitatively different
ways by the transformations that can be applied to them.
Keil used the example of a chair that has its back sawn off
and an extra leg glued on – most people would agree that
it has become a stool rather than a chair. However, dyeing
a dog’s fur red, making its tail bushier, and allowing it to live
in the wild, will not change it from a dog into a fox. By
changing the salient perceptual and action-related features
of nonliving things we can alter identities; the same does
not apply for living things. When asked to justify why, for
example, the dog did not become a fox, participants stated
that it was because the internal organs (or DNA) would re-
main the same (although they could not state how the in-
ternal organs of foxes and dogs differ). Keil proposed that
“rather it is a belief in biological essence that seems to grow
out of a naïve theory of natural kinds that is driving their in-
tuitions.”
The argument for knowledge being organised along cat-
egorical lines has been given further support by studies of
semantic development in children.3 S. Gelman (1988) re-
ported that four-year-olds can explicitly state whether ob-
jects are made by people or not (see also S. Gelman & Kre-
mer 1991), and a number of studies have demonstrated that
preschoolers (again, around four years old) have a relatively
sophisticated understanding of the differences between liv-
ing and nonliving things. For example, R. Gelman and Meck
(R. Gelman 1990) asked children to describe what was on
the inside and outside of animate and inanimate objects.
The insides and outsides of animate things were described
in different ways, whilst the insides and outsides of inani-
mate objects were described in the same way. R. Gelman
(1990) argued that these results highlight children’s tenden-
cies to generalise properties across examplars of animate ob-
jects, but not across the animate-inanimate boundary, and
proposed that knowledge about animate and inanimate ob-
jects was domain-specific and governed by contrasting un-
derlying rules.
A similar argument comes from the work of Massey and
R. Gelman (1988). They presented children with colored
photographs of novel examples of mammals, nonmam-
malian animals, rigid complex artefacts, wheeled objects
and statues that had animal-like parts, and asked them
which items were capable of going up a hill by themselves.
Three- and four-year-olds chose the animals, and rejected
the artifacts with animal-like parts. This indicates an ability
to use the appropriate visual-perceptual properties present
in the novel objects to decide whether or not the object was
capable of self-initiated movement. R. Gelman (1990) ar-
gued that this ability to distinguish between objects that can
and cannot move on their own is the basis for the develop-
ment of the conceptual distinction between animate and
inanimate objects.
However, a number of other studies have indicated that
the animate/inanimate distinction is acquired even earlier
in infancy (Mandler & McDonough 1996; Poulin-Dubois et
al. 1995; Smith 1989). Smith (1989) presented 12-month-
old infants with pictures of nonobjects that were made from
combining parts of animals (to make “living nonobjects”) or
artefacts (to make “nonliving nonobjects”), and, using a ha-
bituation paradigm, demonstrated that the children could
distinguish between the “living” and “nonliving” things.
Mandler et al. (1991) further showed that 18-month-old in-
fants could make distinctions at an even more fine-grained
level, separating animals, plants, and nonliving things. In-
deed, even within the domain of nonliving things the infants
could apparently distinguish furniture from kitchen uten-
sils, though they could not separate tools and musical in-
struments. These studies suggest that infants are able to
make judgments about global categories very early, perhaps
even before they can categorise objects at a basic level (e.g.,
a chair as opposed to furniture). Mandler et al. (1991)
posited that infants do not use physical similarity when
forming categories but rely instead on more abstract prop-
erties, such as movement patterns and origin of movement
(self generated or extrinsic), which are associated with each
category (see also R. Gelman 1990; Mandler 1992). Con-
sistent with this, Mandler and McDonough (1996) found
that 14-month-old infants generalised their responses to ac-
tions between living things, but not to nonliving things (and
vice versa). When shown a dog drinking, the infants were
willing to make a rabbit drink but not a motorcycle. When
shown a car being started with a key they were willing to
start a truck with a key but not a fish.
These findings suggest that even young infants can dis-
tinguish between different categories, lending support to
the idea that there is a predisposition to differentiate be-
tween living and nonliving things. Furthermore, if living
and nonliving things do come to belong to different knowl-
edge domains, perhaps represented in different neural ar-
eas, then we would expect category-specific patterns of im-
pairment after brain damage.
4.3. Some problems
The proposal that our semantic knowledge is categorically
organised has primarily been driven by reports of patients
who have category specific impairments accessing visual
and functional information about living things, with no con-
comitant problems with nonliving things. However, these
patients are only problematic for accounts stressing the im-
portance of visual/perceptual knowledge for living things,
and functional knowledge for nonliving things, if the func-
tional knowledge evaluated is the same for both categories.
But, as we have already noted, the term “functional” knowl-
edge has been used in neuropsychological studies to refer
to all kinds of nonsensory information and does not always
refer strictly to the function (or use) of the object. Typically
“functional” knowledge for nonliving things refers to object
usage and motor activity on the part of the actor; in contrast,
“functional” knowledge for living things includes biological
functions (e.g., eating), the context in which animals are
found, the sounds animals make, and so forth. Hence the
“functional” knowledge that can be impaired in patients
with impairments for living things is not the same as the
“functional” knowledge about nonliving things that can be
spared. Until there have been reports of patients with cat-
egory specific problems in accessing visual and functional
knowledge when the type of information is matched across
categories, there is no empirical reason to abandon an ac-
count which stresses the importance of different types of in-
formation for different categories. Furthermore, we sug-
gest that accounts stressing the importance of different
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types of knowledge for different categories can in fact ac-
count for patients who have category specific impairments
accessing all kinds of semantic knowledge (i.e., “functional”
as well as visual/perceptual). Let us suppose that living
things are represented primarily in terms of visual and sen-
sory features. Now, if these important (perhaps even defin-
ing) visual/sensory features are impaired, then patients may
not have enough information to differentiate one exemplar
from another. For example, if a patient does not know that
a giraffe has a long neck, he does not really know what a gi-
raffe is, and therefore could not answer a question tapping
“functional” knowledge, such as “Does a giraffe eat meat or
leaves?” This hypothesis has been supported by recent neu-
roimaging studies, which show that modality-specific areas
associated with the processing of form are activated when
subjects answer verbally presented questions about the vi-
sual and functional/categorical properties of living things
(Chao et al. 1999; Thompson-Schill et al. 1999; see sect. 5).
It appears that perceptual knowledge of form is fundamen-
tally important for our stored representations of living
things. “Knowing” what a living thing is, and being able to
answer all kinds of questions about it, depends heavily on
being able to access this stored perceptual information. In
contrast, activation in cortical areas associated with form
processing is not enhanced when subjects answer questions
about the functional/categorical properties of nonliving
things. This is consistent with the idea that the important
contrasts, or defining attributes, are visual/perceptual for
living things but not necessarily for nonliving things. Chao
et al. (1999) in fact report increased activation in the mid-
dle temporal gyrus for tools (relative to animals) when cat-
egorical information must be retrieved. They point out that
this region borders areas known to be specialised for pro-
cessing motion (area V5), suggesting that information about
motion when tools are used plays an important role in their
categorisation.
We also suggest that the developmental research is con-
sistent with the idea that different types of knowledge are
important for different categories. Indeed, R. Gelman
(1990) argued that children learn to differentiate between
animals and non-animals on the basis of the different move-
ment patterns shown by these categories. Furthermore, the
categorical account of stored knowledge does not distin-
guish between different types of learned representation (vi-
sual/perceptual and semantic/functional, etc.), and conse-
quently, has difficulty explaining why visual processing
disturbances can be linked to poor identification and loss of
stored knowledge for living things (sect. 3). Also, the ac-
count has difficulties in accommodating cases where func-
tional knowledge for living things appears to be intact and
the deficit is only for the visual properties of these objects
(Hart & Gordon 1992; Riddoch & Humphreys 1993). In
section 6, we outline the HIT account, that allows these dif-
ferent lines of evidence to be integrated.
5. Anatomical considerations
5.1. Brain imaging studies
A number of recent studies have attempted to assess
whether living and nonliving things are stored in anatomi-
cally separate brain regions, using functional imaging tech-
niques. Martin et al. (1996) used positron emission topog-
raphy (PET) to compare the brain regions that were active
when subjects named living (animals) and nonliving (tools)
things. When they subtracted the regions activated when
subjects were naming tools from the areas activated when
subjects were naming animals, they found that naming an-
imals selectively activated the left medial occipital lobe and
inferior temporal regions. When they reversed the subtrac-
tion (i.e., areas active when naming tools minus areas active
when naming animals) they found that naming tools selec-
tively activated the left middle temporal gyrus and the left
premotor region. Interestingly, the areas selectively acti-
vated when subjects were naming tools were very similar to
those activated when subjects named actions associated
with objects (Martin et al. 1995) or when they imagined
grasping objects (Decety et al. 1994). This is consistent with
the idea that activating information about object use and
the associated motor action is important for naming tools.
In contrast, the activation of stored visual information,
within the left medial occipital and inferior temporal cor-
tex, may be more prolonged and important for the identifi-
cation of living things. Again, this idea is supported by con-
verging PET data indicating that similar areas are activated
when subjects retrieve stored colours associated with ob-
jects (Martin et al. 1995). The results support the notion
that different brain regions mediate the identification of liv-
ing and nonliving things. Furthermore, since converging
evidence can indicate the functional roles of the different
brain regions, the results highlight the importance of par-
ticular domains of knowledge for certain objects (respec-
tively visual and action-related, functional knowledge for
living and nonliving things).
Quite similar results to those reported by Martin et al.
(1996) were found by Perani et al. (1995), using a task in
which pairs of objects had to be matched according to
whether they had the same base-level names (e.g., a tennet
and a hacksaw). Damasio et al. (1996), like Martin et al.
(1996), examined functional activation in an object naming
task, but focused on activation within regions of the tem-
poral lobe. They found that naming animals resulted in ac-
tivation of the left inferotemporal region (more anterior to
regions highlighted by Martin et al. 1996) whilst the nam-
ing of tools led to activation of posterior middle and infe-
rior temporal gyri.
It is not clear whether some of the reported anatomical
differences reflect variations in scanning procedures or in
the task requirements; nevertheless, the data highlight the
importance of the inferior temporal lobe for naming ani-
mals and the left, inferior frontal and posterior middle tem-
poral regions for naming tools. There may, in addition, be
selective involvement of the left medial occipital area in an-
imal identification.
One problem with these PET studies is that the stimuli
have tended not to be matched across the categories. Dif-
ferences in the activations found with animals and tools,
then, may be due to the contrasting types of knowledge in-
voked by these stimuli or differences in stimulus com-
plexity or familiarity. Stronger activation of posterior visual 
processing areas (e.g., in medial occipital cortex) may be
found with animals because they are visually more com-
plex. Moore and Price (1999) attempted to assess this by
comparing PET activations in naming and picture-word
matching tasks with visually complex animals, visually sim-
pler fruit/vegetables, visually complex (multi-component)
nonliving things (vehicles, appliances) and visually simpler 
(single-component) nonliving things (tools, utensils). They
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found increased activation in the right medial extra-striate
and occipito-temporal areas for multi-component relative
to single-component items, and particularly for animals
relative to the other categories they examined. This sug-
gests that these posterior brain regions are implicated in
the processing of more complex visual configurations, with
animals being particularly dependent on activation here.
In addition, living things (animals and fruits and vegeta-
bles) were associated with activation of the left anterior
temporal cortex and nonliving things with activation of the
left posterior middle temporal cortex (see also Damasio et
al. 1996; Martin et al. 1996). These results suggest that, in-
stead of thinking of there being one area specialised for
processing living things, and one for nonliving things,
there are rather multiple areas, implicated in processing
and retrieving different forms of knowledge for the par-
ticular stimuli. For example, for living things, areas sup-
porting both visual processing and the retrieval of associa-
tive knowledge may be important. Thus extra-striate areas
are sensitive to visual complexity, and they are also impli-
cated in the processing of animals, consistent with there
being a strong mediating role of visual knowledge in the
identification of these stimuli. Activation of the anterior
temporal cortex for living things, similar to that reported
by Damasio et al. (1996), may instead link visual process-
ing to the retrieval of stored associative knowledge. This
fits with lesion data from a patient (reported by Breedin et
al. 1994) who suffered profound atrophy of the anterior,
inferior temporal cortices whilst leaving more posterior ar-
eas of temporal cortex intact. This patient had only a mild
deficit on object decision tests designed to assess access to
stored structural knowledge, and he showed strong per-
ceptual priming (Srinivas et al. 1997), along with poor
judgments based on semantic relatedness between ob-
jects. His performance was also worse with living than
nonliving things. For accounts such as the Cascade model
(sect. 3.1), living things should generate stronger associa-
tive as well as perceptual competition between stimuli, re-
quiring prolonged differentiation at both perceptual and
associative levels, as indicated by different sites of activa-
tion in functional imaging studies and effects of brain le-
sions at contrasting sites.
To link data on functional imaging to models in a more
precise way, we need to establish the brain sites implicated
at different stages of object processing. Price et al. (1996),
for example, assessed whether there were particular brain
regions linked to object naming as opposed to object recog-
nition (referring here to access to stored structural knowl-
edge). They had subjects perform four tasks: (1) name
(coloured) objects, (2) name the colour of nonobjects
(matched to the object for complexity), (3) say “yes” to the
coloured objects (the object baseline), and (4) say “yes” to
the coloured nonobjects (the nonobject baseline). They as-
sumed that objects gain automatic access to structural in-
formation (cf. Glaser 1994), and argued that the contrast
between the two baseline conditions (with objects and
nonobjects) can reveal areas involved in object recognition
(activated by objects but not by equally complex nonob-
jects). The brain regions mediating name retrieval may be
indicated by the contrasts between the two naming condi-
tions (conditions 1 and 2) relative to the two baselines (be-
cause both the naming tasks required retrieval of a stored
phonological label associated with the visual stimulus). Of
most relevance here, though, is the interaction given by the
contrast between the object naming condition and its base-
line (conditions 1 minus 3) relative to the contrast between
the nonobject colour naming condition and its baseline
(conditions 2 minus 4). This interaction indicates areas as-
sociated specifically with retrieving the names of known ob-
jects from vision. Price et al. found that the interaction was
linked to selective activation of the left inferior and poste-
rior temporal lobe. This study suggests that this region is
particularly involved in name retrieval for known objects,
and it is more activated in name retrieval than in object
recognition alone. The same area has also been found to be
activated more by animals than by tools (Martin et al. 1996;
Perani et al. 1995). If such inferior and posterior temporal
regions are linked to the involvement of stored visual
knowledge in processing, the data suggest that this knowl-
edge is recruited particularly when name retrieval is in-
volved. The conclusion that follows from this, even in on-
line tasks, is that knowledge sources may be activated to
different degrees, in a top-down manner (e.g., for naming,
but not for recognition). We return to this in our formula-
tion of the HIT account.
Studies using fMRI have added extra information by dif-
ferentiating further between regions within the posterior
temporal cortex and by contrasting activation from objects
with that found when the same knowledge is addressed
from verbal questions. Thompson-Schill et al. (1999) pro-
posed that stored visual knowledge was not only activated
when subjects were asked to name living things, and to an-
swer questions concerning their visual attributes, but also
when asked to answer questions about non-visual informa-
tion (e.g., Are pandas found in China? Are snails edible?).
In contrast, they argued that it was not necessary to access
stored visual information when functional questions were
asked about nonliving things. In their study, subjects were
asked yes-no questions about the visual and functional
properties of living and nonliving things, and fMRI was
used to assess whether the left ventral occipito-temporal
cortex (particularly the fusiform gyrus) was activated in
each condition, relative to a baseline condition in which
nonsense auditory stimuli were presented. The left ventral
occipito-temporal cortex was chosen as the area of interest
because previous studies have shown that it is involved in
representing the visual properties of objects (D’Esposito et
al. 1997; Martin et al. 1995). Thompson-Schill et al. found
that there was a significant interaction between category
(living vs. nonliving) and type of question (visual vs. func-
tional) in the pattern of activity in the fusiform gyrus (as-
sumed to be involved in representing modality-specific vi-
sual/perceptual information). In particular, they found that,
while this area was only activated by the visual questions for
nonliving things, it was activated by both the visual and
functional questions for living things. Chao et al. (1999)
likewise report a remarkable overlap of areas in the lateral
fusiform gyrus activated by animals both in an object nam-
ing task and in a task requiring both naming and the re-
trieval of meaning from words (e.g., to answer the question,
“forest animal?” To the word “deer”). They found similar
overlap across tasks for tools, but in different areas – the
middle fusiform gyrus and middle temporal gyrus.4 These
results point to common regions being activated from dif-
ferent modalities. The regions implicated in the study of
Chao et al. have, in other experiments, been linked to the
processing of form (in the lateral fusiform gyrus) and the
processing of motion (in middle fusiform and temporal ar-
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eas) (see Bonda et al. 1996; Ungerleider & Haxby 1994).
Hence the findings are consistent with specific forms of
knowledge being drawn on to different degrees when ac-
cessing stored knowledge about living and nonliving things,
and that these forms of knowledge are organised respec-
tively around sensory and motor processes. It also fits with
this argument that areas of the left inferior frontal cortex,
when scanned, have been shown to be activated more by
nonliving than living things (and typically the nonliving
things have been tools). From other imaging studies it ap-
pears that left inferior frontal cortex is implicated in the re-
trieval of knowledge about actions, and it is activated when
subjects must name actions associated with tools as well as
when they name the tools themselves (Grabowski et al.
1998; Grafton et al. 1997; Martin et al. 1995). Chao et al.
add that additional differences are apparent within the cat-
egories of living and nonliving items (e.g., between houses,
tools, and chairs), reflecting the kinds of knowledge impor-
tant in the representation of each type of stimulus (e.g.,
houses, though nonliving, are not associated with activation
of the middle temporal gyrus). We return to the implica-
tions of these data in section 6.
In summary, neuroimaging data indicate that living and
nonliving things activate different areas of cortex in identi-
fication tasks. These different areas of cortex can also be
linked to contrasting stages of identification: visual pro-
cessing and access to visual knowledge (bilateral, medial ex-
tra-striate), contrasting with access to associative (anterior
temporal), motion, and action knowledge (in left medial
temporal and fronto-parietal regions). Naming, as opposed
to recognition, also seems to involve activation of additional
visual processes, consistent with there being top-down re-
cruitment of visual knowledge for individuation of a target
object from its perceptual neighbours (particularly in left
inferior occipito-temporal regions).
These conclusions are also consistent with evidence on
category differences in event-related potentials (ERPs).
ERP studies are particularly useful for providing informa-
tion about the time course over which representations are
activated. An ERP study by Kiefer (in press) suggests that
living and nonliving stimuli generate both contrasting and
overlapping ERPs, at different times. Subjects had to
judge whether a super-ordinate category probe (presented
verbally or by means of two pictures from the chosen cat-
egory) was appropriate to a target stimulus (presented ei-
ther as a name or a picture). Kiefer found that early ERP
differences emerged for living and nonliving targets (after
about 160–200 msec), which were restricted to when pic-
torial presentations were used. These early effects are con-
sistent with there being more elaborated perceptual pro-
cessing of pictures of living things than nonliving things.
There were also differences between the categories on
later ERPs, with living and nonliving things respectively
producing a reduced N400 component over occipito-tem-
poral (bilateral) and fronto-central (left hemisphere) sites.
Other ERP studies have demonstrated differences in
fronto-central sites for N400 components associated with
action verbs versus concrete nouns (Dehaene 1995; Pul-
vermuller et al. 1996), suggesting that the fronto-central
changes are linked to the retrieval of associated action
knowledge. These differences in the later ERP component
in Kiefer’s study were found with both words and pictures
as stimuli. The late effects are consistent with living and
nonliving things drawing on contrasting forms of associa-
tive knowledge, stored in different brain regions, for both
verbal and pictorial stimuli alike.
5.2. Lesion studies
In addition to their PET data, Damasio et al. (1996) re-
ported results from group studies of patients with deficits
in naming living or nonliving things (see also Tranel et al.
1997). They found that impairments in naming animals
were associated with damage of the left inferotemporal re-
gion, and impairments in naming tools were associated with
damage to the junction of the temporal, occipital, and pari-
etal cortices. Damasio et al. (1996) argued that their data
reflected naming rather than recognition problems, since
patients were classified according to whether independent
raters could identify the object from the description pro-
duced by patients when the object could not be specifically
named. In contrast, Tranel et al. (1997) reported patients
classified by recognition impairments (after unilateral right
as well as left hemisphere damage). They reported that
recognition problems for tools were associated with dam-
age to the left occipito-temporal-parietal junction, whilst
recognition problems for animals were associated with both
left and right medial occipito-temporal lesions. The lesion
sites linked to recognition problems for animals in this last
study were more posterior to those linked to naming prob-
lems in the earlier study, though conclusions need to be
cautious. Correct identification of object descriptions by in-
dependent raters (as in Damasio et al. 1996) does not nec-
essarily indicate that the patients had intact access to se-
mantic knowledge. Also in these studies patients were
classed as showing deficits if they performed at a level of 2
standard deviations below that shown by control subjects;
however, this does not necessarily mean that the patients
were more impaired on one category of object than another,
when the categories were compared directly (see Cara-
mazza & Shelton 1998). Nevertheless, we note that the
recognition deficits associated with posterior right as well
as left hemisphere medial occipito-temporal damage link to
Moore and Price’s (1999) finding that multi-component ob-
jects (and particularly animals) strongly activate this brain
region. It may be that additional visual processing is needed
in this area to differentiate within sets of complex, struc-
turally similar objects, generating both enhanced activation
in normal subjects and deficits in recognizing animals in
brain lesioned patients. This also fits with evidence on the
category-specific deficits for living things found in the pa-
tients reported by Forde et al. (1997), Humphreys et al.
(1997), and Riddoch et al. (1999). These patients had pos-
terior occipito-temporal damage and all had particular
problems in interrogating visual knowledge about objects.
For instance, the patients were poor at object decision, at
answering definitions that stressed the visual properties of
objects, and at drawing objects from memory. These prob-
lems were more pronounced for living things than for non-
living things. Associative and functional (action related)
knowledge about both living and nonliving things was good.
More anterior temporal regions may be involved in ac-
cess to associative knowledge, necessary for name retrieval
for living things (see also Breedin et al. 1994). Consistent
with this, deficits in some patients with poor identification
of living things is linked to bilateral damage to antero-
medial parts of the temporal lobes as well as to more infe-
rior temporal regions (Gainotti et al. 1995). However, the
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degree to which the damage needs to be bilateral is unclear.
Caramazza and Shelton (1998) for example report a patient
with impaired knowledge of living things following unilat-
eral damage confined to the left hemisphere (though to
fronto-parietal regions in this case). The patients reported
by Forde et al. (1997) and Humphreys et al. (1997) also suf-
fered unilateral left hemisphere lesions (but, as noted
above, to relatively medial occipito-temporal areas). For
these patients, the deficits for living things were apparent
in naming rather than recognition tests (e.g., fruits and veg-
etables could be categorised but not named). This suggests
that left hemisphere representations are implicated partic-
ularly in naming tasks, with posterior occipito-temporal re-
gions being interrogated to differentiate targets within sets
of living things.
In contrast to the data on deficits with living things, Gain-
otti et al. (1995) conclude that deficits in recognising and
naming nonliving things occur after damage to left parietal-
frontal regions. However the data base for these patients is
somewhat limited. Silveri et al. (1997) report one such case
where an analysis using PET was conducted. They showed
hypometabolism confined to the middle temporal gyrus,
the hippocampal and parahippocampal regions, and the in-
ferior parietal lobe of the left hemisphere. In contrast,
Cappa et al.’s (1998) patient, who apparently had problems
particularly in naming nonliving things, had a unilateral le-
sion affecting the anterior left temporal lobe. Tippett et al.
(1996) similarly reported problems in naming nonliving rel-
ative to living things in patients with resections of the left
anterior temporal lobe to relieve epilepsy.
Overall, the neuropsychological data concur with the re-
sults from functional imaging studies in suggesting that
different brain regions mediate the recognition and nam-
ing of living and nonliving things. Lesions affecting inferior
occipito-temporal regions, extending anteriorly into the
temporal lobe, seem particularly to disrupt processing for
living things and lesions affecting left temporal-parietal and
also parietal-frontal areas disrupt processing for nonliving
things. There are some anomalies though, such as the left
fronto-parietal lesion linked to a deficit in living things re-
ported by Caramazza and Shelton (1998), and the data sug-
gesting that the anterior left temporal area may be involved
in naming nonliving things (Cappa et al. 1998; Tippett et al.
1996). These inconsistencies illustrate the importance of
collecting further data, across larger sets of patients each as-
sessed to provide a functional analysis of any deficit relative
to a model of object naming.
6. The hierarchical interactive theory (HIT)
The data we have reviewed have demonstrated the reality
of category-specific deficits in object naming as empirical
phenomena, with effects occurring for both living and non-
living things. The majority of accounts that have been out-
lined to explain these deficits have emphasized single fac-
tors – the categorical nature of our stored knowledge (sect.
4), the differential roles of perceptual versus functional
knowledge for living and nonliving things, respectively
(sect. 2), the importance of correlated perceptual features
or of perceptual-functional relations (sect. 2), the interac-
tion of perceptual processes with other forms of knowledge
needed for a task (sect. 3). Our interpretation of the evi-
dence is that, whilst particular deficits can be linked to each
account (so that each is sufficient to explain particular pa-
tients), no single factor account can cover all of the patients
(i.e., no one account is necessary). Instead, we propose a
framework that is powerful enough to accommodate differ-
ent patterns of deficit in contrasting patients.
6.1. Hierarchical knowledge and interactive processing
We begin by discussing the need for a hierarchical system
for object processing by outlining a model of visual object
recognition and naming, as this is the task most commonly
used to diagnose category specific impairments. We then
discuss the need for top-down (interactive) processes
within such a model. These two ideas, of a hierarchical and
interactive system, capture the essence of the HIT account.
To account for object naming, HIT adopts the architecture
of the Cascade model of object recognition, which had two
defining characteristics: a hierarchy of stored representa-
tions and the assumption that partial activation could be
transmitted between processing systems. The hierarchy of
stored representations in the Cascade model contained
three types of stored knowledge: (1) stored structural de-
scriptions, (2) stored functional and inter-object associative
information (“semantic” knowledge), and (3) name repre-
sentations. According to the model, selective damage can
occur to each form of representation, so that, for example,
a patient can have a pronounced deficit in semantic knowl-
edge (e.g., poor retrieval of associative or functional knowl-
edge about an object) without necessarily having a deficit
in stored structural knowledge. As we outline below, this is
consistent with dissociations between the performance of
different patients on tasks designed to “tap” each stage of
memory storage. Note, however, that although a hierarchy
of memory storage is assumed, processing within models of
this type does not depend on access to each memory stage
being completed before the next is initiated. Thus, as far as
processing is concerned, only a first pass of activation is hi-
erarchical. Processing, after this first pass, is not necessar-
ily hierarchical. For example, there may be a delay in ac-
cessing precise structural knowledge from an object,
though access to categorical knowledge may be completed
(see Humphreys et al. 1997).
Let us consider the neuropsychological evidence for a hi-
erarchy of memory storage. Take first the distinction be-
tween stored structural descriptions and other types of
knowledge. Evidence for this comes from patients who can
perform object decision, but who still show impaired access
to semantic information about an object. In object decision
tasks patients can be asked to discriminate between stimuli
(of equal perceptual complexity and perceptual “good-
ness”), some of which are real objects and others non-
objects created by interchanging the parts of real objects.
Because objects and nonobjects cannot be distinguished on
the basis of general perceptual information, their classifi-
cation must depend on association with stored knowledge.
Some patients can succeed at object decision whilst being
impaired at matching associatively related objects or ac-
cessing any further information about the entity (Hillis &
Caramazza 1995; Humphreys & Riddoch 1999; Riddoch &
Humphreys 1987c; Sheridan & Humphreys 1993; see also
Breedin et al. 1994). This suggests that such patients can ac-
cess structural knowledge (to distinguish objects and
nonobjects) even when access to associative knowledge is
deficient.
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Some patients with category specific deficits for living
things are poor at performing object decisions, especially
for items from the affected categories (e.g., Caramazza &
Shelton 1998; Sartori & Job 1988). However, this is not uni-
versally the case, and some patients demonstrate intact ob-
ject decision performance for affected categories (Laiacona
et al. 1997; Sheridan & Humphreys 1993). We propose that
these contrasting patients have lesions affecting different
functional stages of object processing. The former “cate-
gory specific” patients have deficits affecting visual access
to structural knowledge (in the structural description sys-
tem) in addition to any further deficits affecting functional/
associative knowledge or name retrieval. The latter “cate-
gory specific” patients do not have a deficit affecting the vi-
sual activation of structural knowledge, and their deficit re-
sides at a later processing stage.
There are other explanatory advantages in a model sep-
arating stored visual/perceptual knowledge, in the struc-
tural description system, from other types of knowledge. In
particular, such a model can account for patients who show
good knowledge of functional/associative knowledge of liv-
ing things when given their spoken name, whilst still being
impaired in naming them from vision (Forde et al. 1997;
Riddoch & Humphreys 1987c; 1993). Damage confined to
the structural description system should leave other forms
of knowledge intact, though visual naming (and access to vi-
sual knowledge in general) may be impaired. Such a model
can also help explain a pattern of deficit in which a patient
has good visual access to structural knowledge (e.g., object
decision), good auditory access to functional/associative
knowledge, but poor auditory access to structural knowl-
edge (e.g., drawing from memory). This pattern was re-
ported by Hart and Gordon (1992) and Riddoch and
Humphreys (1987c). It can be accommodated if there is a
selective impairment in mapping back from the semantic
system to the structural description system, and if the struc-
tural description system is used when long-term knowledge
of visual properties must be retrieved.
All of the above deficits can be conceptualised in terms
of hierarchical memory representations that are accessed in
a feed-forward manner, as proposed by the Cascade model
(Humphreys et al. 1988) – providing there is also off-line
interrogation of visual/perceptual knowledge in the struc-
tural description system. The latter process would be re-
quired when we are asked to retrieve perceptual knowledge
when given the name of an object. We next consider a pat-
tern of performance that suggests that, even for on-line
naming, some form of re-interrogation of structural knowl-
edge is required. This leads to our formulation of the HIT
model.
As we discussed in sections 3.1 and 5.2, some authors
have reported patients whose category specific problems
seem more pronounced on name retrieval rather than on
tests of semantic knowledge (Cappa et al. 1998; Farah &
Wallace 1992; Forde et al. 1997; Hart et al. 1985;
Humphreys et al. 1997). Nevertheless, in a detailed evalu-
ation that has been conducted on two such patients with
problems with living things, the fundamental problem ap-
peared to be in activating perceptual knowledge about ob-
jects. As we have noted, Humphreys et al. (1997) reported
two patients who were impaired at naming living things but,
on forced-choice tests, showed apparently good access to
associative and categorical knowledge about these objects
(e.g., successfully categorising fruits and vegetables). Yet,
despite this good performance on associative and categori-
cal tasks, deficits in perceptual knowledge were revealed by
tests of drawing from memory, object decision, and naming
to perceptual definitions. The apparent inconsistency be-
tween, on the one hand, the relatively good access to asso-
ciative and categorical information from vision and, on the
other, the perceptual knowledge impairment, may be ac-
counted for in at least two ways. It may reflect the ability of
patients to access partial associative and categorical knowl-
edge and to respond accurately using this information un-
der forced-choice conditions. In addition, it may reflect the
role of top-down (re-entrant) activation of perceptual
knowledge in object naming, which we discuss below.
The idea here is that, in a first pass in object processing,
there is activation of stored structural descriptions and par-
tial activation of associative/functional knowledge. How-
ever, for naming to be achieved there needs to be further
(top-down) interrogation of perceptual knowledge, which
drives the process of differentiating a target object from its
close neighbours. For living things, this may require further
interrogation of form information for animals, colour and
texture for fruits and vegetables, and so forth. For nonliv-
ing things this may mean further interrogation of action-
related functional knowledge, that distinguishes one arte-
fact from another. In patients such as those described by
Humphreys et al. (1997), with problems in naming living
things, we propose the following. There is initial visual ac-
cess to associative/functional knowledge, but the mild im-
pairment in perceptual knowledge prevents successful re-
entrant activation from being achieved. Consequently,
patients cannot access enough information to differentiate
between the target item and its close perceptual and se-
mantic neighbours. The HIT model incorporates this idea
of re-entrant processing, which can be conceptualized in
terms of an interactive activation and competition frame-
work, as illustrated in Figure 2. This distinguishes the
model from a pure feed-forward account, such as the Cas-
cade model of Humphreys et al. (1988). According to HIT,
there is not only activation of a hierarchy of processing
stages in object naming, but also interactivity in this pro-
cessing so that different forms of knowledge are activated
in a reiterative fashion for name retrieval to operate.
We can link this idea of re-entrant processing to the PET
results on object naming reported in section 5.1. There we
discussed the data of Price et al. (1996), showing increased
activation of the inferior, posterior left temporal lobe in ob-
ject naming relative to object recognition. We suggest that
this increased activation reflects the extra visual processing
needed for name retrieval, as opposed to object recogni-
tion, to take place.
We have attempted to explore the reasons why top-down
re-entrant processing may be useful in object naming
through simulations. As previously noted, Humphreys et al.
(1995) implemented a simple interactive activation and
competition model of object naming, which incorporated
top-down as well as bottom-up connections between each
level within a hierarchy of memory representations (for
structural, “semantic” and name information about ob-
jects). The model captures the hierachical and interactive
nature of HIT, though its knowledge representations are
undoubtedly oversimplified and primitive; nevertheless it
allows us to undertake a preliminary exploration of the dy-
namics of processing different categories of object within
this framework. Objects from living and nonliving cate-
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gories were represented in the model by vectors reflecting
the rated perceptual similarity between objects. Thus for
any given target object, its own structural representation
would be assigned a value of 1 whilst structural representa-
tions of other similar objects would be activated too, but to
a lesser degree (see sect. 3.1). Naming was assumed to oc-
cur when units at the name level reached a set activation
threshold (10.2). Overlap between the perceptual descrip-
tions of living things slowed their naming, because it cre-
ated competition for access to specific name representa-
tions (relative to when nonliving things were presented).
Within such a model, living things can be named either by
(1) prolonged perceptual processing (enabling the visual in-
put to over-ride any initial competition at the name level)
and/or (2) re-entrant “clean-up” which reduces overlap
within the structural description system. Watson and Hum-
phreys (in preparation) explored the utility of re-entrant
clean-up in this model first by selectively adding noise to
top-down connections, and second, by removing top-down
connections from the semantic to the structural represen-
tations (so that the model operated solely in a feed-forward
fashion, from structural descriptions to semantics). For the
HIT approach to be viable, the top-down connections
ought to have some functional effect on object naming.
Apart from the alterations to the strength of top-down con-
nections (through noise and selective disconnection), the
parameters of the model were otherwise the same as those
reported in Humphreys et al. (1995)5. Consistent with the
HIT approach, Watson and Humphreys found that re-
entrant clean-up was generally useful for speeding up the
naming process, and particularly so for living things. Vary-
ing degrees of noise were added to the weights connecting
“semantic” to structural units (i.e., to disrupt re-entrant ac-
tivation to the “structural description system”). When the
average noise was 0.25 per connection (for a maximum con-
nection strength of 1), “RTs” for living things increased
from a mean of 24.2 to 34.1 cycles; “RTs” for nonliving
things remained constant (20.6, taking an activation value
of 0.2 on the output units as a threshold). Increasing the
top-down noise further (e.g., to a mean parameter value of
5 per connection) led to errors being made (where name
units failed to reach the set threshold after 1,000 cycles).
The identification rate for living things fell to 50% whilst
that for nonliving things remained at 100%. In this case pro-
longed processing of stimuli was insufficient to enable iden-
tification to take place, when top-down (or re-entrant) noise
was present. Similarly, removing the connections from se-
mantic to structural units also disrupted the naming of liv-
ing things, though less dramatically (RTs for living things in-
creased from 24.2 to 30.6 cycles; for nonliving things there
was no change). These simulations indicate that, where
stimuli overlap perceptually, re-entrant processing can be
useful in differentiating the input efficiently, for individual
identification to take place.
6.2. Category specific deficits
We have argued that a model with hierarchically-arranged
memory representations is required in order to account for
the selective impairments in retrieving particular forms of
knowledge in different patients (e.g., to account for patients
who can access perceptual but not associative or functional
knowledge normally from vision). We have also proposed
that re-entrant top-down processing is useful for distin-
guishing between perceptual neighbours, when object
naming is required. We next review how a framework as-
suming interactive processing, within a hierarchical set of
memory representations can accommodate the category
specific nature of the resultant deficits.
First, any model that incorporates re-entrant feedback
for on-line naming may suppose that activation is transmit-
ted continuously between processing levels. From this fol-
lows the same arguments concerning category specific
deficits for living things made by the Cascade model
(Humphreys et al. 1988). Living things suffer due to per-
ceptual overlap between representations of exemplars from
the same category. This generates competition between
perceptual representations, and also between representa-
tions that are accessed “down-line” (e.g., for associative and
functional knowledge, and for names), all of which will slow
name retrieval. This competition is present within the sys-
tem in its “normal” (unlesioned) state, and it can be exac-
erbated by damage to various levels of the naming system
(see Humphreys et al. 1995, for simulations). On top of this,
there may be additional, detrimental effects for living
things when stored perceptual knowledge is degraded, if
there are indeed correlated relations (and hence strong 
inter-connections) between their perceptual and functional
features (McRae et al. 1997; Moss et al. 1997; see sect. 2).
With such inter-correlated representations, damage to
some features may generate impairments across a range of
stimuli. For nonliving things, similar damage should be less
effective because features will be common to smaller sets
of items.
In addition to effects of perceptual overlap and feature
correlation, perceptual features tend to be more diagnostic
for living relative to nonliving things (for which action-
related functional knowledge may be particularly diagnos-
tic). The shape of an animal or the colour of a fruit will carry
more information about the identity of that object than, say,
the precise shape or colour of a kettle. Due to these factors,
we suppose that visual information will have a higher
weighting than other types of information in our represen-
tations of living things. Hence damage to such features
should be particularly disturbing. For an analogous reason,
damage to action-related knowledge may selectively impair
nonliving things.
Finally, the HIT model supposes that knowledge is re-
activated in order to facilitate name retrieval. We suggest
that re-activation of perceptual knowledge is particularly
important for the naming of living things for at least three
reasons: (1) owing to their greater perceptual overlap, re-
entrant “clean up” processes are more likely to be useful
(Watson & Humphreys, in preparation); (2) such processes
are more necessary because of correlated perceptual fea-
tures and/or correlated perceptual and functional features,
(3) perceptual features are more diagnostic (and more
strongly weighted) than functional features for the identifi-
cation of living things. Deficits in re-entrant activation of
perceptual knowledge can account for the selective naming
problems, without apparent recognition problems, for liv-
ing things in at least two patients reported in the literature
(Humphreys et al. 1997).
To date, our discussion has highlighted re-entrant activa-
tion of visual knowledge, which we suggest involves brain
regions in the inferior occipito-temporal regions. However,
whilst this may be useful for identifying living things (ow-
ing to their perceptual overlap, and the importance of dis-
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tinctive perceptual features for defining these items), re-
entrant activation of different forms of stored knowledge
may be useful for identifying other objects. As has been
noted by other authors (Warrington & McCarthy 1987),
sensori-motor knowledge (e.g., concerning actions that
might be associated with the objects) may be useful for 
differentiating many nonliving things. For this reason, re-
entrant activation of brain regions representing this knowl-
edge (e.g., at the temporal-occipital-parietal junction, and
in inferior left frontal regions, Damasio et al. 1996;
Grabowski et al. 1998; Martin et al. 1996) may be involved
in identifying nonliving things. As a consequence of this,
deficits in naming nonliving things could be caused by dam-
age to the neural areas that are the sites of this re-entrant
activation. Note that a mild impairment at this level may al-
low some semantic knowledge to be retrieved even if nam-
ing fails (Humphreys et al. 1997). This may account for pa-
tients of the type reported by Cappa et al. (1998) and Silveri
et al. (1997), who performed well on word-picture match-
ing tasks whilst being selectively poor at naming nonliving
things. A more severe impairment would prevent even as-
sociative/functional knowledge from being retrieved, as
well as causing a naming impairment. Overall, however, and
in keeping with the hierarchical nature of our account, we
suppose that more posterior damage will be linked with
problems in accessing and/or re-activating visually-related
knowledge (though the visual information involved may dif-
fer across categories; e.g., form for animals, colour/texture
for fruits/vegetables, motion for tools, etc.)(see Breedin et
al. 1994).
There are however at least two problems for the argu-
ment that re-activation of visual/perceptual knowledge for
form and colour is particularly influential for recognising
and naming living things. These are that: (1) some patients
with impairments for living things have deficits with func-
tional as well as visual/perceptual knowledge, even when
assessed auditorily (Caramazza & Shelton 1998; Laiacona
et al. 1993; 1997; Sheridan & Humphreys 1993); and (2)
some patients with impaired visual/perceptual knowledge
do not have a category-specific deficit for living things
(Humphreys & Rumiati 1998; Lambon Ralph et al. 1998).
We deal with each in turn.
Concerning the first point, the HIT account suggests that
visual/perceptual knowledge will be drawn upon even
when answering functional and associative questions about
living things, to the extent that visual/perceptual knowledge
is strongly weighted within the overall, distributed repre-
sentation of such stimuli. This assertion is supported by
data from functional imaging (Chao et al. 1999; Thompson-
Schill et al. 1999). Hence it is possible for a deficit of visual/
perceptual knowledge to influence the retrieval of non-
sensory knowledge. In addition, though, the model holds
that forms of associative and functional knowledge may be
represented separately for different categories of object,
not least because this knowledge varies across categories –
we note the earlier point we made concerning how func-
tional knowledge for living and nonliving things can differ
in kind. This means that associative and functional knowl-
edge may be selectively impaired for living things even if 
visual/perceptual knowledge is intact. The patient reported
by Sheridan and Humphreys (1993) illustrates this. She had
poor functional knowledge about fruits and vegetables yet
discriminated real fruits and vegetables from perceptually
similar nonobjects in a difficult object decision task. This in-
dicates a deficit in functional but not visual/perceptual
knowledge, which is still specific to living things. Thus non-
sensory knowledge about living things can be disrupted by
damage at either a visual/perceptual level (which impairs
access to semantic knowledge) or at a functional level. The
extent to which a visual/perceptual deficit impinges on the
retrieval of functional knowledge will also vary across pa-
tients. A mild visual/perceptual deficit may leave the re-
trieval of functional information relatively intact, as docu-
mented by Forde et al. (1997; see also Humphreys et al.
1997).
The second point, concerning patients with visual/per-
ceptual impairments that are not category-specific, is more
difficult, since at first sight the HIT account predicts that
visual/perceptual damage will differentially influence living
things. In section 3.4, we discussed some ways in which the-
ories could explain how visual/perceptual deficits might af-
fect living and nonliving things to an equal degree, and the
same points could be reiterated here (e.g., where patients
are able to use semantic knowledge to recover information
for living things, or where different types of perceptual in-
formation are damaged). In addition to this, our simulations
with HIT have indicated that the exact predictions depend
on the type of damage that is inflicted (Watson & Hum-
phreys, in preparation). As we noted in section 6.1, when
we add noise to the connections to and from the structural
description system to functional and associative knowledge,
the identification of living things becomes increasingly (and
selectively) problematic. However, if “dynamic” noise is
added, which fluctuates over time as activation is cycled
through the system, then a different pattern of results
emerges. First, the detrimental effects of the noise are
smaller. Second, the differential impairment to living things
is decreased. For example, when a maximum noise value of
5 per connection was added on random iterations, the mean
identification time for living things increased from 24.2 to
respectively 33 cycles (for bottom-up noise, from structural
descriptions to associative knowledge) and 32.7 cycles (for
top-down noise, from associative knowledge to the struc-
tural descriptions). The mean identification time for non-
living things increased too, though, from 20.6 to 26 itera-
tions (for both bottom-up and top-down noise). With
dynamic noise, the network is never pushed toward a sin-
gle value in vector space but is rather biased randomly in
different directions over time, as the network converges.
This slows identification time, but generally to an equal de-
gree across stimuli, irrespective of whether stimuli come
from a part of vector space where representations are
“sparse” (for nonliving things) or “clustered” (as case for liv-
ing things). “Static” (constant) noise, however, pushes acti-
vation in the network systematically away from the target
representation. There is then greater disruption for objects
represented in terms of similar vector values (for living
rather than nonliving things). The simulations suggest that
we need to have precise ways of linking lesions to models,
in order to formulate predictions. For now we simply note
that HIT does not necessarily hold that damage to visual/
perceptual knowledge selectively impairs living relative to
nonliving things.
6.5. Implementing HIT and its relation to other models
HIT bears a clear family resemblance to several other mod-
els in the literature. Like the Cascade model (Humphreys
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et al. 1988) it allows activation to be transmitted continu-
ously between processing levels and it emphasizes the
knock-on effects of perceptual and semantic overlap on the
recognition and naming of objects. It is also consistent with
ideas that correlated activation of perceptual features, and
strong links between common perceptual features and
functional information, can play a determining role in
recognition and naming (cf. McRae et al. 1997; Moss et al.
1997). In this respect, the model captures many of the ideas
expressed in the OUCH model of semantic memory (Cara-
mazza et al. 1990), which holds that perceptual-functional
associations lead to rapid access to semantic knowledge for
objects. HIT diverges from the latter models in specifying
a hierarchical architecture of memory representations, sep-
arating stored structural descriptions from semantic knowl-
edge to better account for fractionations between patients
(sect. 6.1). HIT also diverges from all of these accounts in
the proposal that re-entrant activation plays an important
role, particularly in name retrieval. The idea that re-entrant
activation plays a role in object identification is similar to
the arguments made previously by Warrington and Mc-
Carthy (1987). They suggested that different modalities of
experience (visual, tactile, auditory, kinesthetic, etc.) con-
tribute in retrieving the meaning of objects, and that ob-
jects can vary in how they are represented in terms of their
weighting across the different modalities. Visual/percep-
tual knowledge may be weighted more strongly than func-
tional knowledge for living things; functional knowledge
may be more strongly weighted for nonliving things. Dama-
sio and colleagues (Damasio 1989; 1990; Damasio et al.
1996) have similarly argued for distributed forms of object
representations, involving limbic as well as modality-spe-
cific forms of knowledge (limbic representation of an ob-
jects’ affective association, visual representation of its ap-
pearance, auditory representation of any associated sound,
verbal representation of abstract knowledge, etc.). These
distributed knowledge sources will be activated in a variety
of tasks, depending on the extent to which an object must
be differentiated from competitors for the task to be
achieved. Evidence on the facilitatory role of action on the
learning of names to artefacts (Humphreys & Riddoch
1999) provides evidence for a modulatory role of action on
name retrieval for these stimuli.
To date, our simulations of HIT have used an interactive
activation and competition framework (Humphreys et al.
1995; Watson & Humphreys, in preparation). This has the
benefits of having a modular representation scheme, in
which representations at different processing stages can be
damaged selectively (e.g., so that access to associative/func-
tional knowledge can be damaged but not access to visual/
perceptual knowledge). However it also has some disad-
vantages. For instance, the localist representation scheme
used makes it more difficult than some approaches to in-
corporate robust forms of learning, though it is possible to
use forms of Hebbian learning to establish weightings
based on correlated activation between representations
(see Burton 1994; also Pulvermuller [1999] makes similar
arguments for a role of Hebbian learning in establishing
learned representations for objects across contrasting
neural regions). Other models have approached simula-
tions of category-specific deficits using fully distributed
representations and generalised learning routines such as
back propagation (e.g., Durrant-Peatfield et al. 1997), or
using self-organising feature maps, which can establish lo-
cal “fields” for particular object categories and so can be le-
sioned selectively (e.g., Mikkulainen 1997; Ritter & Koho-
nen 1989; Zorzi et al. 1999). Within the last approach, some
of the problems in identifying living things can be under-
stood in terms of a coarsening of the process of mapping
from perceptual descriptions of objects into maps repre-
senting associative and functional knowledge. When stim-
uli overlap in terms of both their perceptual and associative/
functional representations, performance will be particu-
larly disrupted (see Dixon et al. 1997, for a similar argu-
ment, couched in terms of Kruschke’s [1992] ALCOVE
model of object categorisation). An equivalent approach
can also be adopted on the output side, for mapping from
associative/functional knowledge to names. Damage to
these output maps should result in a deficit that is more pro-
nounced on naming than on recognition (see Zorzi et al.
1999). Such an “output” deficit could occur in addition to
output problems stemming from impaired re-entrant acti-
vation of forms of knowledge critical for identification, and
should thus be associated with different lesion sites (e.g.,
for living things, this output deficit may be linked to more
anterior lesions than a deficit in re-entrant activation; cf.
Forde et al. 1997; Humphreys et al. 1997, who report ap-
parent output deficits along with posterior lesions).
This discussion makes it clear that the HIT approach could
be implemented in a number of ways, using a variety of ar-
chitectures; indeed Figures 3 and 4 here illustrate different
ways in which stored knowledge could be represented within
the framework. Critical to the approach, though, are two
points: (1) that there is a hierarchy of processes, so that (e.g.)
perceptual knowledge can be spared when other forms of
knowledge are damaged, and vice versa; and (2) that re-en-
trant activation is useful for identification. These two critical
points enable us to explain: (a) those patients with intact ac-
cess to perceptual but not to other forms of stored knowledge
(Hillis & Caramazza 1995; Humphreys & Riddoch 1999;
Riddoch & Humphreys 1987c; Sheridan & Humphreys
1993), (b) apparent naming impairments for living things fol-
lowing inferior occipito-temporal lesions, (c) the greater ac-
tivation of inferior occipito-temporal regions when living
things are identified, both from vision and audition, and the
association of these areas with category-specific deficits for
living things in patients, and (d) the greater activation of left
middle fusiform/temporal gyrus and inferior frontal areas
when nonliving things are identified (particularly tools), and
the association of these areas with category-specific deficits
for nonliving things.
Now, given that HIT could be implemented in a number
of ways, it could be argued that the framework is in fact too
powerful, and not open to refutation. Against this, the
above two points do stress critical issues on which the ap-
proach could be refuted: if no fractionations occur between
access to contrasting knowledge sources in different pa-
tients (e.g., access to perceptual but not functional knowl-
edge), and if naming could not be linked in a relatively di-
rect way to the recruitment of visual knowledge over and
above that found in categorization tasks. However, on these
points, we suggest that the evidence is supportive.
6.6. Processing in other modalities
Our discussion of HIT has focussed on the naming of visu-
ally presented objects, since this is the task that has been
used in most studies in the literature. However, there seems
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no reason why a similar architecture could not be adopted
to account for processing in other modalities. Perceptual
recognition stores (equivalent to the structural description
system) may exist for touch, smell, taste, sounds and so on
(as illustrated in Fig. 3). These different perceptual knowl-
edge stores would be interrogated to retrieve different
forms of stored knowledge about objects. Other non-
perceptual forms of knowledge may exist in a further ver-
bal knowledge store (e.g., for encyclopedic knowledge such
as who sang “Old Shep”). Naming can be contingent on the
appropriate activation pattern being established across the
different knowledge stores. Note that, on this account, all
forms of knowledge would not necessarily be accessed when
naming takes place (see Chertkow et al. 1992, for some ev-
idence). Furthermore, on this account these modality-
specific forms of perceptual knowledge would not only be
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Figure 3. (Top) A framework for HIT illustrating the semantic representation of an animal (e.g., a dog), accessed from vision. Within
this scheme there are distinct forms of stored knowledge for various forms of perceptual, motoric, and encyclopedic knowledge about
objects. The dog is represented in terms of a pattern of activation across these different forms of stored description, shown here by the
colouring given to a “unit” within each knowledge store (the darker the unit, the more strongly activated). We posit stored perceptual
descriptions for action, for sound (auditory knowledge), for taste, smell, and touch. Note that the units do not necessarily represent lo-
calised knowledge nodes, but could represent a pattern of distributed activity across multiple units within a particular subsystem. Phono-
logical representations could then be activated on the basis of a given pattern of activation across all areas.
(Bottom) A framework for HIT illustrating the semantic representation of a musical instrument (e.g., a guitar), accessed by means of
its sound. Note that both the type of information accessed first, and the pattern of distribution across the different types of semantic
knowledge, differ from the example in Figure 3(Top).
contacted on-line in identification tasks (within each re-
spective modality), but they would also be accessed off-line
when input from another modality must draw upon specific
forms of knowledge. For example, to decide whether an
elephant has a relatively long or short tail, when given its
name, we must access stored visual knowledge. To decide
if a lemon is sour or sweet, when given its name, one might
access the same sensory knowledge that allows us to recog-
nise a lemon when we taste it. For different categories of
object, we believe that the activation of certain perceptual
knowledge sources is more critical than others.
Now, if both on-line and off-line tasks involve activa-
tion of diverse knowledge systems (some perceptual, some 
sensori-motor, etc.), we may come to question whether the
idea of “semantic memory” becomes superseded. What is
semantic memory other than the sum of its distributed per-
ceptual, motor, verbal, and connotative components (see
Allport 1985; Warrington & McCarthy 1987, for similar
views)? In discussing object naming we were careful to dis-
tinguish structural from functional and associative knowl-
edge, and Figure 3 suggests that similar distinctions can be
made for other input modalities. But, in what sense is func-
tional knowledge more “semantic” than the structural
knowledge that defines the form of an object – especially if
we define some forms of functional knowledge in terms of
the action associated with an object (as with tools)? For liv-
ing things in particular, connections from the structural de-
scription system to other knowledge systems may indeed be
central in our long-term representations, and more impor-
tant than other types of knowledge for defining these ob-
jects. Does the idea of a “semantic memory,” perhaps or-
ganised by biological category, have any reality over and
above this?
We suggest two approaches to this question. One is to
maintain that certain knowledge stores (e.g., a verbal store
specifying encyclopedic knowledge, not gained by direct
sensory experience with stimuli) are truly “semantic.”
These knowledge stores may indeed represent something
like a dictionary definition of the meaning of objects, which
is accessed irrespective of the modality of the input. An-
other stems from the arguments of Damasio (1989; 1990).
Damasio proposed that distributed knowledge stores (per-
ceptual, sensori-motor, verbal, etc.) are bound together
through “convergence zones,” which store the combinato-
rial arrangements of the different forms of stored knowl-
edge for each object. Object naming involves reciprocal ac-
tivation between modality-specific knowledge systems and
the convergence zones, which serves to synchronize neu-
ronal firing and stabilize memory retrieval (see Fig. 4). We
may even conceive of these convergence zones in terms of
topographic maps that link different forms of sensory and
motor representations (see sect. 6.5). One interesting as-
pect of this proposal is that communication via convergence
zones may be necessary to access inter-object associative
knowledge even within a modality (e.g., the structural de-
scriptions for cup and saucer may be linked via convergence
zones). It follows that damage to this process will selectively
impair access to inter-object associative knowledge even
when access to stored perceptual knowledge of an individ-
ual object is intact (see Hillis & Caramazza 1995; Riddoch
& Humphreys 1987c). In the framework as set out in Fig-
ure 3, it is not clear how inter-object associations within a
modality are represented.
It is also possible that convergence zones and/or verbal
encyclopedic knowledge stores are categorically organised
(Caramazza & Shelton 1998), which would allow for both
“true” category specific deficits and for deficits that mimic
category specificity whilst reflecting a co-varying factor
(e.g., impaired differentiation of visual features). However,
we have argued that there is currently little empirical evi-
dence of “true” category specific disorders. Alternatively,
convergence zones that represent exemplars from the same
category could be functionally/anatomically close because
they link to similar sensory areas (Damasio 1990). Conver-
gence zones for strawberries, apples, and peaches will have
interactive links with cortical areas representing infor-
mation about smell, taste, colour, and shape whereas the
important links from the convergence zones for saws, ham-
mers, and screwdrivers will be to areas storing the associ-
ated motor engrams, functional information, and shape.6
On this view, convergence zones moderate access to forms
of information other than those that can be derived directly
from the modality-specific sensory input. Damage across
convergence zones will lead to a close coupling of impair-
ments across modalities (e.g., Forde & Humphreys 1995;
1997), whilst damage to knowledge systems supporting ac-
cess to a given zone produces modality-specific disorders.
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Figure 4. An alternative framework for HIT where “semantic
memory” is captured in terms of convergence zones. The model
here illustrates the semantic representations of a dog. The amount
of information stored in particular sensory areas, and the impor-
tance of this information, will vary across different categories of
object (as indicated by the thickness of the lines).
Note that damage to these zones cannot be thought of as
losing stored representations per se, since the zones serve
as access devices rather than knowledge stores. In access-
ing knowledge systems for particular tasks, contrasting
neural areas will be drawn upon, as suggested by the func-
tional imaging data (sect. 6). The degree of activation of a
given neural area (visual auditory, sensori-motor, etc.) will
reflect factors such as the degree of differentiation required
along that dimension (e.g., the degree of perceptual over-
lap) and the weighting of that dimension in the knowledge
representation (these last factors being closely related).
6.6. Conclusions
We have argued that (1) there is no single locus of category-
specific impairments for either living things or nonliving
things; several functional loci can each be identified as suf-
ficient to cause the deficits, but none seems necessary; and
(2) stored knowledge is represented in a distributed man-
ner, with different forms of perceptual and action-related
knowledge being recruited on-line for particular tasks. At
the most, “semantic” memory may reduce to our verbal, en-
cyclopedic knowledge about objects; minimally it may be
no more than the currently instantiated patterns of activa-
tion across the distributed knowledge representations. To
accommodate the findings, we have proposed the HIT. It
brings together a hierarchical model of memory represen-
tation with an interactive approach to knowledge retrieval,
for object naming. The interactive approach to processing
enables different forms of knowledge to be used for partic-
ular objects and tasks, and it can be used to accommodate
neuropsychological evidence on lesion sites and functional
neuroimaging data on the involvement of contrasting brain
areas in the naming of different classes of object.
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NOTES
1. We acknowledge that an even greater range of deficits than
this can be distinguished in the neuropsychological literature, in-
cluding deficits with abstract relative to concrete nouns, with
colour names, action names, proper names, and so forth (see Co-
hen & Burke 1993; McCarthy 1995). However, the literature on
selective deficits with living and nonliving objects is itself both
large and diverse, and requires extensive discussion in its own
right. Hence we confine ourselves to this topic. It is possible that
these other deficits can be conceptualised within the frameworks
we discuss.
2. The term structural description here is meant to primarily
to distinguish a perceptual memory of the visual form of objects
from associative, contextual, and functional (e.g., action-based)
knowledge of objects (typically thought to be represented in se-
mantic memory). We are not committed to whether this percep-
tual memory explicitly represents parts of objects and parts-based
relations, or whether it is more holistic in nature.
3. Note that these studies have focused on how children learn
to distinguish between animate and inanimate objects rather than
the more general living-nonliving dichotomy.
4. Chao et al. contrast activation across categories but not
within categories relative to a baseline condition, such as passive
viewing. Hence it is difficult to assess whether visual areas, such
as the lateral fusiform gyrus, were activated relative to baseline
when answering non-visual questions about nonliving things
(though relative to the activation produced by nonliving things,
answering non-visual questions about living things did further ac-
tivate this region). Thompson-Schill et al. (1999) included base-
line conditions within subjects, to enable comparisons to be made
within each category.
5. Connections form semantic to name units were set as being
either “high” (0.9) or “low” (0.7), to represent objects with high or
low frequency names, respectively.
6. Note that in our model nonliving things (such as tools) will
have links to visual/perceptual areas (e.g., representing shape).
The point is that visual/perceptual information will not be as im-
portant for these items because (1) there may be fewer links (e.g.,
no representation of colour, fewer parts) and (2) visual/perceptual
attributes alone may be less useful for differentiating a target ob-
ject from its competitors.
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Abstract: Although the principles defining HIT find support within a va-
riety of fields, the framework is currently underspecified in several re-
spects, which prevents it from fully achieving its purpose. We highlight a
number of such shortcomings and propose avenues for a resolution of
some of these issues.
Category specific deficits in brain damaged individuals point to
the interactive effects of the organization of our cognitive system
and of the structure of the world we inhabit on object processing
performance. Humphreys & Forde’s (H&F) review describes sev-
eral factors that may determine this interaction. The HIT frame-
work they propose is defined by few very general principles that
are supposed to allow the expression of each of these factors, in
the hope of producing a general account of category specific
deficits.
The simulation studies reported by H&F demonstrate that HIT
may account for deficits specific to living things that result either
from a visual encoding impairment, loss of structural knowledge,
or damaged connections between the structural description sys-
tem and subsequent processing stages. In every case, the deficits
rest on the assumed greater visual similarity between semantically
related living things than that between nonliving things (e.g., Ar-
guin et al. 1996; Dixon et al. 1997; Humphreys et al. 1988). The
effect of similarity may plausibly be extended to other types of fea-
tures, which could differentially affect processing across cate-
gories and modalities.
Similarity alone appears insufficient to account for the com-
plete variety of category specific deficits reported so far. This ac-
count seems to require, in addition, an appeal to other factors,
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such as the variable weights different types of knowledge may
have for the representation of particular categories (e.g., Farah &
McClelland 1991; Warrington & Shallice 1984), and the pattern
of feature correlations that exists within and between representa-
tion domains for objects of different categories (e.g., McRae et al.
1997; Moss et al. 1997). H&F do appeal to these factors. They do
not however, emerge spontaneously from the current definition of
HIT and a more detailed formulation appears necessary to allow
their implementation.
The weight of a particular type of knowledge for the represen-
tation of objects within a category may be assumed to depend on
whether the items from that category register within this domain
of knowledge representation. This is probably determined by two
factors: (1) whether an object’s features are relevant within that
domain (e.g., actions for using a fork vs. a giraffe); (2) the stability
of features within that domain (e.g., color of lemons vs. tele-
phones). There is presently no provision within HIT to allow these
crucial determinants to affect the organization of the knowledge
representation system. Some plausible extension to the theory
specifying how the experience of feature relevance and stability
may affect the information that is stored about an object therefore
appears required for HIT to naturally implement the factor of
variable weights of knowledge types across categories.
The notion that correlations between object features may affect
processing concerns the degree to which the presence of a partic-
ular property in an item predicts other properties. Within a neural
network such as HIT, this effect would most likely be mediated by
the connection weights between feature pairs. A specification of
how these variable connection weights may plausibly be imple-
mented (presumably on the basis of learned conditional probabil-
ities) will be necessary before the concept of feature correlations
can be considered applicable within the HIT framework.
Other relevant issues are the sequence of processing stages
within the hierarchy proposed by HIT and the constraints that
may apply on the connections between the assumed representa-
tion systems. These are presently poorly specified. These issues
however, seem relevant with respect to HIT’s account of deficits
specific for nonliving things. This account appears to rest on the
assumption that the role of action-related functional knowledge in
the processing of nonliving things is directly analogous to that of
visual structural knowledge that was demonstrated for the recog-
nition of living things. Within the context of the visual object
recognition task however, it may be noted that whereas the corre-
spondence between an input image and its appropriate structural
description is rather systematic, the correlation between this un-
processed image and the actions we may perform with the de-
picted object appears extremely weak. This is why theories of vi-
sual object recognition generally assume that access to stored
visual knowledge is required to mediate the access to more ab-
stract forms of knowledge (Biederman 1987; Tarr & Bülthoff
1998). Even without this assumption though, it is clear that any di-
rect access of action knowledge from the input image cannot be
as effective as that of structural knowledge, given the differing de-
grees of transparency in the mappings involved. A difference be-
tween action and structural knowledge in terms of the ease and/
or order in which they are accessed from an input image means
they must play unequal roles in the visual object recognition task,
independent of the category the target object belongs to. How this
unequality may then interact with the living versus nonliving dis-
tinction is a complex issue that requires a more detailed treatment
than that offered by H&F.
Finally, a fundamental assumption of HIT is that knowledge
about the world is distributed across multiple stores specialized
for specific types of information. H&F present an empirical basis
supporting a distinct store for visual structural knowledge. The
foundations for the other knowledge stores (e.g., action or biolog-
ical function knowledge) discussed by H&F are unclear, however.
An apprehension of the different kinds of properties that may
characterize objects is an insufficient basis to assume multiple seg-
regated knowledge stores. In the absence of empirically demon-
strated dissociations, general guiding principles should also be in-
volved in making deductions regarding this issue. For instance, it
may be noted that, in a neural network, knowledge is stored
mainly within the connection weights, that serve notably to con-
vert the representation of an object from one type of format into
another (e.g., from visual structure to meaning). Therefore, a con-
sideration of the functional (e.g., representation formats involved
and the transparency of the mappings between them) and neuro-
physiological (e.g., neural pathway development and synaptogen-
esis) factors that determine the connections available within the
network may be part of the decision criteria for a psychologically
plausible type of stored knowledge.
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Abstract: Developmental research on infants’ categorization of living and
nonliving objects finds that very young children are equally skilled in
grouping such objects. The lack of a specialization for one type of object
over another may be due to knowledge of function and the time frame for
acquiring such knowledge.
Investigations of how our representational systems fall apart, as
presented by Humphreys and Forde (H&F), provide insights into
the nature of intact structures and possibly their development. At
first glance, H&F’s three-tiered model (HIT) for object knowl-
edge appears to be consistent with the developmental progression
of concept acquisition in infancy. It is likely that infants’ early con-
cepts are based on perceptual similarities among category mem-
bers. Some claim that, within the first year, infants’ categorization
is based on responsiveness to perceptual or structural features
(Bornstein 1984; Mandler 2000). For example, facial configura-
tions contain important information for categorizing cats and dogs
(Quinn & Eimas 1996). Infant attention to object function and cat-
egory assignment based on function may emerge in the second
year. Infants group animals and vehicles based on the presence of
legs or wheels at 14- and 18-months-of-age (Rakison & Butter-
worth 1998), and by 18 months infants recognize correlations be-
tween the form and function of parts of artifacts (Madole & Co-
hen 1995). Last in development comes facility with naming.
Infants’ object naming explodes after the acquisition of approxi-
mately the first 50 nouns, something that generally occurs be-
tween 18- to 20-months-of-age (e.g., Miller 1981). Thus, at least,
in this superficial sense we find developmental support for H&F’s
model.
A further look at the developmental literature reveals that from
the start humans’ categorization of living and nonliving objects
may be on equal footing. Categorization research with the
youngest of participants has been conducted with 3-month-olds,
and some of this work has assessed their ability to categorize liv-
ing things in comparison to nonliving things. Three-month-olds
categorize mammals and furniture presented as still images (Behl-
Chadha 1996) and animals and vehicles in still images and moving
point-light displays (Arterberry & Bornstein 2000). An interesting
finding in both of these studies was that an advantage for one ob-
ject type, living or nonliving, was not found over the other – a find-
ing that is in contrast to some other areas of infant perception and
naming studies with intact adults. Schiff et al. (1989), for example,
found differential performance by 5-month-olds in an intermodal
perception task with living (a person) and nonliving (a car) objects,
and Laws and Neve (1999) found an advantage for naming living
things in “normal” adults.
One reason we do not see a specialization for one category of
objects over another in very young infants may be due to how the
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relation between perception and function is viewed. In the HIT
model, visual/perceptual information (stored structural descrip-
tions) is separated from functional (or action) knowledge, and the
latter is a more advanced process than the former. The authors
claim, as an example, that to name living objects, more attention
is paid to form, whereas to name nonliving objects, more attention
is paid to action. However both form and action information is
available at the visual/perceptual level, and according to some the-
orists (e.g., Gibson 1979), visual/perceptual information cannot
be dissociated from function (or action) information. From this
view, “function” refers to what is possible based on the needs of
the actor and the properties of the object. Moreover, young infants
respond to this information (e.g., Adolph et al. 1993).
By contrast, H&F use the term “function” to refer to conven-
tional use. Adults have had years of experience to learn the con-
ventional uses and actions of objects, and over time they may dis-
regard what is possible in favor of what is typical. To continue with
H&F’s example in section 6.2, a kettle is typically used for cook-
ing, but it can function as a vessel for hauling dirt or other sub-
stances. The property of containment is available in the percep-
tual array and is immediately available to the observer, regardless
of age or experience. However, what substance one particular cul-
ture contains in the kettle is learned over time. Thus, acquisition
of such knowledge may further refine the organization of the con-
cept.
The role of increasing knowledge in concept organization is 
illustrated by a recent theory of children’s acquisition of the dis-
tinction between animacy and inanimacy. Several researchers
have suggested that an understanding of animacy and inanimacy
in general, and the animal-vehicle distinction in particular, is
based on the knowledge of the differences between how animate
and inanimate objects move (Gelman 1990; Mandler 2000; Raki-
son & Poulin-Dubois, in press). Rakison and Poulin-Dubois (in
press) posit that over the first two years of life children acquire
several levels of understanding as they come to fully appreciate
the distinction between animate and inanimate objects. The dis-
tinction begins with an early understanding of the onset of motion
(self-propelled vs. other caused) and lines of trajectory (smooth vs.
irregular) of different classes of moving objects, and it culminates
with an understanding of the purpose of action (such as goal-
directed vs. without aim) and the influence of mental states (in-
tentional vs. accidental). Thus, with development, increasing
knowledge of function and/or the animacy distinction, may lead
to the living-nonliving specialization that is found in adulthood.
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Is category specificity in the world 
or in the mind?
H. Clark Barrett
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human
Development, 14195 Berlin, Germany. barrett@mpib-berlin.mpg.de
Abstract: HIT produces category-specific deficits without category-
specific mechanisms by assuming that differences in properties of objects
are transparently converted into differences in representational format. A
complete model would specify the mechanisms that accomplish this. Such
category-specific mechanisms may have evolved because assumptions
about the properties of some kinds of objects (e.g., living things) are in-
valid for others (e.g., artifacts).
HIT is one of a class of models that postulates category-specific
deficits in the absence of category-specific mechanisms. Instead,
the model contains a variety of information formats (e.g., percep-
tual, semantic), none of which is category-specific in itself. In 
order for category-specific deficits to emerge from such a model,
there must be principled differences in the kinds of informa-
tion used to represent different kinds of object. How do these 
category-specific differences in representational format arise?
In many models, including HIT, different types of information
are assumed to be privileged for different categories of object, a
priori (see also Farah & McClelland 1991). For example,
Humphreys and Forde (H&F) suggest that living things have high
“perceptual overlap” (i.e., high within-category feature correla-
tion, also called “structural similarity”), and that “perceptual fea-
tures tend to be more diagnostic for living relative to nonliving
things . . . The shape of an animal or the colour of a fruit will carry
more information about the identity of that object than, say, the
precise shape or colour of a kettle. Due to these factors, we sup-
pose that visual information will have a higher weighting than
other types of information in our representations of living things”
(sect. 6.2).
But where does this “weighting” come from? Because assump-
tions such as these are built into the model, category-specific
deficits appear to emerge for free, as the mechanisms that pro-
duce them are not specified. In other words, category-specific dif-
ferences are assumed to be transparently available properties of
the world, rather than of the mind.
Clearly, if there are category-specific differences in how objects
are represented in different information stores, damage to a par-
ticular store will systematically impact different categories of ob-
ject. But what produces this category-specific privileging of par-
ticular information formats? Is it learned? Are some kinds of
information more “available” than others in the stimulus objects
themselves? Or might there be evolved mechanisms that privilege
certain kinds of information for particular categories of object,
precisely because this information is more useful for the purposes
of identification, inference, and so on?
Reason to suspect the latter lies in two observations. The first is
that capacities to identify and make inferences about particular
naturally occurring kinds of object, including taxonomic living
kinds, tool-like artifacts, food substances, and so on, would have
been adaptive and strongly selected for in the past. Second, it is
precisely because there are kind-specific differences in principles
that can be used to diagnose category membership, and to make
adaptive inferences about category members (including those
H&F have pointed out), that we expect mechanisms for con-
structing specialized representations of particular object kinds to
have evolved. A brief examination of the principled differences
between biological taxa and artifacts serves to illustrate this point.
Consider the reasons why, as H&F point out, members of bio-
logical taxa have many highly correlated, and highly diagnostic,
perceptual features. These properties of biological taxa result
from the facts that (1) traits are passed reproductively from par-
ents to offspring, and (2) living things are related to each other
through descent from common ancestors. The more closely re-
lated two individuals are, the more traits they will share, and the
more likely they are to share any given trait – a principle which
holds across taxa for any arbitrarily selected trait, regardless of
function (Sober 1988). For these reasons, phenotypic traits passed
on through reproduction are very highly correlated in, and diag-
nostic of, biological taxa (especially lower-level taxa such as fami-
lies, genera, and species). Not only does this mean that feature
correlations can reliably be used to infer descent from a common
ancestor, and thus shared taxonomic category membership, but
they can also be used to induce the presence of a trait in one or-
ganism, given its presence in another of the same taxonomic cat-
egory (e.g., if this mushroom is poisonous, another in the same
genus is likely to be so as well) (Coley et al. 1997). From an evo-
lutionary point of view, these are extremely useful and robust prin-
ciples, and we expect evolved systems for representing living
things to use them not merely by chance, but by design.
These principles do not hold, on the other hand, for artifacts.
Artifacts are not the same kind of natural kind as are living things,
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because they do not inherit their properties en masse through bi-
ological reproduction. Rather, they are endowed with their prop-
erties by the person who constructs them (Bloom 1996). We thus
expect form-function correlations between exemplars of artifact
categories (e.g., screwdrivers, chairs, wastebaskets), but only, as a
matter of general principle, in those structural features directly re-
lated to function. For example, in order to function as a waste-
basket, an object need only be of a certain size, with an opening,
and capable of holding trash; it could be spherical or cylindrical;
made of plastic, metal, or a hollow elephant’s foot, and so on. From
an evolutionary point of view, we expect artifacts to be represented
much differently from living things, and for these representations
to be constructed and accessed by different mechanisms. Indeed,
the principles that such mechanisms rely on for making adaptive
inferences may not hold across category types; for example, the as-
sumption that traits will be richly correlated, regardless of func-
tion, holds for taxonomic living kinds but not for artifacts. This
kind of functional incompatibility is what selects most strongly for
the evolution of domain-specific mechanisms.
These points are not incompatible with the HIT model pre-
sented by H&F. Rather, they are meant to illustrate that one can-
not merely stipulate that different information formats will be
privileged for different categories of object. The model itself must
specify the mechanisms or processes that produce such category-
specific differences; if not, one is simply extracting from the model
the assumptions that one puts in. Evolutionary theory, coupled
with a careful analysis of the principles that have been reliably true
of the kinds of objects with which humans interacted in the past,
is an excellent source of hypotheses about the origins and nature
of such mechanisms.
Limitations on current explanations 
of category-specific agnosia
Daniel Bub and Cindy Bukach
Psychology Department, University of Victoria, Victoria, B.C. V8W 3P5,
Canada. dbub@uvic.ca
Abstract: The HIT framework accepts a number of assumptions that 
are widely held as plausible or even well established in the literature on
category-specific agnosia. We point out that a number of these elementary
conjectures, now almost taken for granted, have received little in the way
of convincing empirical support.
Any interpretation of category-specific agnosia must attempt to
define the nature of the difference between biological and man-
made objects. Based on the evidence, there seems to be at least
one class of patients that is affected by the degree to which mem-
bers of a category share similarities in their appearance. These
cases have difficulty identifying animals, fruits and vegetables,
musical instruments, and so on, because within any one of these
classes of objects, there are many different exemplars that overlap
in both their perceptual and conceptual properties. Identification
errors result when such a patient is presented with a particular ex-
emplar (e.g., a lemon) due to failure in resolving the co-activation
that occurs between similar members of a category (other fruits
and vegetables; e.g., Arguin et al. 1996; Dixon et al. 1997).
This part of the story seems reasonable, and any integrative
framework like HIT would have to include some way of produc-
ing decrements in performance when the system cannot fully dis-
ambiguate members within a class of similar exemplars (where
similarity is defined along perceptual and conceptual dimensions).
We may argue with the evidence from PET (Price et al. 1996)
cited by the authors as support for their choice of re-entrant mod-
ulation as the mechanism by which a target object is differentiated
from its competitors for perceptual identification (see Bub 2000
for a critique of the argument developed by Price et al.). But we
agree with the general assumption that one form of category-
specificity represents a failure to resolve competitive activation
between the stored representations of similar objects.
How, though, can we explain the existence of patients who have
more trouble identifying man-made than biological objects? We
cannot appeal to notions of shared perceptual features or struc-
tural dimensions for most of these objects, so what is the underly-
ing cause of the confusion that allows different birds or flowers to
be identified, say, but not different kinds of tools or kitchen uten-
sils? In our view, the idea that man-made objects require func-
tional knowledge for their identification, and that selective im-
pairment of such knowledge is responsible for certain kinds of
agnosia, though intuitively appealing and almost universally en-
dorsed in the literature, is actually accompanied by minimal evi-
dence. Any account that simply reifies this assumption in a com-
putational model, without evaluating alternative possibilities, can
only provide an integrative framework of what we wish to conjec-
ture but cannot prove.
The reasons behind our skepticism are as follows: First, while it
is clear that we can easily state and intuitively understand that
man-made objects have a particular use, it does not follow that this
knowledge plays a direct role in establishing the identity of an ob-
ject. Of course different objects are associated with different func-
tions but do these functional differences directly influence per-
ception? Written words evoke a strong and automatic internal
experience of sound, yet empirical claims about the role of
phonology in visual word recognition are based on much more
than the fact that we hear words or subvocalize them when we
read. The causal role of phonology in visual word recognition is
difficult to establish unambiguously even after many years of care-
ful research. Yet faced with the question of how different kinds of
conceptual knowledge mediate word and object classification, we
seem to have simply accepted, in the absence of adequate empir-
ical support, the idea that because man-made objects conjure up
ideas of their use, such knowledge must play a part in perception.
We regret that the functional imaging literature, on which
Humphreys and Forde (H&F) place considerable emphasis, can-
not be considered as a strong source of evidential constraint here.
The problem, as outlined by one of us in a recent review (Bub
2000), is that the presence of activation suggesting, for example,
that regions associated with hand actions are contacted during
passive perception of tools does not permit an inference that such
activation is needed for perceptual identification. By analogy, ac-
tivation of articulatory regions is common during visual recogni-
tion, but we would not infer that this kind of representation is im-
portant for word comprehension. The activation of regions
associated with hand movements could be a consequence of ob-
ject recognition rather than a mediator of the process.
Finally, we note that the tacit assumption about functional
knowledge in the neuropsychological literature is that it concerns
information about the use of specific objects. But is impairment
of such information the major cause of the failure to identify man-
made objects? If so, we might expect to see confusion errors de-
termined by functional similarity between exemplars; cup might
be confused with mug, hammer with axe, screwdriver with
wrench. Unfortunately, a detailed analysis of errors within the ag-
nosia literature has yet to be undertaken, and indeed, the concept
of functional relationship has been so variously defined that the
question itself requires considerable clarification before an an-
swer can be broached. It remains possible that some other type of
relational constraint might better characterize the nature of iden-
tification errors for man-made objects.
Although linguists who specialize in semantic theory have gen-
erally devoted little attention to the representation of concrete ob-
jects, it is instructive to consider that Wierzbicka’s (1985) analysis
of man-made objects includes many contextually-relevant fea-
tures, so that the situations in which objects co-occur is relevant
to defining their actual purpose. The shape of a cup, for example,
is not understandable without knowing something about how cups
are used with saucers. And the difference in the appearance of a
cup and mug is due to the fact that mugs are not used with saucers
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and so do not taper at the base. Thus, man-made objects are re-
lated by contiguity rather than similarity of function. A saucer is
not related to cup because they have similar functions nor is a
knife similar in function to a fork, at least if we confine ourselves
to questions of how each is used independently of the other. Their
relationship exists because they are used together in many situa-
tions.
We conclude, then, that the issue of how man-made objects are
related to each other so as to yield selective difficulty for certain
kinds of patients remains a major question that has received little
clarification as yet. The HIT framework accepts the conventional
viewpoint that the function of an object interacts with its form. But
the proof of this claim requires detailed predictions of the kind of
objects that generate competitive activation during the process of
identification. Is the competition between canoe and sailboat or
between canoe and wigwam?
Beyond the sensory/functional dichotomy
George S. Cree and Ken McRae
Department of Psychology, University of Western Ontario, London N6A 5C2,
Canada. {gcree; mcrae}@julian.uwo.ca www.publish.uwo.ca/~gcree
www.sscl.uwo.ca/psychology/cognitive/mcrae/mcrae.html
Abstract: Most current theories of category-specific semantic deficits ap-
peal to the role of sensory and functional knowledge types in explaining
patients’ impairments. We discuss why this binary classification is inade-
quate, point to a more detailed knowledge type taxonomy, and suggest how
it may provide insight into the relationships between category-specific se-
mantic deficits and impairments of specific aspects of knowledge.
Humphreys and Forde (H&F) propose a hierarchical model of se-
mantic memory that distinguishes between perceptual structural
and functional-associative semantic information. They use their
model to explain patterns of category-specific semantic deficits,
focusing on structure within perceptual representations, noting
the top-down influence of semantic representations during pro-
cessing. Unfortunately, limitations in existing theories prevent the
authors from being able to provide insight, beyond the possible
role of sensory versus functional knowledge, into the structure of
the functional-associative component of their model. As they
point out, definitions of sensory and functional knowledge have
been underspecified, and tests of access to this knowledge in pa-
tients with category-specific deficits have been inconclusive. We
agree that the notions of both sensory and functional features have
been underspecified and inconsistent. We focus our discussion on
possible improvements.
First, can a knowledge type account that goes beyond a binary
sensory/functional distinction provide insight into reported pat-
terns of deficits? To show that knowledge types can account for the
basic behavioral phenomena, we (McRae & Cree, in press) used
Wu and Barsalou’s (in preparation) feature classification scheme
(28 knowledge types) to classify each feature from our semantic
feature production norms (549 concepts). We demonstrated that
knowledge type construed in this manner accounts for several
trends in the patient literature, including the tripartite distinction
among creatures, nonliving things, and fruits and vegetables, as
well as the fact that musical instruments tend to pattern with crea-
tures, and nonliving food items tend to pattern with fruits and veg-
etables. Analyses showed that eight (rather than two) knowledge
types explained the majority of the variance, suggesting that se-
mantic memory is, indeed, organized by type of knowledge.
A critical prediction of the knowledge type account is that cer-
tain patterns of impairment (e.g., creatures being more impaired
than nonliving things) imply accompanying patterns of impair-
ment of specific feature types (e.g., impaired sensory features)
that should differ by category in specific and predictable ways.
Based on current theories that rely on binary distinctions, typical
studies designed to test this prediction probe a patient’s knowl-
edge of perceptual and functional attributes of both living and
nonliving things using feature verification, feature priming, nam-
ing from definition, or forced-choice from definition. To the best
of our knowledge, none of these feature-based patient studies has
adequately defined and tested the appropriate types of knowl-
edge, nor adequately controlled the variables that would allow for
valid inferences to be drawn from the results.
Such feature-based studies can be criticized for several reasons.
First, a simple classification into sensory/functional knowledge ig-
nores important distinctions in knowledge type, such as those
demonstrated in our research. Studies often incorrectly treat all
sensory knowledge as equivalent, comparing, for example, the
parts of living things with the colours of nonliving things, as though
these types of knowledge are a priori equally accessible (and cen-
tral to the concept). Second, although it is well known that some
knowledge types are more central/salient within a domain (e.g.,
the functions of nonliving things), tests often compare access to
knowledge type across domains by distorting the definition of the
feature type in the domain for which the knowledge is less central,
and perhaps even absent (e.g., for creature functional features, re-
searchers have mistakenly used items like squirrel <climbs
trees>). Third, some types of knowledge are shared by many cat-
egory members (e.g., creatures – <has eyes>), whereas the equiv-
alent types of knowledge may be distinguishing in other categories
(e.g., the external parts of nonliving things). Finally, it is essential
to acknowledge the difficulty that exists in finding functional, or
other “non-sensory” features of concepts, that do not have a sig-
nificant perceptual component. A simple thought experiment in
which one imagines how the feature in question was learned re-
veals this fact.
Given these constraints, how might one move beyond the sen-
sory/functional dichotomy to test accessibility of types of knowl-
edge in the three major domains? Table 1 demarcates the types of
knowledge that our norms suggest may be suitable for such con-
trasts. Assuming that it is obvious why a comparison should work,
we focus discussion on the comparisons that do not appear possi-
ble. First, fruits and vegetables have few external components,
and share the ones that they do have, making it difficult to find
similarly shared external components in the other domains. Sec-
ond, external surface features, such as colour, tend to be consis-
tent and informative for creatures and fruits and vegetables, but
vary more widely for specific instances of nonliving things, mak-
ing verification of these types of features easier (all else being
equal) for the former. Third, internal components are rarely listed
in norms for creatures, and even if reasonable estimates of the im-
portance of this feature type could be derived, these features are
highly shared when compared with the internal components of
nonliving things. Finally, few creatures have explicit functions and
associated actions, and those that do exist differ in kind from the
functions and associated actions of fruits and vegetables and non-
living things.
It is important to note that although Table 1 offers potential
comparisons, other variables exist that must be equated for valid
inferences to be drawn. The feature verification literature with
normals has shown that equating these variables is not easy, and
certainly cannot be done based on intuition alone. In addition to
those listed above, such as the number of concepts in which a fea-
ture occurs, some of these factors include: production frequency
in a feature-listing task, ranked production frequency, cue valid-
ity, intercorrelational strength of a feature, number of features in
a concept, concept typicality, and concept familiarity (Ashcraft
1978; McRae et al. 1999).
In conclusion, we agree with H&F that understanding cate-
gory-specific semantic deficits requires integrating a number of
factors. We add to their list of factors an account of types of knowl-
edge that extends beyond the sensory/functional distinction. Pro-
viding evidence for or against such a knowledge type account will
require significantly more careful research than has been con-
ducted to date.
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Category-specific deficits: 
Will a simpler model do?
Jules Davidoff
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Abstract: The purpose of the commentary is not to contradict HIT but
rather to question whether its increase in predictive power outweighs the
decrease in parsimony. For the refutable aspects of HIT, a simpler model
for naming appears to achieve as much. Both models better fit the facts
concerning naming performance than describe category-specificity.
When the number of reported cases of category-specific disorders
was small, models to describe them could be accordingly simple.
Heirarchical interactive theory (HIT) is, therefore, not an unex-
pected solution to the problem of providing some sort of unifying
structure to the present complexity in the patterns of preserved
and impaired deficits. The purpose of this commentary is not to
contradict HIT but rather to question whether its increase in pre-
dictive power outweighs the decrease in parsimony. Our brain
comes with multiple top-down connections. One does not doubt
that they could serve as the neural basis for the re-entry processes
required for HIT. However, at the present time a simpler model
without feed-back loops contains the kernel of the explanation
proposed in HIT.
The introduction of re-entry procedures and multiple knowl-
edge bases in HIT promotes a danger “that the framework is in
fact too powerful, and not open to refutation.” In answer to the
concern of irrefutability, Humphreys & Forde (H&F) point to two
issues that make their model testable. The first would be if it
turned out that “no fractionations occur between contrasting
knowledge sources in different patients” and the second would be
if it turned out that “naming could not be linked in a relatively di-
rect way to the recruitment of visual knowledge over and above
that found in categorization tasks.” Of these, only the second is
non-obvious.
As the refutable part of HIT is relatively circumscribed, it
would repay considering whether a more simple scheme might
not do just as well. Take a previous model (Davidoff & De Bleser
1993) (see Fig. 1) also based on the hierarchical structure of the
logogen model (Morton 1979; 1985). The model in Figure 1 does
not benefit from the Cascade procedures in Humphreys et al.
(1988) and is clearly the worse for that. However, just as in HIT,
the intermediate structures between the structural description
and the phonological output lexicon are referred to as stores of
knowledge. Though H&F do at various places go back to the older
term of semantics, the change in nomenclature is to be recom-
mended given the alternative uses of the term semantics in allied
disciplines. More critical, H&F’s model (Fig. 3), like that in Fig-
ure 1, proposes that it is only sensory knowledge that has a strong
(direct) access to the phonological lexicon. However, it is no sur-
prise that the knowledge required to carry out categorization tasks
is not that used for naming. Access to associative or functional
knowledge might be reasonably be expected to help recruit the
names for the category (e.g., tool, furniture) or for where the ob-
jects are found (e.g., garage, living room) but it would be a non-
obvious way to name the object. Thus, aphasic patients may show
very good preservation of association knowledge combined with
little useful naming (Laws et al. 1995).
Figure 1 collapses all forms of sensory knowledge. Clearly, dis-
sociations within sensory knowledge do occur and the elaboration
in H&F’s Figure 3(Top) is warranted. However, the one form of
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Table 1 (Cree & McRae). Suggested comparisons for which tests of retention of specific types of knowledge may reveal 
insight into domain level deficits
Knowledge C vs F&V
type Example features C vs NLT C vs F&V F&V vs NLT vs NLT
External Crab <has pinchers>
4
components Tricycle <has pedals>
External surface Frog <is green>
4
features Pear <is green>
Internal Cherry <has a pit>
4
components Car <has an engine>
Internal surface Corn <tastes sweet>
4
features Cake <tastes sweet>
Functions Olive <used for oil>
4
Bed <used for sleeping>
Actions Strawberry <is picked>
4
Spear <is thrown>
Participants Pony <used by children>
4 4 4 4
Doll <used by children>
Time Pumpkin <used for Halloween>
4 4 4 4
Cabin <used for vacations>
Affect/Emotion Wasp <is annoying>
4 4 4 4
Bomb <is frightening>
Contingency Garlic <causes bad breath>
4 4 4 4
Car <causes pollution>
Associated entities/ Lobster <eaten with butter>
4 4 4 4
Objects Saucer <used with tea cups>
Note: C 5 Creatures, NLT 5 Nonliving Things, F&V 5 Fruits and Vegetables.
sensory knowledge that is not included in Figure 3(Top) is that of
colour. Since Lewandowsky (1908) it has been known that an im-
pairment in the retrieval of object-colour knowledge occurs with-
out impairment for object identification. Thus, the position of this
type of sensory knowledge is likely to be after structural descrip-
tions and connected to the more direct path to naming (see Fig.
1). While the role of colour in superordinate categorization tasks
is unsettled (Davidoff & Ostergaard 1988; Price & Humphreys
1989), its role in naming is undisputed (Biederman & Ju 1988; Os-
tergaard & Davidoff 1985; Price & Humphreys 1989). Moreover,
the admittedly rather sparse clinical evidence is in favour of 
object-colour being beneficial to naming in aphasia (Bisiach 1966;
Montanes et al. 1995). If colour is more reliably associated with
living things, one might have thought that impairments in the re-
trieval of object-colour knowledge would have gone consistently
with a category specific naming impairment. Yet, the evidence is
that it does not (Forde et al. 1997; Luzzatti & Davidoff 1994). In-
deed, more generally, the pattern of dissociations in patients
shows no necessary link for functional or sensory properties to ei-
ther living or nonliving things (Laws et al. 1995; Powell & David-
off 1995).
H&F recognise that finding an explanation “concerning pa-
tients with visual/perceptual impairments that are not category-
specific, is more difficult.” Their answer is two-fold; H&F first
argue for what is essentially a compensatory strategy that may be
available to some patients by interrogating functional or associa-
tive knowledge. In Figure 1, it is clear such a procedure could pro-
mote an increase in naming ability. Second, H&F consider simu-
lations with HIT using dynamic noise and note the consequent
changes in naming output do not produce a category-specific im-
pairment. However, there is a simpler solution. Sensory knowl-
edge, even if reliably posted on the direct route to naming, is only
of secondary importance. The critical aspect for identification, as
H&F say, is sorting out the visual information at the level of the
structural description. It is surprising how lacking in detail that se-
lection process need be (Davidoff & Warrington 1999); their pa-
tient RK could accurately name animals but performed at chance
in discriminating parts, global shape, and colours of the animals.
Of course, there must be a limit to the changes made to an animal
before recognition becomes impossible but with so much naming
that can be achieved with so little, one may have difficulty in allo-
cating any role for the other forms of sensory knowledge in ex-
plaining category-specific impairments.
The accumulation of data has not provided a clear answer as to
why our minds so obviously divide the world into natural and ar-
tificial kinds. Figure 1 and HIT give a better account of naming
than they do of category specificity. Natural kinds differ from ar-
tifacts in both their taxonomic classification (Disendruck & Gel-
man 1999) and in their uniformity of conceptualisation (Berlin
1999). Perhaps neuropsychology needs to look elsewhere for an
answer.
Conceptual deficits without features: 
A view from atomism
Roberto G. de Almeida
Department of Psychology, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec H4B
1R6, Canada. almeida@alcor.concordia.ca
www.psychology.concordia.ca
Abstract: Humphreys and Forde fail to account for the ontology of the
“features” that they claim are constitutive of concepts. This failure is com-
mon to decompositional theories of conceptual representation. Category-
specific deficits can be better explained by a theory that takes inferential
relations among atomic concepts to be the key characteristic of conceptual
representation and processing.
Concepts play a prominent role in the cognitive sciences because,
qua mental representations, concepts are the very elements of
thought and higher cognition. Regarding the nature of the repre-
sention of concepts, proposals range from several types of de-
compositional theories – from definitions to prototypes – to ver-
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Figure 1 (Davidoff). A model of object naming (adapted from Davidoff & de Bleser 1993).
sions of atomism (Fodor 1998). In recent years, category-specific
semantic deficits have been an important source of evidence for
the nature of conceptual representation since patterns of deficits
arising from focal brain damage or disease reveal aspects of con-
ceptual organization which are not always transparent in studies
with normal subjects.
But what, after all, is the nature of conceptual representation?
If you start reading Humphreys and Forde’s (H&F’s) article with
this question in mind – assuming research on conceptual deficits
aims at unveiling the answer to that fundamental question – soon
you realize that you are in a theoretical loop in the middle of an
empirical maze from which you can leave only if you have answers
to other even more fundamental questions: What is the nature of
a perceptual feature? What is the nature of a functional feature?
Are they concepts? Do they have the same status as other concepts
(DOG, for instance; Is DOG a concept in the HIT model?)? Are
they “sub-concepts”? Are they primitive elements? Where do they
come from? Unfortunately, H&F do not have answers to these
questions. However, the types of commitments one makes re-
garding the nature of conceptual representation set the conditions
under which one can evaluate the pattern of conceptual deficits.
In fairness, although H&F do not provide a full account of the na-
ture of the elements constitutive of conceptual representation, it
is quite clear that they are committed to the idea that concepts are
represented by bundles of features.
Actually, it became a standard assumption in the field that no
matter how one organizes one’s conceptual stock – whether by hi-
erarchical trees whose topmost branches are LIVING and NON-
LIVING or by any other taxonomic principle – concepts are rep-
resented by bundles of features. The idea is that the concept
DOG, for instance, is in fact represented at some level as a finite
or infinite set whose elements are things such as BARKING,
FURRY, FOUR-LEGGED, PET, CANINE (see, e.g., Rapp &
Caramazza 1991). The concept SCREWDRIVER, feature theo-
ries suggest, might also be represented at some level by a set of
properties which should include things such as SCREW-DRIVER
(function?), ELONGATED, HAS-A-HANDLE, and so on. Func-
tional and perceptual properties – whether or not with different
weights and whether or not represented within different subsys-
tems – are in fact sets of features that supposedly contribute to
concept tokening (i.e., for one’s entertaining of the concept
SCREWDRIVER in screwdriver contexts).
Elsewhere (see de Almeida 1999a), I have suggested that the
cost of assuming that concepts are bundles of features is not only
undermining the ontological foundations of one’s theory but also
committing to a noncompositional view of conceptual representa-
tion (see also Fodor 1998). In fact, in psycholinguistics, most em-
pirical studies suggest that lexical concepts (i.e., concepts labeled
by natural language morphemes) are not definitional or do not de-
compose into sets of more primitive elements (see, e.g., de
Almeida 1999b; de Almeida & Fodor 1996; Fodor et al. 1975). This
is certainly the case of verb concepts; and in fact, to my knowledge,
thus far no one found evidence for “category-specific” verb con-
cept deficits (e.g., that “features” such as CAUSE or GO, suppos-
edly constitutive of complex verbs, are selectively impaired).
If not features, then what? In the remainder of this commen-
tary, I will suggest that an atomistic view can better account for the
pattern of dissociations of conceptual deficits. But before I move
on to the analysis of category-specific deficits, I have to present
briefly some of the basic assumptions of the atomistic-inferential
view advocated here (for further discussion see de Almeida
1999a). First, it is assumed that concepts are atomic representa-
tions. Contrary to feature theories, the content of a concept is de-
termined by epistemic liasons, not by its inferential relations (see
also Fodor 1990). Thus, the content of X is determined by its prop-
erty of “being an X,” not by the relations obtained between con-
stitutive elements (such as features). The present proposal as-
sumes that all relations between concepts are inferential in nature
– which means that for someone to possess concept X does not
imply also that someone possesses concepts Y and Z: In this sense,
concepts are individuated by virtue of their nomic relations with
words, objects, events, and so on, not with their constitutive rela-
tions with other concepts. Second, it follows that any relations that
are obtained between concepts X and Z are by virtue of their as-
sociation or, more precisely, by virtue of their shared inferential
domains – roughly, the sets of inferences unleashed by concepts.
Much in the spirit of meaning postulates (henceforth, MPs; see
Carnap 1959), those inferences are taken to be entailments. Suf-
fice it to say for now that the inferential domain of concept X is a
set of MPs. The assumption is that the inferential domain of X is
the set A of inferences that are caused by X and also the subset B
of inferences that are caused by Y but of whose entailments X
takes part.
Categorical effects, thus, can be taken to constitute overlapping
inferential domains. Under this view, category-specific deficits
can be taken to arise from damage to concepts constitutive of cer-
tain MPs (for instance, the concept LIVING which might be re-
lated to ANIMAL via the MP [;x, ANIMAL(x) r LIVING(x)]).
There are two related hypotheses to consider. The first is that the
loci of the deficits are in the sets of inferences unleashed by the
tokening of concept X (say, DOG). Since those inferences might
be disrupted by the broken entailments that involve LIVING (as
in the MP above), patients may have trouble selecting the appro-
priate lexical items in naming tasks. The assumption is that the to-
kening of DOG (by the word or the picture) causes the computa-
tion of the inferential domain of DOG – which intersects with the
inferential domain of many other concepts, thus giving rise to se-
mantic paraphasias. The second – and perhaps stronger – hy-
pothesis places the locus of category-specific deficits in the selec-
tion of the appropriate concept, given a certain token stimulus.
That is, it is possible that the specificity of the problem is in the
causal link between the proximal stimulus dog and the concept
DOG. Thus, in this sense, when dog is presented, DOG may be
accessed but the inferences it unleashes (e.g., to ANIMAL) may
lead the patient to consider other alternatives (CAT, COW) which
are in the inferential domain of ANIMAL. Patients’ strong per-
formance in word/picture matching tasks even in “impaired” cat-
egories may provide evidence for the causal link hypothesis. Also,
the fact that patients are able to produce items that are within the
category (or, possibly, inferential domain) of the target item sug-
gests that they are able to determine the nature of the stimuli (i.e.,
by assumption, dog may cause [DOG or CAT or COW]) but are
unable to produce “dog” and in many trials they produce an in-
correct response.
In sum, it appears that an atomistic-inferential theory of con-
ceptual representation and processing can account for the pattern
of dissociation without the perils of ontological vagueness and
without sacrificing compositionality.
Structural descriptions in HIT –
a problematic commitment
Markus Graf and Werner X. Schneider
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Abstract: Humphreys and Forde conceptualize object representations as
structural descriptions, without discussing the implications of structural
description models. We argue that structural description models entail two
major assumptions – a part-structure assumption and an invariance as-
sumption. The invariance assumption is highly problematic because it con-
tradicts a large body of findings which indicate that recognition perfor-
mance depends on orientation and size. We will delineate relevant findings
and outline an alternative conception.
We are in accordance with the two basic principles of the HIT
model – a hierarchical processing structure and top-down (inter-
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active) activation. However, one aspect of the HIT-model de-
serves closer consideration: Humphreys and Forde (H&F) em-
ploy the term “structural descriptions” to characterize the repre-
sentations of the purely visual ( i.e., “pre-semantic”) system of
object recognition. Thus, they use a technical term which refers
to a specific type of recognition model, without offering convinc-
ing reasons for their choice and without discussing its implica-
tions.
Object recognition approaches can be classified into invari-
ant property approaches, object decomposition approaches, and 
image-based approaches (see e.g., Ullman 1996; Wallis & Bülthoff
1999). In structural description models, objects are divided
(parsed) into parts and represented in terms of their parts and 
the relations between the parts (e.g., Biederman 1987; Marr & 
Nishihara 1978; Sutherland 1968). Structural descriptions can be
viewed as a mixture of part decomposition and invariant property
approaches, whereby parts and their relations are defined as 
invariant properties (Ullman 1996). Therefore, we claim that
structural description models include two major assumptions re-
garding object representations: (1) Object representations are
characterized by a part-structure, and (2) are based on invariant
properties and encoded in a propositional format, so that they are
more or less invariant regarding spatial transformations (invari-
ance assumption). Both assumptions are logically independent.
We intend to show that the invariance assumption is problematic
and doubt that Humphreys and Forde wanted to embrace it (see
Humphreys et al. 1988, p. 68).
The authors barely explain their choice of structural descrip-
tions, but instead refer to the cascade model (Humphreys et al.
1988) – which supplies no detailed explanation. Their justifica-
tion of structural descriptions seems to be derived from what
Humphreys et al. called structural similarity, a concept which is
based on two measures: the number of shared parts (derived from
attribute listings), and the ratio of outline contour overlap (see
sect. 3.1). Outline contour overlap, however, is not specific for
structural similarity, but is a general measure for visual similarity.
Thus, only one of these measures relates to the notion of struc-
tural descriptions – and moreover, it only refers to the part-struc-
ture assumption.
Do object representations actually have a part-structure? There
is empirical support for the hierarchical nature of object repre-
sentations (Palmer 1977); and there is evidence that parts play a
role in both real-time object recognition (Biederman & Cooper
1991) and in categorization (Goldstone 1996; Tversky & Hemen-
way 1984). However, these findings are not uncontroversial, as
Srinivas (1993) could not replicate the results of Biederman and
Cooper, using a similar procedure. Furthermore, other findings
question a special role of parts in object representations (Cave &
Kosslyn 1993; Murphy 1991). Overall, the empirical findings seem
consistent with the first assumption of structural description mod-
els, but some doubts remain.
A crucial question for any recognition model is whether it can
explain subjects’ performance in recognizing objects after spatial
transformations. A large number of behavioral studies accumu-
lated which demonstrate that reaction times and error rates in ob-
ject recognition depend systematically on stimulus orientation
(both in the picture plane and in depth) and size (for reviews see
Ashbridge & Perrett 1998; Jolicoeur & Humphrey 1998; Lawson
1999; Tarr & Bülthoff 1998). This pattern of results is not just due
to early perceptual processes, but seems to be caused by high-level
representations (e.g., Lawson & Humphreys 1998). Also neuro-
physiological data with single cells confirmed the orientation- and
size-dependency (for review and discussion see Farah 2000).
Moreover, an orientation effect was even found when all major
parts or features of an object remained visible after a rotation in
depth (Humphrey & Jolicoeur 1993; Lawson et al. 1994; but see
Biederman & Gerhardstein 1993), or when elementary geometri-
cal shapes – consisting of just one component – were rotated in
depth (Tarr et al. 1998). Thus, effects of viewpoint are not just a
result of self-occlusion of object parts or features. Taken together,
the findings indicate that object representations are specific to ori-
entation and size, which is regarded as evidence that object rep-
resentations are image-based (e.g., Tarr & Bülthoff 1998).
This large body of findings cannot be explained with the exist-
ing structural description models, because they predict more or
less invariant recognition performance – with minor exceptions
like rotations in the picture plane (Hummel & Biederman 1992)
and self-occlusion of parts in depth rotation (Biederman & Ger-
hardstein 1993). Is the inability to explain these data just a prob-
lem of the existing structural description models, or is it a matter
of principle for this model type? The concept of a part-structure
in visual object representations, by itself, does not necessarily lead
to invariant recognition performance. The problematic point,
however, is that structural description models are committed to
the idea of invariance; they try to capture object invariance at the
level of parts and relations. For example, size constancy can be ac-
counted for by assuming that only relative sizes of the parts of a
shape’s contour are coded. It is this invariance assumption and the
resulting abstraction regarding spatial transformations which
leads structural description models to predict invariant recogni-
tion performance – and which makes them principally inappro-
priate to explain human object recognition.
How is it possible, then, to conceptualize a part-structure in 
object representations? It should be noted that evidence for hier-
archical representations and the existence of a part-structure is
compatible with most recognition models. Considering the orien-
tation- and size-dependency of recognition performance, the most
reasonable strategy is to integrate the concept of part-structure
into an image-based framework of recognition. In such a model,
relations between parts would be represented in an implicit way –
and not explicitly as in structural description models. But this does
not seem to be a disadvantage, because, to our knowledge, there
is no empirical evidence indicating that relations between parts
are coded explicitly in object representations.
Taken together, it seems advisable to refrain from making a
commitment to structural descriptions, particularly because the
invariance assumption of structural description models is highly
problematic. We outlined an alternative image-based conception
and suggest to use the more neutral term (structured) visual rep-
resentations.
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Abstract: Although Humphreys & Forde’s HIT provides a comprehen-
sive account of category-specific deficits, standard models of categoriza-
tion and identification may also be able to explain many aspects of such
deficits. The assumptions of an exemplar-based account of category-
specific deficits are presented, and it is argued that exemplar models may
be able to explain key findings on impaired object identification and cate-
gorization.
Humphreys & Forde’s (H&F’s) Hierarchical Interactive Theory
provides a coherent and principled account of the bewildering
array of findings on category-specific deficits. The model
emerges from a research strategy that aims to unify a broad
range of neuropsychological findings. This is an important strat-
egy, and it is likely that HIT will become a benchmark for mod-
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els of category-specific agnosia. However, it is somewhat sur-
prising that well-established research on concept learning and
categorization has had relatively little impact on theoretical and
empirical work in neuropsychology. The basic mechanisms of
categorization and identification are relatively well understood,
but there have been very few attempts to apply standard models
of categorization and identification to category-specific deficits.
I would argue that this is unfortunate, for two reasons. First,
standard theories of categorization can be used to derive precise,
testable predictions about category-specific deficits, and thus
form the basis of a productive research programme. Second, ap-
plying standard theories to category-specific deficits may reveal
which aspects of processing might be altered in patients, with-
out compromising the theory’s ability to explain normal catego-
rization or identification.
Recently, we have proposed that exemplar models of catego-
rization and identification might form the basis of a comprehen-
sive account of category-specific deficits (Lamberts & Shapiro, in
press). Exemplar models, such as Nosofsky’s (1986) Generalized
Context Model, are among the best and most systematic accounts
of categorization and identification across a wide range of stimuli
and conditions. These models assume that category learning in-
volves the storage of specific instances or exemplars in memory,
and that subsequent categorization or identification is based on
the similarity between the stimulus and the exemplars in memory.
Exemplar models not only explain categorization and identifica-
tion, but also the links between these tasks (Nosofsky 1987).
Moreover, they form the basis of detailed accounts of the time
course of category decisions (Lamberts 1995; 2000; Nosofsky &
Palmeri 1997), and their principles underlie what is probably 
the most successful connectionist model of category learning 
(Kruschke 1992).
The exemplar-based account of category-specific deficits is
based on the finding that living and nonliving objects tend to dif-
fer in perceptual similarity. H&F refer to several studies that sug-
gest that living things are more similar to each other than nonliv-
ing things. This difference in similarity structure within the
categories leads to very specific predictions about the nature of
category-specific deficits. An exemplar account would predict that
identification (which is the task of assigning a unique label to an
object) is easiest for objects that have few similar neighbors. If dis-
criminability of objects is low, or if exemplar memory is damaged
(either of which could be the result of brain damage, see Lamberts
& Shapiro, in press; Nosofsky & Zaki 1998), objects with many
similar neighbors will be harder to identify than objects without
similar neighbors. Applied to the living versus nonliving cate-
gories, nonspecific brain damage should lead to a selective im-
pairment of identification of living objects, as observed in the vast
majority of studies.
The exemplar account makes other predictions as well. If the
task is categorization rather than identification (i.e., if objects have
to be assigned to categories that contain more than just one mem-
ber), nonselective damage should have the opposite effect: objects
with similar neighbors in the same category should be categorized
more accurately than objects without similar neighbors in the
same category. This implies that brain damage should impair per-
formance on nonliving objects more than on living objects if cat-
egorization is the task.
From this contrast, it follows that a critical test of the similar-
ity-based account involves a direct comparison between identi-
fication and categorization of different objects. In one such
study, Forde et al. (1997) carried out a number of experiments
with their patient S.R.B., and found that his identification abil-
ity was impaired more for living objects than for nonliving ob-
jects. Forde et al. (1997) also examined S.R.B.’s ability to cate-
gorise living and nonliving things. He was shown line drawings
of fruit, vegetables, animals, and tools and asked to classify them
into their respective categories. S.R.B. scored very highly in this
task. His overall pattern of performance was exactly as predicted
by the exemplar account. Moss et al. (1998) also compared cat-
egorization and identification performance for their patient,
R.C. Tested with the Snodgrass and Vanderwart picture set, R.C.
was able to identify 50% of the pictures of artefacts, compared
to only 9% of pictures of living things. In many cases in which
R.C. failed to name the item, he was still able to provide some
information about it. For 63% of the naming errors made on the
living things in the test set, this included the correct superordi-
nate name (e.g., animal for donkey, or fruit for peach), which in-
dicates that his categorization abilities with these objects were
relatively well preserved. Superordinate names were hardly ever
produced for the nonliving things. Moss et al. (1998) also carried
out a direct test of R.C.’s ability to categorise colour photographs
of living and nonliving objects into their superordinate cate-
gories. R.C. was able to categorise the living things very accu-
rately (93% correct), scoring within the normal range. However,
his ability to categorise the nonliving objects (83% correct) was
below the range for controls. Again, this confirms the exemplar
model’s predictions.
The exemplar account does have some characteristics that make
it an attractive alternative for existing models of category-specific
deficits. The model has been developed outside the neuropsy-
chological literature, and has become one of the best-tested and
most productive theories of perceptual categorization, identifica-
tion and recognition. The model’s simplicity and formal rigour are
further assets. Of course, we cannot claim that exemplar models
readily explain all aspects of category-specificity, but the models’
scope and implications certainly merit further study.
Category-specific deficits: Insights from
semantic dementia and Alzheimer’s disease
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Abstract: Recent investigations and theorising about category-specific
deficits have begun to focus upon patients with progressive brain disease
such as semantic dementia and Alzheimer’s disease. In this commentary
we briefly review what insights have been gained from studying patients
of this type. We concentrate on four specific issues: the sensory/functional
distinction, correlation between features, neuroanatomical considerations,
and confounding factors.
Although many reports of patients with category-specific disorders
have been based on stable brain-damaged patients (e.g., CVA: Sac-
chett & Humphreys 1992; HSVE: Warrington & Shallice 1984), it
is only relatively recently that data from patients with progressive
brain disease have been used to inform this issue. This is despite
the fact that semantic impairments in progressive disorders such as
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and semantic dementia (SD) were es-
tablished many years ago (e.g., Warrington 1975). We summarise
below some of the insights that have been gained from this source
of data (for a fuller account, see Lambon Ralph et al. 1998b).
The sensory/functional distinction. Although there have been
a number of reported associations between category-specific im-
pairment for living things and relatively poor sensory knowledge
(e.g., Gainotti & Silveri 1996), evidence for the complementary as-
sociation (between nonliving things and functional knowledge) is
sparse. One example was provided by a longitudinal analysis of
definition and naming data of patients with AD (Lambon Ralph
et al. 1997). Although the AD patients did not demonstrate cate-
gory-specific differences in overall performance, Lambon Ralph
et al. (1997) were able to show that a decline in the ability to name
living things was associated with loss of sensory information whilst
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poorer naming of artefacts paralleled degraded functional knowl-
edge. As noted by Humphreys and Forde (H&F), there is an in-
creasing number of single cases that call the causality of this asso-
ciation into question. There are patients with category-specific
deficits for living things with equivalent sensory and functional
knowledge. Patients with semantic dementia, in contrast, seem to
show the opposite combination – although conceptual knowledge
is degraded overall, their ability to give or confirm sensory attri-
butes is particularly affected (Lambon Ralph et al. 1998b 1999).
If one controls for concept familiarity, there is little evidence that
this pattern leads to the predicted category-specific impairment
(Bozeat et al. 2000; Garrard et al., in press a; Lambon Ralph et al.
1998a; 1998b; 1999).
With this issue in mind, we have recently completed analyses of
a feature database collected from intact control subjects (Garrard
et al. 2001). Despite the fact that Shallice and Warrington’s (1984)
original proposal was based upon assumptions about the nature of
those features that distinguished individual concepts, neuropsy-
chological assessments of feature knowledge have not differ-
entiated between shared and distinctive attributes. In the feature
database, we found no difference in the number of distinctive sen-
sory features listed for living and nonliving concepts. The number
of distinctive functional attributes was, as predicted, greater for
artefacts. Further analyses also revealed another category differ-
ence that may prove to be critical. The greater visual overlap/sim-
ilarity of living things noted by H&F, extends to conceptual rep-
resentation themselves. We (see also McRae & Cree, in press)
found that shared features were much more prominent for living
than nonliving concepts.
Correlated features. Explanations of category-specific deficits
that focus upon the importance of intercorrelated features predict
that the direction of the category-difference should be related to
severity (though the two best known positions make opposite pre-
dictions: Gonnerman et al. 1997; Tyler et al. 2000). Two recent
studies including a relatively large number of AD patients found
no positive evidence for either version of the theory (Garrard et
al. 1998; in press c). The first, a cross-sectional analysis, found that
the direction of the category-specific difference was not related to
severity. Rather specific deficits for living or nonliving concepts
were both more likely to be found in the most severely affected
patients. More recently, after adding longitudinal data to the pre-
vious cross-sectional study, we found no positive evidence for the
predicted cross-over in category-differences when plotted as a
function of severity (either in terms of overall disease progression
or the degree of semantic impairment). The lack of an effect in the
target patient group (AD) may be explained by further analyses of
the feature database, noted above. First, the number of signifi-
cantly correlated feature pairs as a proportion of the total number
of possible features pairs is extremely small, suggesting that any
effect of feature co-occurrence is likely to be weak. Second, in-
tercorrelation is confounded by feature distinctiveness – it is
shared features that tend to correlate with others, again suggest-
ing that it may be the distribution of shared versus distinctive fea-
tures, which is critical.
Neuroanatomical considerations. Although it did not support
the correlated feature accounts of category-specificity, the cross-
section AD study (Garrard et al. 1998) did find positive evidence
in favour of neuroanatomical influences. Those cases with rela-
tively poor artefact knowledge/naming had more AD pathology in
parietal regions, supporting the predominant view that there is a
temporal versus frontoparietal difference at the heart of category-
specific deficits. The semantic dementia cases are, again, a puzzle
in this regard. The atrophy in these cases (e.g., Mummery et al.
2000) is focused upon the anterolateral aspects of the temporal
lobes bilaterally and includes the inferior temporal gyrus. One
might expect this to lead to relatively poor performance for living
things as is found in some patients with HSVE for whom the dis-
tribution of pathology is somewhat similar (though it tends to in-
volve medial as well as lateral temporal regions bilaterally: Gain-
otti et al. 1995).
Confounding factors. We finish where H&F began. Concept
familiarity strongly influences the accuracy of patients with se-
mantic impairment (Bozeat et al. 2000; Lambon Ralph et al.
1998a) and it certainly explains some, but not necessary all, of the
underlying difference in category-specific cases (e.g., Funnell &
De Mornay Davies 1996). We would argue that familiarity is no
more a “nuisance” or confounding factor than different sensory-
functional weightings of concepts – there is plenty of evidence
that familiarity should be regarded as a critical part of under-
standing this issue. The magnitude of category-differences is re-
duced dramatically once familiarity controlled stimuli are used for
assessment and there are at least three demonstrations of an in-
teraction between category-specific differences and familiarity
(Funnell & De Mornay Davies 1996; Gainotti & Silveri 1996;
Lambon Ralph et al. 1998b). Implemented computational mod-
els of conceptual knowledge show that when familiarity is in-
cluded during training, not only does it influence the models’
overt performance (Lambon Ralph et al., in press), but also the
nature of the derived semantic representations is changed. Fa-
miliar concepts tend to take up greater amounts of the semantic
“space,” making them much less vulnerable to simulated damage
(Rogers & McClelland, submitted).
What is structural similarity 
and is it greater in living things?
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Abstract: Humphreys and Forde (H&F) propose that greater within-
category structural similarity makes living things more difficult to name.
However, recent studies show that normal subjects find it easier to name
living than nonliving things when these are matched across category for
potential artefacts. Additionally, at the level of single pixels, visual overlap
appears to be greater for nonliving things.
Two important and related issues in the paper by Humphreys and
Forde (H&F) require examination: (1) What is the evidence that
living things (i.e., with high structural similarity according to
H&F) are more difficult to name than nonliving things (i.e., with
low structural similarity)? and (2) What constitutes structural sim-
ilarity? Does “contour overlap” adequately capture the degree of
structural similarity within categories?
Turning to the first issue, H&F cite several studies to support
the notion that normal subjects make more errors or are slower
to name items with high structural overlap (exclusively living
things: Gaffan & Heywood 1993; Humphreys et al. 1988; Lloyd-
Jones & Humphreys 1997; Vitkovitch et al. 1993). All failed,
however, to match across category for: visual complexity; some
failed to also match for familiarity (Humphreys et al. 1988; Vit-
kovitch et al. 1993); or any variables including name frequency
(Gaffan & Heywood 1993). Hence, the results of these studies
may reflect the influence of the same artefacts that have proved
troublesome in patient studies of category-specific effects. In
contrast to the studies reported by H&F, several more recent
studies have documented better (and faster) naming of living
than nonliving things by normal subjects on sets of stimuli
matched across category for familiarity, visual complexity, and
name frequency. This has been demonstrated using a variety of
paradigms including the rapid presentation paradigm of Gaffan
and Heywood (Laws & Neve 1999) and the naming-to-deadline
paradigm of Vitkovitch et al. (Laws 2000), naming latency (Laws
1999). These points raise two related issues that need to be ad-
dressed by H&F: first, that the results of unmatched studies are
prone to artefact explanations and second, that when matching
has been achieved, these studies contradict a central tenet of the
Commentary/Humphreys & Forde: Hierarchies, similarity, and interactivity in object recognition
486 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2001) 24:3
HIT (and the Cascade) model, that is, that living things (struc-
turally similar according to H&F) are harder to name and iden-
tify than nonliving things (structurally dissimilar).
Turning to the more fundamental question: What constitutes
structural similarity (at least for H&F)? In an attempt to quan-
tify some aspects of structural similarity, H&F refer to two mea-
sures (from Humphreys et al. 1988), both of which may misrep-
resent the degree and/or characteristics of structural similarity.
The first consists of subject ratings showing that living things
have more shared parts than nonliving things. Nevertheless,
common parts are often structurally quite dissimilar, for exam-
ple, the ears of an elephant, rabbit, or dog, and so, may not pro-
vide a reliable indicator of structural similarity. The other, per-
haps more pertinent, measure refers to contour overlap for items
from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) corpus of line draw-
ings. This measure may misrepresent “structural similarity” be-
cause it concentrates on gross contour overlap at the expense of
internal detail. Direct evidence for this comes from Laws et al.
(in press), who developed a measure of pixel-level overlap for
subcategories of item from the Snodgrass and Vanderwart cor-
pus. This measure was calculated by subtracting pixel values for
all pairs of pictures (size standardized to 256-by-256 pixels, i.e.,
65,536 pixels per picture) in any subcategory. The difference
value was then squared and summed for all pixels in the array.
Finally, the square root of the sum of squared differences gave
the Euclidean Distance (ED) between the two pictures. Within-
subcategory mean and standard deviation ED values were cal-
culated for items in 6 living and 5 non-living subcategories (see
Fig. 1).
By contrast with H&F, Laws and Gale found greater within-
category structural similarity for nonliving than living things (ED
was greater for living than nonliving things: t 5 3.9[df 5 118] 
p , .000). In addition, they found that ED for body parts and mu-
sical instruments clustered with nonliving and living things re-
spectively (see Fig. 1) and so, appears to incorporate the excep-
tions that occur in the category-specific deficits literature, that is,
that musical instruments tend to be impaired along with living
things and body parts with nonliving things. It seems that the mea-
sure of ED overlap has more justification than H&F’s use of gross
contour overlap (alone) since only the former incorporates both
internal and contour information, predicts the performance of
normal subjects with matched stimuli (outlined above), and may
even account for the unusual performance of patients when nam-
ing body parts and musical instruments. To summarise, the points
raised here seem difficult to accommodate within the HIT model
proposed by H&F and indeed, point to some evidence that ap-
pears to oppose HIT predictions.
What is specific about category specificity?
Fractionating patterns of impairments and
the spurious living/nonliving dichotomy
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Abstract: What aspects of the data from studies of acquired category-
specific impairments are relevant to theories of knowledge representa-
tion? Discussion in the target article focuses on the living/nonliving di-
chotomy. However, many case studies reveal considerably more complex
patterns of impaired and preserved performance that undermine this dis-
tinction. We consider this evidence and discuss its implications for theo-
ries of knowledge representation.
The issue that we address concerns the kinds of data from studies
of category-specific disorders that are typically deemed relevant
to theories of knowledge representation. In their paper, Hum-
phreys and Forde (H&F) focus their discussion primarily (but not
exclusively) on what are described as cases of selective impair-
ments affecting object knowledge for living versus nonliving
things. Indeed, this apparent dichotomy is frequently presented
in the literature on category-specific disorders as a key aspect of
the data that theories of knowledge representation must explain.
However, a closer inspection of evidence from single case studies
suggests that category-specific deficits rarely break down in terms
of this simple dichotomy. Rather, patients show complex patterns
of impaired and preserved performance that vary among different
categories of objects across the living/nonliving divide (Hillis &
Caramazza 1991; Warrington & McCarthy 1987).
For example, JBR, one of the patients reported originally by
Warrington and Shallice (1984), is described by H&F (and others)
as having a selective deficit for living things. In fact, as H&F ac-
knowledge, while JBR was poor at naming objects from biological
categories such as animals and plants, he was also impaired at
naming musical instruments, tools, fabrics and gemstones – a pat-
tern seemingly at odds with the patient’s supposed deficit for liv-
ing things. YOT (Warrington & McCarthy 1987), when tested on
an auditory/written word matching task, performed relatively well
with objects from the categories of animals, occupations, vegeta-
bles, and fabrics, but poorly with flowers, furniture, and body
parts. The patient PS (Hillis & Caramazza 1991) was dispropor-
tionately impaired at naming animals, birds, vegetables, and fruits,
but had no difficulty naming varieties of foods and body parts. An-
other patient, JJ, described by the same authors, was good at nam-
ing animals and birds, but poor at naming across a diverse range
of other categories including vegetables, fruits, body parts, cloth-
ing, transportation, and furniture. This pattern could be described
as a case of the selective preservation of animals and birds, but not
a selective preservation of living things, or a selective impairment
for nonliving things. Other case reports describe patients with
highly circumscribed deficits that seemingly affect a single cate-
gory of objects or a small number of categories. These include se-
lective impairments for body parts (Dennis 1976), proper names
(Semenza & Zettin 1989), facial expressions (Rapcsak et al. 1989),
foods (Warrington & Shallice 1984), indoor objects (Yamadori &
Albert 1973), countries (McKenna & Warrington 1978), animals
(Hart & Gordon 1992), as well as fruits and vegetables (Hart et al.
1985). Perhaps equally as striking are demonstrations of the ap-
parent selective preservation of a single category of objects. For
example, Shelton et al. (1998) have recently reported the case of
a patient with a selective sparing of knowledge for body parts.
These observations seem to us to have important implications
for theories of knowledge representation.
The spurious living/nonliving dichotomy. First, as others have
pointed out, the complex patterns of performance that are ob-
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Figure 1 (Laws). Mean ED values for subcategories plotted
against item mean ED. This shows that ED separates living and
nonliving items and also clusters body parts along with nonliving
things and musical instruments with living things.
served in patients undermine descriptions of the theoretically rel-
evant data in this domain in terms of a simple living/nonliving di-
chotomy (Caramazza & Shelton 1998; Warrington & McCarthy
1987). Theories of knowledge representation that are constrained
by patient data should not be restricted to (or even based upon)
this distinction. Despite this, the dichotomy is still frequently used
in the literature. Interestingly, as H&F note, fractionating patterns
of category-specific impairments were one of the original motiva-
tions for the sensory/functional hypothesis (Warrington & Mc-
Carthy 1987) – with which Hierarchical Interactive Theory (HIT),
outlined in the target article, shares several core assumptions. Ac-
cording to this view, categorical distinctions arise because of the
differential weighting of modality-specific features in object rep-
resentations (Warrington & McCarthy 1987). Although this pro-
posal has been highly influential in accounts of category-specific
deficits, attempts to formulate and test predictions of the sensory/
functional hypothesis have largely focused on general claims about
a putative asymmetry in the weighting of “visual” and “functional”
features in the representation of living and nonliving things (Farah
& McClelland 1991, but see Warrington & McCarthy 1987).
Fractionating patterns of performance and probabilistic mod-
els of knowledge representation. Second, if, as we argue above,
discussions of category-specific disorders should not be based on a
living/nonliving dichotomy, what is the appropriate range of facts
from patient studies that should be used to constrain theories of
knowledge representation? Should these theories be evaluated in
terms of their ability to account for every statistically reliable pat-
tern of impaired and preserved performance that is reported? Pre-
sumably, some aspects of the structure of knowledge representa-
tions (possibly including the distinction between biological forms
and artefacts) are likely to be dependent on individual differences
in experience, knowledge and expertise (Jackendoff 1990). Re-
search on categorisation also shows that subjects notions of cate-
gories can be enormously flexible: Quite ad hoc groupings of objects
can still make good categories if an appropriate context or theme
can be provided (e.g., Barsalou 1985; Goodman 1972). Conse-
quently, the types of conclusions that are drawn from patient data
in this domain should also consider variation in the structure of
knowledge representations across individuals. In approaches like
HIT, there seems to be an implicit assumption that distinct patterns
of performance across patients can be accounted for largely in terms
of the locus and (presumably) extent of damage to the system. But
it is also likely that impairments reflect individual differences, in ad-
dition to general constraints on representation. It seems to us that
much of the interesting computational work in this domain must
also take place at a more fine-grained level – that is, where the sta-
tistical parameters of intercorrelations among features underlying
category structures are specified (e.g., Devlin et al. 1998; Leek, in
press; McRae et al. 1997). But while H&F discuss possible inter-
correlations between, for example, form and function in object rep-
resentations (Moss et al. 1997), as currently articulated, it is not
clear what HIT adds to this aspect of the debate.
The sensory/functional assumption 
or the data: Which do we keep?
Bradford Mahon and Alfonso Caramazza
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138.
caram@wjh.harvard.edu mahon@fas.harvard.edu
Abstract: The HIT model explains the existence of semantic category-
specific deficits by assuming that sensory knowledge is crucially important
in processing living things, while functional knowledge is crucially impor-
tant in processing nonliving things – the sensory/functional assumption.
Here we argue that the sensory/functional assumption as implemented in
HIT is neither theoretically nor empirically grounded and that, in any case,
there is neuropsychological evidence which invalidates this assumption,
thereby undermining the HIT model as a whole.
The HIT model of Humphreys and Forde (H&F) is a descendent
of the sensory/functional theory (SFT) first proposed by Warring-
ton, McCarthy, and Shallice (Warrington & McCarthy 1983; 1987;
Warrington & Shallice 1984). Both the HIT model and the SFT
explain category-specific deficits through the assumption that vi-
sual properties play a crucial role in recognizing and naming liv-
ing things, while functional/associative properties play an equally
important role in recognizing and naming nonliving things. We
will call this assumption as instantiated in the HIT model, the sen-
sory/functional assumption. Although this assumption has been
challenged in the context of the SFT on both theoretical and em-
pirical grounds (Caramazza & Shelton 1998) the authors of the
HIT model worry that their theory may be too powerful, with too
many dimensions, to be empirically refuted. In this commentary
we will argue that this worry may be unnecessary: the evidence
that has been used to undermine the SFT also undermines the
HIT model.
One argument presented by Caramazza and Shelton (1998)
against the SFT is that the putative distinction between the cate-
gories “living” and “nonliving” in terms of the relative importance
of visual/perceptual and functional/associative properties is em-
pirically untenable. When asked to list the important properties of
a given exemplar, normal subjects do not list more visual proper-
ties for living things compared to nonliving things; nor do they list
more functional/associative properties for nonliving things com-
pared to living things (Caramazza & Shelton 1998; Garrard et al.,
in press; McRae & Cree, in press).
This objection may not apply as forcefully to the HIT model
since it implements the sensory/functional assumption in a more
complex way (even though it also assumes that visual properties
are more important for the category “living things”). Within HIT,
the principal aspect of the sensory/functional assumption is that
members of the category “living things” are structurally much
more similar to one another than are exemplars from the category
“nonliving things.” A consequence of this putative difference in
perceptual “crowding” between categories is that any perturba-
tion in processing visual structural representations would dispro-
portionately affect the category “living things.” A parallel argu-
ment is made for functional properties and the category “nonliving
things.” But what is the evidence that living things are structurally
more similar to one another than are nonliving things?
Consider one result cited by H&F in support of the differential
crowding assumption (and which presumably was used to estimate
the structural similarity parameter in the modeling experiments
they cite). Humprheys et al. (1995) found that exemplars from the
category “living things” were rated to be more structurally similar
to one another than exemplars from the category “nonliving
things.” The items used to obtain the ratings were 10 from the cat-
egory “living things” (cat, tiger, cow, fox, horse, squirrel, donkey,
camel, deer, and pig) and 10 from the category “nonliving things”
(belt, blouse, boot, coat, dress, pants, ring, tie, watch, and sweater).
However, the structural similarity ratings could easily go the other
way, with nonliving things being rated as more structurally similar
to one another than living things by the judicious selection of the
items to be rated (e.g., living 5 {octopus, trout, seahorse, worm,
dog}; nonliving 5 {screwdriver, awl, socket-wrench, file, chisel}).
The issue of whether living things actually are more structurally
similar to one another than are nonliving things remains an 
open question, which cannot be determined by rating only a few
exemplars from the two categories, unless theoretically-unbiased
sampling criteria are specified. But this has not been the case.
Without theory internal motivations or independent empirical 
evidence, the authors’ generalization from the twenty exemplars
represented in the model to the entire categories of “living” and
“nonliving” is dubious at best. In short, there is no compelling em-
pirical evidence in support of the claim that visual properties play
a greater role in processing the category “living things” than the
category “nonliving things.”
However, even if we were to grant for the sake of argument that
living things are more structurally similar to one another than are
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nonliving things, there are three types of neuropsychological evi-
dence that are inconsistent with the sensory/functional assump-
tion of the HIT model. These are the same empirical facts cited
by Caramazza and Shelton (1998) to be inconsistent with predic-
tions derived from the SFT.
(1) The categories of category-specific deficits are more fine-
grained than would be expected if conceptual knowledge were or-
ganized merely on the basis of the visual/functional distinction. If
we assume that visual properties are more important for the re-
cognition of living things compared to nonliving things, we would
not expect to find patients with a deficit to the category “animals”
but not to “fruit and vegetables” or the reverse dissociation –
impairment to the category “fruit and vegetables” with no impair-
ment to “animals.” But these patterns of category-specific deficit
have been observed (Caramazza & Shelton 1998; Farah & Wal-
lace 1992; Hart & Gordon 1992; Hart et al. 1985; Hillis & Cara-
mazza 1991). The HIT model might account for this pattern of
performance by making the ad hoc assumption that within the cat-
egory “living,” different types of visual properties are more im-
portant for some categories of exemplars (e.g., shape for animals)
than others (e.g., color and texture for fruits and vegetables).
However, it has already been shown that patients with a deficit in
retrieving the color of objects do not show disproportionate diffi-
culty for the category “fruits and vegetables” (Luzzatti & David-
off 1994; Miceli et al., in press).
(2) Given the sensory/functional assumption, patients with a se-
lective deficit to the category “living” should also display a greater
deficit for the visual/perceptual properties of exemplars from the
impaired category compared to their functional/associative prop-
erties. Caramazza (1998) reviews five patients (patient EW: Cara-
mazza & Shelton 1998; patients GR and FM: Laiacona et al. 1993;
patient JEN: Samson et al. 1998; Moss et al. 1998) with selective
deficits to the category “living” but equal impairments for func-
tional and visual knowledge of living things. H&F defend the HIT
model against this pattern of deficit in two ways. First, they claim
that there are two types of functional/associative knowledge.
Functional knowledge of living things includes biological func-
tions such as eating and the context in which the exemplar is
found, while functional knowledge of nonliving things includes an
object’s usage and motor activity on the part of the user. They con-
clude: “Hence the ‘functional’ knowledge that can be impaired in
patients with impairments for living things is not the same as the
‘functional’ knowledge about nonliving things that can be spared.
Until . . . the type of information [in neuropsychological tests] has
been matched across categories, there is no empirical reason to
abandon an account which stresses the importance of different
types of information for different categories” (sect. 4.3). It is not
clear what kind of matching the authors are requesting. They
could not be asking for task items to be matched for such factors
as task difficulty or familiarity, because these variables were
matched in the case of EW, for example. If they meant that the
same items be included for the two categories, then by their own
definitions of what counts as functional knowledge for living
things and nonliving things, it is not possible to match the type of
information between the two categories. It is not clear then what
the force of their conclusion is supposed to be – it seems that they
are building into their theory just the categorical distinction
against which they are arguing. Are the authors claiming that func-
tional knowledge is domain-specific?
Second, the authors propose that damage to visual/sensory fea-
tures will simply make inaccessible the functional information as-
sociated with the visual representation. In support of this claim,
they cite neuroimaging results in which an area assumed to be in-
volved in storing information about the form of objects showed ac-
tivation when subjects were answering functional questions about
animals (Chao et al.,1999; Thompson-Schill et al. 1999; but see
Caramazza 2000 for criticism of Thompson-Schill et al.). How-
ever, it is not possible to know whether a brain region that shows
activation in an imaging study is necessary for the task in which
the subject is engaged – the region could just as well be active be-
cause it is associated with the task. Because H&F are making a
claim about the necessity of visual/sensory knowledge when an-
swering functional questions about living things, the neuroimag-
ing evidence is simply not capable of supporting their claim. Fur-
thermore, the only implication that could be drawn from the
neuroimaging results is that some visual knowledge is activated
when subjects answer functional questions about animals. But the
authors need much stronger evidence to support their quantita-
tive claim that functional knowledge is impaired to the same de-
gree as visual knowledge. Even if the neuroimaging data were ca-
pable of supporting a claim about the necessity of visual
knowledge for answering functional questions, the data cannot be
stretched into supporting a claim of why patients show equivalent
deficits to visual and functional knowledge.
Consider then the state of the HIT model’s explanation of the
performance of patients EW, GR, and FM (three of the patients
cited above who had deficits to the category living and equal im-
pairments to visual and functional knowledge for that category).
These three patients were at close to normal levels of performance
for visual and functional knowledge for the category “nonliving.”
HIT must at the same time make the claim that damage to visual
knowledge is extensive enough so as to create equivalent impair-
ments for functional knowledge in the category “living,” and ac-
knowledge that visual knowledge is unimpaired for the category
“nonliving” in the same patients. Thus, we are left with the unan-
swered question: How is it that visual/perceptual knowledge of
nonliving things is unimpaired in these patients? Are we to enter-
tain the claim that there are two kinds of visual/perceptual knowl-
edge, one kind for living things and one kind for nonliving things?
Neither can the performance of these patients be dismissed by
the claim that ceiling effects in the unimpaired category are mask-
ing a deficit. For example, patient GR (Laiacona et al. 1993) was
impaired for both visual and functional knowledge of living things
(55 and 58% correct, respectively) and yet was not at ceiling for
visual and functional knowledge of nonliving things (91 and 84%,
respectively). Thus, it cannot be the case that a deficit for the vi-
sual properties of nonliving things is not being detected.
(3) Even if we were to grant the claim that visual knowledge is
necessary in order to answer functional questions about animals,
the central prediction made by this hypothesis is not borne out.
The prediction is the same as that made by the sensory/functional
assumption: patients who have damage to visual/perceptual
knowledge must have a deficit to the category “living.” However,
patients have been reported with an impairment to visual/per-
ceptual knowledge but no deficit to the category “living” (Colt-
heart et al. 1998; Lambon Ralph et al. 1998). H&F acknowledge
the problem posed by this last pattern of deficit and present an
empirical argument in defense of the HIT model in which they
cite an unpublished simulation (Watson & Humphreys, in prepa-
ration, cited in Humphreys & Forde 2000) which supposedly
shows that it is possible to damage visual knowledge in the model
in such a way that the “differential impairment to living things” is
decreased. However, evidence from simulations in which the dif-
ference in impairment levels between categories is reduced when
certain types of “lesions” are made to the model is not sufficient
to save HIT. What they must show is that the model performs in
a quantitatively comparable way to the behavior of patients: se-
verely impaired knowledge of visual/perceptual features but
worse performance in naming exemplars from the category “non-
living” than “living” (Lambon Ralph et al. 1998).
It does not seem that theories based on the sensory/functional
assumption are able to account for the facts of category-specific
deficits. Thus, in response to the authors’ worry that the HIT
model’s current articulation is too powerful to be empirically re-
futed, we have argued that there already exists sufficient neu-
ropsychological evidence to invalidate the model’s core assump-
tion, and consequently, the model as a whole.
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On disentangling and weighting kinds 
of semantic knowledge
Agnesa Pillon and Dana Samson
Unité de Neuropsychologie Cognitive, Université Catholique de Louvain,
Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348, Belgium. {pillon; samson}@neco.ucl.ac.be
www.neco.ucl.ac.be
Abstract: To account for category-specific semantic deficits, Humphreys
and Forde propose to fractionate semantic memory into multiple sensory
and functional knowledge stores. There are reasons to doubt the empiri-
cal productivity of this proposal, unless theoretically motivated principles
of distinguishing and weighting the different kinds of object knowledge
can be spelled out in detail.
In order to account for category-specific semantic deficits, Hum-
phreys and Forde (H&F) assume that different forms of sensory
and functional knowledge are weighted differently in the repre-
sentation of different categories of objects and that each of these
knowledge forms is represented within a separated knowledge
store. Our commentary focuses on this particular aspect of the Hi-
erarchical Interactive Theory. We think further specifications are
needed before this Multiple-Knowledge-Stores (MKS) account
for category-specific semantic deficits could be put into the ap-
propriate empirical test.
First, the account should make more explicit the principles that
are assumed to organize knowledge in semantic memory. Unless
these principles are spelled out in detail, there is no theoretically-
motivated basis on which a consistent taxonomy of the different
kinds of object knowledge could be drawn and the relevant tests
for assessing patients’ semantic knowledge be designed. There is
no obvious means to relate a given property of an object to one or
another kind of knowledge. How could we decide, for example,
that “kangaroos move by jumping” is a property pertaining to
knowledge of “biological functions,” “action,” or “motion” and on
which basis could we assume that knowledge of this property re-
lies on a functional/biological, functional/action or visual/motion
knowledge store? The present ambiguity comes in part from the
knowledge stores being equated with “perceptual recognition”
stores. On one hand, this invites the interpretation that knowledge
of object properties is assumed to be organized according to the
sensory modality or modalities that are used to learn and transact
particular objects (Tranel et al. 1997). On this interpretation,
knowledge of biological functions, as well as knowledge of char-
acteristic motion (for animate and inanimate objects) and, even,
of object usage, might be considered as being heavily dependent
on visual knowledge. On the other hand, a number of non-inci-
dental aspects of object knowledge seemingly could not be linked
uniquely or directly to a specific perceptual or motor knowledge
store. We know where and how animals live, how to eat and cook
vegetables, how we have to take the bus, and that we can use a ket-
tle to boil water for tea. Such knowledge seems to require the var-
ious perceptual and motor features on which objects and actions
are based being integrated within a relation specifying the specific
space, event, process, or goal in which they are involved. It is un-
likely that the elementary sensory and motor features that make
up the vocabulary of perceptual and motor systems could suffice
to represent such knowledge. Integration of features might, at the
very least, require some inter-modal or supra-modal processing
system. It is unclear which knowledge store, located at which hi-
erarchical level of the proposed architecture, could achieve this
goal.
Second, the account should clarify what is meant by the differ-
ent forms of knowledge being weighted differently in the repre-
sentation of different categories of objects. Weighting could be
conceived of as a quantitative or a qualitative feature. In the for-
mer case, it could refer to the ratio of the number of a given kind
over other kinds of properties (Farah & McClelland 1991) or to
the relative prevalence of the different sensory modalities in trans-
acting objects (Tranel et al. 1997). In the latter, one could consider
the extent to which various kinds of properties are important in
discriminating between two similar entities (Warrington & Mc-
Carthy 1983), the relative contribution of each kind of property in
categorizing an exemplar as being or not being a given object
(Malt & Johnson 1992) or the relative centrality (i.e., causal sta-
tus) of different types of properties within the relational structure
of the object’s features (Ahn 1998). Adopting one or another view
of weighting might have significant consequences. Empirical esti-
mates based on different views did produce contrasting results.
For example, Farah and McClelland (1991) found that visual
properties have greater weight than functional properties for liv-
ing but not for nonliving things, whereas Ahn (1998) found that
both visual and functional properties could be causally central in
the representation of living and nonliving things.
Hence, in its present state of specification, the MKS account
does not allow to empirically derive a principled estimate of
knowledge weighting across categories, which is crucially needed
yet to draw new predictions about which subsets of living or/and
nonliving objects could selectively be impaired, given hypotheti-
cal damage to one or another knowledge store.
Still, even such estimate were available, the cascaded and in-
teractive processing framework of the MKS account makes it dif-
ficult to predict, without the help of a simulation, which pattern a
patient with a given category-specific semantic deficit should dis-
play when answering questions about different kinds of object
properties. Let us suppose, for example, that knowledge of fruit is
highly dependent on color knowledge while knowledge of animals
is highly dependent on shape. One could not rule out the follow-
ing expectations: selective damage to the color knowledge store
should impair naming of fruit and, at the same time, the retrieval
of color, shape, and function of fruit, because color knowledge
might also be required when answering questions about shape and
function of fruit – while, for animals, naming as well as retrieving
knowledge of shape, function, and color could be spared because,
in this case, access to color knowledge might be supported by the
integrity of activation from spared knowledge stores (shape and
function). Hence, the question is raised whether a localised dam-
age to such an architecture could eventually result in the pattern
that is intuitively expected given selective damage to a knowledge
store, that is, a selective semantic deficit for a category (e.g., fruit),
associated with a selective impairment in accessing one kind of
knowledge (color) across all categories (fruit, animals, etc.). If this
intuitive prediction were shown to be wrong, then we ask the
question of how evidence could be sought in a patient’s perfor-
mance for the hypothesis that its category-specific deficit origi-
nates from a specific knowledge store being selectively damaged.
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Mutual access and mutual dependence 
of conceptual components
Friedemann Pulvermüller
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Abstract: The HIT model comes close to a view suggested by Donald
Hebb, that cognitive representations are organized as distributed neuron
webs, cell assemblies, whose components are mutually connected and
whose internal connections provide continuous information exchange
among sub-components of the representation. Two questions are asked re-
lated to (1) the organization of internal connections of a concept repre-
sentation and (2) the conditions under which information exchange be-
tween components are assumed in the HIT model.
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Humphreys and Forde’s (H&F’s) seminal paper summarizes a
wealth of neuropsychological and neuroimaging data on category-
specific brain processes. Their synopsis is convincing. Concepts
are laid down in the human brain as distributed representational
and access systems. The cortical topologies of the network or-
ganizing an individual entry in semantic memory reflects linked
sensory knowledge (visual, acoustic, gustatory, etc.), action knowl-
edge, and verbal attribute. Lesions in specific parts of the distrib-
uted networks can affect conceptual categories to different de-
grees (e.g., action-related concepts more than visually or related
ones), and at different processing levels (e.g., in object perception,
processing of functional attributes, or naming). The motor and
sensory modalities crucial for defining a concept, together with
the degree of feature overlap of the concepts, are crucial for de-
termining category-specific brain processes.
This approach exhibits family resemblance to other recent neu-
roscientific models of language and cognition which agree on two
points.
1. A word and the concept it stands for are laid down in the
brain by a distributed neuronal representation. The distributed
representation consists of sub-parts, functionally distinct compo-
nents, representing the concept’s perceptual attributed (e.g.,
structural descriptions of visual attributes), its action attributes
(sometimes referred to as “functional” attributes), and its word
form (functional dependence postulate).
2. There are reciprocal connections allowing for reciprocal
activity flow between the sub-parts of a representation. The bi-
directional connections can yield interactive processing of infor-
mation of different types (e.g., phonological and semantic) and
mutual functional dependence ( functional dependence postulate).
The new neuroscientific models of language and cognition are
distinct from classical modular proposals denying functional de-
pendence (2). A modular view may postulate that information at
each level (perception/structural, action/functional, word form) is
autonomous (or “encapsulated”). They are also different from ac-
counts questioning functionally distinct components (1), for ex-
ample, models implying that all conceptual and meaning-related
items are stored in one uniform conceptual layer.
Although the new models exhibit a family resemblance to each
other, it may be fruitful to look at possible differences. Le me ask
two questions which occurred to me when comparing H&F’s the-
ory to a model we proposed (Braitenberg & Pulvermüller 1992;
Pulvermüller 1991; 1992; 1996; 1999) which builds upon Hebb’s
(1949) concept of cell assemblies.
Paths through the networks. Along which routes would infor-
mation travel through the neuron networks representing concepts
and words? H&F present an architecture where structural de-
scriptions are calculated from visual input. These are mapped onto
functional knowledge including action knowledge and onto other
knowledge types. Only from there is the word form knowledge in
the phonological output lexicon accessed (target article, Fig. 3A;
see also Fig. 1A of this response). A dog picture reminds one of
being chased by such an animal (and of its various other attributes)
and finally calls up the word “dog.” If a concept is accessed
through a different input modality, for example, if a guitar is rec-
ognized from its sound, an analogous process activating the word
form representation indirectly, after excitation of structured de-
scriptions of visual features or action associations (cf. Fig. 3B). The
guitar sound would trigger the mental image of the instrument
and possibly the finger movements necessary for playing it, and
this indirectly triggers the mental pop-up of the word.
As an alternative, the neuron populations organizing the word
form would be connected directly to the neuronal equivalent of
both the structural and functional knowledge (Fig. 1B of this com-
mentary). Direct links would exist from perisylvian language
areas, where word forms may be housed, to the visual areas in in-
ferior temporal lobes, where the structural visually-related infor-
mation may reside, and to the action-related areas in the frontal
lobes, where certain types of functional knowledge may be ex-
pected. The visual picture of the dog would activate the word first,
and finally activity would spread to other areas where, for exam-
ple, action associations or other perceptual attributes are stored.
In an analogous manner, the sound of the guitar would first
awaken the word which, in turn, would activate the shape.
As a third possibility, it may be that all relevant components of
a neurally stored concept are directly linked by reciprocal long-
distance connections. For example, the structural visual repre-
sentation in inferior-temporal and/or occipital areas would be
linked to the word form representation in the perisylvian language
areas which, in turn, would connect to the functional representa-
tion in action-related fronto-central areas, which, finally, would
project to, and receive projections from, the visual areas (Fig. 2 of
this commentary). This architecture may be considered a synthe-
sis of the earlier proposals and would be consistent with neu-
roanatomical knowledge and with the observation that differential
activation seen close to action-related cortical areas occurs quite
early, within the first 1/4 second after presentation onset of writ-
ten words, around the time the lexical access process may take
place (Pulvermüller et al. 1999; 2000).
Mutual dependence of components. Of utmost importance is
H&F’s argument that re-entrant perceptual information from the
visual modality may be essential in object naming (target article,
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Figure 1 (Pulvermüller). A: Sketch of the functionally effective connections illustrated in Humphreys and Forde’s HIT model. Infor-
mation transfer is from structural visual representations to other sensory and action-related functional representations and finally to word
form representations. B: An alternative view may be that there is direct access of word form information from all other functional com-
ponents, so that, for example, both action-related and visually-related information can directly interact with the word form represent ac-
tion.
sect. 6). We recently reported a complementary finding, that action-
related brain processes may be relevant for the access to words that
refer to actions. Patients with lesions in their right hemisphere not
dominant for language were investigated. All suffered from left-
sided hemiparesis caused by lesions destroying part of the motor
cortex and adjacent prefrontal areas of the right hemisphere. These
patients participated in a speeded forced-choice lexical decision ex-
periment where they had to indicate by button presses whether a
briefly presented letter string was a correct German word or a
pseudoword they had never encountered. Although the patients did
not show language difficulties in everyday life or on clinical aphasia
tests, they exhibited category-specific processing deficits for action
verbs, that is, reduced accuracy (and prolonged latencies) of lexical
decisions on action verbs relative to matched word stimuli not pri-
marily characterized by action associations. We interpret this find-
ing as evidence for the importance of re-entrant action-related in-
formation to the word form representation in the lexical decision
task. Taken together, these data are consistent with the idea of func-
tional inter-dependence of the sub-components of conceptual-
linguistic representations (cf. point (2) above) (Genkinger & Pul-
vermüller, in press; Pulvermüller et al. 1998).
H&F postulate “that different forms of knowledge are activated
in a reiterative fashion for name retrieval to operate” (sect. 6.2,
para. 7). It is, however, not clear to me how this generalizes to other
cognitive operations and tasks. A more radical view may be that
such continuous re-entrant information flow between processing
components and cortical areas is a fundamental characteristic of
cortical processing. Would the authors consider this a possibility?
Further evidence in support of a distributed
semantic memory system
Eleanor M. Saffrana and H. Branch Coslettb
aDepartment of Neurology, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Temple
University School of Medicine, Philadelphia, PA 19140; bDepartment of
Neurology, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, Philadelphia, PA
19104. saffran@astro.temple.edu hbc@mail.med.upenn.edu
Abstract: We offer additional points that support a distributed semantic
memory: (1) the activation of representations that are modality-specific;
(2) patients with inferotemporal lesions fail to activate visual object repre-
sentations in semantic tasks, although normal subjects do; (3) direct acti-
vation of action systems from pictorial information, but not from words;
(4) patients who demonstrate superiority with abstract words fail to access
perceptual representations.
We endorse Humphrey and Forde’s (H&F’s) proposal for a dis-
tributed semantic memory system, a position we have advocated
elsewhere (Breedin et al. 1994; Saffran 2000; Saffran & Schwartz
1994; Saffran & Sholl 1999). In this commentary, we would like to
raise several additional points, not cited by these authors, that pro-
vide further support for this view:
Dependence on an abstract, modality-free mode of semantic
representation, as advocated by Caramazza et al. (1990) and oth-
ers (Lambon Ralph & Howard 2000), is not sufficient. One of the
strong arguments in favor of this position is that it is parsimonious.
But it may be questioned whether the brain respects the dictates
of parsimony. Note that in the case of the visual system, different
tasks are apportioned to different areas of the brain (e.g., object
recognition, the representation of color information, motion, spa-
tial location, etc.). Furthermore, evidence from neuropsychology
strongly implicates the need to activate representations in specific
brain areas. Consider, for example, the impairment known as “au-
totopagnosia.” In these cases, which involve damage to the left
parietal lobe, patients are unable to point to parts of the body, even
though the words themselves may sound familiar (e.g., Buxbaum
& Coslett 2000). In contrast, these individuals are able to point to
parts of objects, or even parts of non-human (e.g., horse) bodies;
additionally, these individuals may be able to point to the body
part on which an item of jewelry is worn (e.g., watch), despite the
fact that they are unable to point to the same body part on com-
mand. These data suggest that lexical-semantic knowledge of the
human body is distinct from representations underlying knowl-
edge of objects. Consider color information: could a patient have
knowledge of the color RED (even if she knew that cherries are
red) if there were no pointer to information regarding that color
in the visual system? The evidence suggests that she would not
(e.g., Riddoch et al. 1988). And there is the recent finding that a
patient with bilateral damage to the amygdala, who was capable of
recognizing photographs of people, was able to recognize expres-
sions of happiness, sadness, and disgust. But this same individual
had difficulty recognizing angry facial expressions, and most diffi-
culty describing fearful facial expressions as afraid (Adolphs et al.
1994). These observations are consistent with a model that re-
quires the activation of information represented in systems in the
brain that respond to and store specific types of information.
There is evidence from a functional imaging study that normal
subjects activate posterior temporal regions concerned with ob-
ject recognition in semantic tasks, whereas semantic dementia pa-
tients do not (Mummery et al. 1999). These patients have incurred
damage to the anterior, inferior temporal lobes, the same area that
is affected in herpes simplex encephalitis patients, who constitute
the majority of patients impaired on living things. These findings
suggest that such patients are truly impaired in accessing percep-
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Figure 2 (Pulvermüller). The proposed synthesis is that all sub-components of a distributed cortical representation of a concept are re-
lated, for example, to its visual and action attributes and to its word form.
tual information about objects. Note that the information may not
necessarily be lost, but merely inaccessible to other information
stored in semantic memory, as in a case (DM) we have reported
(Breedin et al. 1994; Srinivas et al. 1997). As noted by H&F, DM
performed rather well on object decision tasks, and demonstrated
priming for perceptually similar objects, although he provided lit-
tle or no information when shown pictures of objects (for exam-
ple, cued by the letter /b/, he called a picture of a bone “a buf-
falo”). But this impairment did not prevent him from carrying out
complex, sequential tasks utilizing objects, such as packing a lunch
box or wrapping a present (Buxbaum et al. 1997). A similar pa-
tient, reported by Lauro Grotto et al. (1997), was able to prepare
a variety of foods, even though she could not associate the labels
for those foods with the relevant objects. The performance of
these tasks may be mediated by connections between object
recognition areas in the inferotemporal lobe and action-related
knowledge stored in the parietal lobe.
As just noted, there are cases in which patients are capable of
carrying out complex tasks with objects, even if they perform
poorly on tasks that assess their knowledge using pictures of ob-
jects (e.g., the Pyramids and Palm Trees test of Howard & Patter-
son 1992). This suggests that there may be a privileged relation-
ship between visual representations of objects and action, as
earlier suggested by Gibson (1979). Data from a study by Rumiati
and Humphreys (1998) support this position. In studies with nor-
mal subjects, they found that action errors were likely to occur
with visual stimuli (e.g., mistaking a hammer for a razor and exe-
cuting a shaving motion), whereas semantic errors were more
likely for verbal stimuli. In our laboratory, we have found that pic-
tures of manipulable objects are more likely to elicit verbs as as-
sociates than words do (Saffran et al. 2000). Recent studies with
optic aphasics, who cannot provide names for visual representa-
tions of objects (although they can name to tactile presentation
and verbal description), have shown that these patients can pro-
vide names for visually presented actions (i.e., verbs) (Campbell
& Manning 1996; Teixeira Ferreira et al. 1997).
Finally, there are a number of reported cases of patients who
demonstrate loss of the normal concreteness effect, namely, bet-
ter performance with concrete than abstract words (e.g., Paivio
1991). There is evidence that these individuals, who do better on
abstract words, fail to gain access to perceptual information about
objects, knowledge that is critical to the meanings of concrete
words (Breedin et al. 1994; Marshall et al. 1996). Moreover, five
of the seven such cases reported in the literature (two were not
tested on this contrast) performed better on artifacts than living
things, another finding that supports the perceptual deficit hy-
pothesis as the source of the impairment with biological objects
(Saffran & Sholl 1999).
These findings argue persuasively in favor of a distributed sys-
tem for semantic representation. It appears that the brain is not a
parsimonious instrument, but rather one that assigns specific op-
erations to particular subsystems. While it is likely that there is, in
addition, a modality-free system for storing information about the
world, it appears that this knowledge base is not sufficient to sup-
port normal performance on semantic memory tasks.
Where are object properties? 
In the world or in the mind?
James Tanaka
Department of Psychology, Oberlin College, Oberlin, OH 44074.
tanaka@cs.oberlin.edu www.oberlin.edu/psych/labs/viscoglab.html
Abstract: This commentary questions whether the category properties of
an object can be determined independent of the experience of the cate-
gorizer. Expertise studies have shown that the judged properties of an ob-
ject can differ from expert to novice and from expert to expert. The ex-
pertise findings indicate that object properties exist not only in the world,
but in the mind of the categorizer.
Among the most compelling puzzles in neuropsychology is how
brain damage can selectively impair knowledge about one cate-
gory (e.g., living things) while leaving knowledge about another
category (e.g., nonliving things) relatively intact. What do these
category-specific breakdowns tell us about the neurological orga-
nization of object knowledge? Theories, such as Humphreys and
Forde’s (H&F’s) HIT model, propose that the semantic system
partitions object knowledge according to its sensory (visual, tac-
tile, auditory) and functional properties. To account for category-
specific impairments, such as breakdowns between living and
nonliving things, property-based models propose that objects
from the category of living things contain a disproportionate
amount of visual features in contrast to nonliving objects which
possess a greater number of functional features. Consequently,
damage to visual properties will more severely impair one’s knowl-
edge of living things, whereas damage to the functional properties
will more greatly impair the knowledge of nonliving things. While
property-based models provide a viable account of category-
specific impairments, these models leave unspecified exactly how
the object properties of a category – sensory or functional – are
derived. These models assume that object properties exist some-
where “out there” in the world, waiting for the human categorizer
to discover them. In this commentary, a contrasting viewpoint is
presented where the pragmatics of object categorization are
stressed. According to the pragmatic view (see also Schyns 1998),
object properties are not only determined by the intrinsic features
of an object (e.g., color, shape), but also by the experience and mo-
tivations of the categorizer.
How might experience influence the specification of object
properties? Methodologically, this question can be addressed by
asking experts to list the properties of objects in their domain of
expertise and compare these features to the properties listed by
novices. When Marjorie Taylor and I asked expert dog judges and
bird watchers to list properties for dogs and birds (Tanaka & Tay-
lor 1991), we found that the expert features differed in number,
proportion, and type from the features listed by novices. Overall,
experts mentioned a greater number of functional features for
birds and dogs than novices. As pointed out by H&F, “functional”
with respect to living things typically refers to the behavioral prop-
erties of the object (as opposed to instrumental properties related
to the function of nonliving things). For example, bird experts
knew more than novices about migratory patterns and feeding
habitats of birds, whereas dog experts were more knowledgeable
about the physical abilities and temperaments that distinguish
particular breeds of dogs. These findings suggest that the func-
tional properties of an object are not invariant, but emerge as the
result of the everyday interactions between the object and the cat-
egorizer.
If expertise influences a category’s functional content, it is pos-
sible that expertise might also influence the perceived visual prop-
erties of a category. In the expert study, we found that both bird
and dog experts listed more visual features for objects in their do-
main of expertise than novices. Closer examination of their fea-
tures revealed that bird and dog experts were more knowledge-
able about the color and shape properties of objects in their
domain than novices. Given that bird watching and dog judging
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require the ability to make fine perceptual discriminations quickly
and accurately, it is not surprising that experts would be keenly
aware of the visual properties that characterize objects in their do-
main of expertise. Thus, while the visual properties of an object
are perceptually available to any observer, these features are not
attended to unless they are relevant to the pragmatics of the ob-
server’s task.
The role of pragmatics can be further examined by studying ex-
perts who share the same object domain, but different task goals
within that domain. Medin et al. (1997) investigated the category
knowledge of three types of tree experts, taxonomists, landscape
workers, and park maintenance personnel. They found that tax-
onomists and maintenance workers identified different morpho-
logical properties of trees whereas landscape workers differed
from the other two types of experts with respect to the functional
properties associated with trees. Although all three types of ex-
pertise required specialized knowledge of trees, the kind of knowl-
edge needed to fulfill the pragmatics of that expertise differed
across the groups. Other studies have shown that object proper-
ties are variable and individualistic even for experts who share the
same object domain and task goals within that domain. Studying
expert recreational fishermen, Boster and Johnson (1989) found
that whereas some of the sport fishermen were sensitive to the
morphological properties of fish, other sport fishermen placed
more emphasis on their functional properties. These studies are
informative because they show that despite sharing the same
knowledge domain (i.e., trees or fish), there is considerable varia-
tion across different kinds of experts and also within the same kind
of expert group.
In summary, the expert research demonstrates that the category
properties of birds, dogs, trees, and fish cannot be determined in-
dependent of the person doing the categorizing. While these ex-
periments have focused on expertise related to natural kind cate-
gories, there would be no reason to expect that the pragmatics of
expertise would be any different for experts who specialize in the
categorization of artifactual objects (e.g., automobiles, stamps, an-
tiques). Finally, while the pragmatic view emphasizes the place of
individual differences in object semantics, this approach does not
deny that objects are predisposed toward certain visual and func-
tional characteristics (as suggested by H&F’s HIT model). How-
ever, beyond an object’s normative properties, the manner in which
an object is perceived and used will depend on the unique goals of
the individual. Thus, the pragmatic view holds that object knowl-
edge is not only determined by the structure found in the world,
but also by the structure found in the mind of the categorizer.
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About numbers as a semantic category
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Abstract: Humphreys & Forde concentrate on the living/nonliving dis-
sociation. However, further dissociations have been reported, including
selective loss or preservation in recognizing body parts and numbers. This
commentary outlines the relevance of the number category for under-
standing the organising principles of semantic memory.
The observation of a double dissociation between numbers and
other categories of words consecutively to brain lesions highlights
the importance of numbers as a semantic category. Cipolotti et al.
(1991) reported the case of CG, who could neither produce nor
understand numbers, despite normal performance outside of the
number domain. CG was totally unable to read aloud Arabic nu-
merals, to write Arabic numerals to dictation, to discriminate Ara-
bic numerals from meaningless shapes, to discriminate verbal nu-
merals from nonwords, to produce orally the numeral that follows
or precedes a given auditory numeral, and to judge which of two
verbal numerals or which of two dot patterns is the larger. In con-
trast, she remained able to produce a normal amount of words
from designed semantic categories, to name pictures from differ-
ent semantic fields, to point to the picture corresponding to a spo-
ken name, to define proverbs, to judge whether two words were
synonyms, and her performance was also flawless in size judge-
ment tasks and size serialisation tasks with pictures.
On the other hand, we have examined the case of a patient
(NM) showing the exact reverse dissociation (Thioux et al. 1998).
NM scored between 0 and 10% correct on tasks of picture nam-
ing, naming from a definition, and production of synonyms. Fur-
thermore, NM’s performance was also impaired in various com-
prehension tasks (identically for words and pictures and across
different categories). Despite the presence of this semantic deficit
and the high degree of anomia, NM retained preserved ability to
comprehend and to produce numbers after the cerebral trauma.
The dissociation was observed in oral naming, written naming, and
in several tasks that do not require the processing of Arabic nu-
merals (e.g., verbal fluency tasks, verbal association, recitation,
“what comes next/before” questions). In addition, NM had re-
tained preserved performance on tasks specific to the numerical
domain. For instance, he could read aloud syntactically complex
Arabic numerals, and he could compute or retrieve the solution of
simple arithmetical problems.
One potential explanation of the preservation of numbers in
NM was the relatively high frequency of these elements. How-
ever, we showed that the dissociation remained even when the
items were matched for frequency. Another potential account of
the preservation of numbers was the relatively small size of the
category. However, there was no evidence of a strong correlation
between the size of the category and NM’s performance on tasks
of naming or verbal fluency. Moreover, NM’s performance was in-
accurate in several very small categories composed of very fre-
quent elements (e.g., seasons, geometrical figures). Thus, to-
gether with CG who presented with the reverse dissociation, the
case of NM suggests that numerals form a relevant category at the
semantic level. The only exception to the pattern of dissociation
observed in these two patients was for the days of the week and
the months of the year. In both patients, the series of days and
months were either impaired or preserved with numbers.
Because recent neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that
the left and right intraparietal sulci are sensitive to the magnitude
of numbers (Dehaene et al. 1999; Pinnel et al. 1999), and because
the left parietal region has been found to be the site of the lesion
in several acalculic patients (e.g., Takayama et al. 1994), the se-
lective deficit or preservation of the category of numbers can be
attributed to the selective deficit or preservation of these cortical
regions. Two different hypothesis have been advanced to explain
why the semantic representation of numbers is dependent on the
integrity of these specific cortical regions. According to the first
hypothesis, the meaning of numbers is located where a pre-
linguistic system devoted to the estimation of numerosity has
evolved (Dehaene 1997; Spelke & Dehaene 1999). This archaic
system for processing numerosity is thought to emerge through
the course of evolution within a population of cells involved in rep-
resenting the location of objects in space independently from their
identity and size (Dehaene & Changeux 1993). According to the
second hypothesis, the meaning of numbers has come to be stored
in a region responsible for visuo-spatial processing (Simon 1999).
During child development, this non-numerical system would be
solicited when learning to count (especially for finger-counting),
and then for the construction of a representation of number mag-
nitude.
Now, the question remains to know how many and what kind of
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semantic attributes of numbers must be stored in the adult pari-
etal cortex in order to explain the pattern of dissociation and as-
sociation observed after a brain lesion. The current debate about
category-specific impairments is mainly devoted to the question
of the relative importance of visuo-semantic attributes in the pro-
cessing of living and nonliving entities. If one turns towards num-
bers, it appears that, rather than being defined by visual or func-
tional attributes, numbers are better defined by other numbers.
In fact, numbers share a series of very specific semantic attributes:
they pertain to the same ordered sequence, they represent a quan-
tity, and this quantity can be defined as the sum of the preceding
number and 1, when 0 and 1 have been defined (Russell 1921).
Furthermore, numbers are subject to specific semantic manipu-
lations such as subtraction, multiplication, parity judgment, and so
on. In this respect, one might suggest that numbers are repre-
sented in an autonomous semantic store located in specific corti-
cal areas; a true categorical account (TCA). In such perspective,
most if not all, of the attributes of numbers must be stored in the
same region, and all must be specific to numbers. However, in ap-
parent contradiction with the TCA is the fact that numbers are
also involved in the definition of other concepts (e.g., a dog has got
four legs, there are 60 seconds in one minute, etc.). Another po-
tential explanation of the category-specific deficit or preservation
for numbers might be that they emerge as a category in the se-
mantic system because they share some particular properties im-
plemented in distinct brain regions; a reductionist account (RA).
One such property could be that numbers are organised in an or-
dered sequence. At the semantic level, this means that each num-
ber must be linked to the following one by a “plus-one” link, and
to the preceding one by a “minus-one” link (Thioux et al. 1998).
The observation that, in both NM and CG, the categories of num-
bers, days, and months were conjointly spared or impaired fits
with the hypothesis that these concepts have this important prop-
erty in common. Nonetheless, a RA might have difficultly in ex-
plaining why different aspects of number meaning (e.g., order and
magnitude) were conjointly spared or preserved in CG and NM.
At first glance, this suggests that different meanings of numbers
are grouped together in the same cortical areas.
In this respect, a RA can hardly be distinguished from a TCA,
the only difference being that in the latter the critical areas are as-
sumed to be involved in the storage of all the semantic attributes
of the concepts, and only those. The fact that bilateral parietal ar-
eas are involved in eye movement, visuo-spatial representations,
grasping, time estimation, as well as in magnitude estimation gives
so many opportunities to justify one and the other account. In fact,
all these abilities might have been important in the development
of a fully integrated representation of number meaning, but also,
each of these abilities might rely on a specific area within the pari-
etal lobe.
Concepts and categories: What is the
evidence for neural specialisation?
Lorraine K. Tyler and Helen E. Moss
Centre for Speech and Language, Department of Experimental Psychology,
University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EB, United Kingdom.
lktyler@csl.psychol.cam.ac.uk hem10@cam.ac.uk
Abstract: Humphreys and Forde argue that semantic memory is divided
into separate substores for different kinds of information. However, the
neuro-imaging results cited in support of this view are inconsistent and of-
ten methodologically and statistically unreliable. Our own data indicate no
regional specialisation as a function of semantic category or domain and
support instead a distributed unitary account.
Humphreys & Forde’s (H&F’s)Hierarchical Interactive Theory
(HIT) of object recognition makes important claims about the or-
ganisation and processing of semantic knowledge. In this com-
mentary, we concentrate on two main issues: (1) the authors’ in-
terpretation of the neuro-imaging data as support for their claim
that semantic knowledge is divided into separate stores and that
there is top-down activation of visual information in naming, and
(2) the relation between the organisation of semantic knowledge
and the internal structure of concepts.
H&F suggest that “the concept of a semantic system in any uni-
tary sense may be one of the victims of an attempt to define the
nature of our stored knowledge in more detail” (p. 6). They argue
for multiple substores, concentrating on the separation between
stored structural descriptions and “stored functional and inter-
object association information.” Much of the motivation here
comes from the analysis of the neuroimaging literature (see sect.
5.1) where H&F interpret existing studies as supporting the claim
for anatomical differences in the representation of different cate-
gories or types of knowledge. However, close inspection of the
neuroimaging data suggests a more complex and less coherent pic-
ture than is implied in their review. Instead of a consistent set of
regions being activated in response to either living or nonliving
things, across studies many different regions are activated. For ex-
ample, Perani et al. (1995) report activation in the left fusiform
and the left lingual gyrus for natural kind concepts. None of these
regions overlap with those activated in Mummery et al. (1996)
which reports activation in the left anterior temporal pole, right
anterior temporal pole and right inferior parietal lobe. This dis-
crepancy is typical across the board, with perhaps the exception of
the left posterior middle temporal gyrus which has been activated
in a number of studies in response to tools (Damasio et al. 1996;
Martin et al. 1996). However, even this region is not robustly ac-
tivated within individual studies.
This general lack of consensus across studies is due to many fac-
tors, some methodological and some statistical. H&F acknowl-
edge that some differences may “reflect variations in scanning
procedures or in the task requirements.” We believe that the prob-
lems are even more wide-ranging than this, and warrant greater
caution in the interpretation of results. For example, sets of stim-
uli are not always controlled for factors such as familiarity, image-
ability, and letter length (for words) and visual complexity or struc-
tural similarity (for pictures) although these variables can generate
spurious differences (e.g., Funnell & Sheridan 1992). Problems
also arise because in many studies statistical maps are not cor-
rected for multiple comparisons between voxels. Using uncor-
rected alpha levels over large numbers of contrasts increases the
probability of obtaining a high proportion of false positives. Thus,
many of the reported significant activations may, in fact, be false
positives. Indeed, some studies include little statistical support for
apparent differential activations. Chao et al. (1999) for example,
do not report full statistical information, such as z scores and their
accompanying significance values (nor do they correct for multi-
ple contrasts), yet H&F interpret their finding of lateral fusiform
activation for questions about living things as strong support for
their claim that specific forms of knowledge are drawn on to dif-
ferent degrees when accessing knowledge about living and non-
living things.
When we try to avoid these problems by controlling for nuisance
variables and correcting for multiple statistical comparisons, we find
that there is no neural specialisation as a function of category or do-
main of knowledge (Devlin et al., in press; Tyler & Tovares, in
press). In three PET studies using different tasks (lexical decision
and semantic categorisation) we found an extensive network in L
fronto-temporal regions which was reliably activated for semantic
processing of words and pictures. However, there were no domain
or category effects in either study. We only found differences be-
tween natural kinds and artefacts at an uncorrected level of signifi-
cance and these activations were generally inconsistent across the
experiments.
H&F also rely on neuroimaging results to support the idea of
re-entrant activation of visual information in the naming task.
Their argument is as follows: (1) left inferior and posterior tem-
poral lobes are more involved in object naming than in naming the
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colours of non-objects (Price et al. 1996), (2) if inferior and pos-
terior temporal regions are linked to stored visual knowledge, then
this shows that naming known objects involves extra recruitment
of visual knowledge over and above simply recognising those ob-
jects (i.e., re-entrant activation). The basis for assuming that these
regions are linked to stored visual knowledge is that they are acti-
vated to a greater extent for animals than tools. However, as we
have argued above, the support for this claim is inconsistent at
best. Moreover, even if these regions are more activated for ani-
mals than tools, it seems circular to assume that this is because of
the greater demand on visual processing for these concepts. Thus,
although we agree that interaction among the different stages of
the hierarchy may be more plausible than the strictly feed-forward
cascade model, the specific support cited for this claim is not clear
cut.
Thus, the neuroimaging data do not provide compelling sup-
port for neural specialisation as a function of either category or do-
main. Indeed, they appear to be more compatible with the kind of
distributed account of conceptual knowledge which we have been
developing (Durrant-Peatfield et al. 1997; Tyler & Moss, in press;
Tyler et al. 2000). In this account, concepts are represented as sets
of overlapping features – some distinctive and some shared across
concepts. Frequently co-occurring features (has-legs, has-ears)
support each other and are thus more resistant to damage. Since
their distribution differs across categories, some categories are
more susceptible to semantic damage than others, leading to 
category-specific semantic impairments (Moss & Tyler 2000;
Tyler et al. 2000). On this account, there is no anatomical differ-
entiation by semantic content. Concepts are represented in a dis-
tributed neural system including frontal, temporal, parietal, and
occipital regions. The components of this highly interactive sys-
tem will be more or less involved, depending on a number of fac-
tors – the nature of the input, specific task, and the additional non-
linguistic cognitive demands required.
This leads to our second point. H&F discuss our account of con-
ceptual structure, and agree that “the differences between shared
and distinctive features and the degree to which these features
correlated with the function of the object are likely to be impor-
tant contributing factors in category-specific deficits.” We ac-
knowledge that such models need to be elaborated further and set
within a framework for object recognition (and language compre-
hension). In fact, we have always assumed (implicitly, at least) that
there is a structural description system (or some form of low-level
object processing) necessary for object recognition. We differ
from H&F in assuming that perceptual properties of objects are
not only represented at this level – in a modality specific store of
“templates” for object recognition – but that they are also repre-
sented along with other kinds of semantic property within a dis-
tributed semantic system. One reason for this is that structural
descriptions seem to consist of only a subset of the perceptual
properties of an object – essentially its shape – leaving other per-
ceptual properties such as colour, size, surface texture, and pat-
tern unaccounted for. Second, how are correlations among the
perceptual and functional properties of objects captured if these
properties are stored independently in modular subsystems?
H&F appear to be in agreement with an approach that empha-
sises the internal structure of concepts – yet it is not clear how they
are proposing these inter-feature relations are to be instantiated
across the different information stores.
Thus, while disagreeing with some of their conclusions, we sup-
port H&F’s efforts in laying the groundwork for a thorough dis-
cussion of the issues involved in constructing a cognitive and
neural account of object recognition.
Putting semantics back into the semantic
representation of living things
Deborah Zaitchika and Gregg E. A. Solomonb
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Abstract: The authors’ model reduces the literature on conceptual rep-
resentation to a single node: “encyclopedic knowledge.” The structure of
conceptual knowledge is not so trivial. By ignoring the phenomena central
to reasoning about living things, the authors base their dismissal of se-
mantic systems on inadequate descriptive ground. A better descriptive ac-
count is available in the conceptual development literature. Neuropsy-
chologists could import the insights and tasks from cognitive development
to improve their studies.
The authors claim to be modeling semantic representations in the
domain of living things. To the extent that semantics is about
meaning, we argue that the authors have captured only a small
piece of the puzzle. This point is agnostic with respect to the po-
tential adequacy of a PDP account of the phenomena. Rather, it
is a point about what any model will have to take into account if it
hopes to characterize this cognitive domain adequately. Briefly,
what we do not see in the present paper, nor in most of the neu-
roscience literature at large, is the link between semantics and
concepts.
The sense from much of the neuropsychology literature is that
semantics does not go much beyond naming and object recogni-
tion. However, underlying the semantic phenomena measured in
such tasks is a rich conceptual structure. While this structure is ac-
knowledged in passing by the authors, it plays no role in the model;
“encyclopedic knowledge” is a single node, as if its retrieval were
a trivial matter, not one involving rich and variegated inferences.
For this model, then, a semantic system is not necessary, but only
because it assumes successful retrieval of the very information
such a system would provide.
In fact, the domain of living things is especially rich (see Medin
& Atran 1999). It is one of the earliest and largest domains of
knowledge represented by children; we may even have innate per-
ceptual and attentional mechanisms for the detection of living
things (such as specific motion detectors). Thus, it has been ex-
tensively studied by cognitive developmentalists. This literature
provides us with a rich description of the central phenomena that
characterize reasoning about living things. The best account of
these phenomena to date is that semantic representations in this
domain are organized in a hierarchical conceptual structure.
Moreover, we represent certain concepts as having special status
within the domain. Biological concepts such as growth, nutrition,
movement, and reproduction play a central role in how we reason
about living things, allowing us to make predictions and support-
ing causal explanations. Core concepts such as these specify which
objects are in the domain and which are out.
To the extent that researchers want to model semantic repre-
sentations of living things, this is the understanding that needs to
be explained. It is an understanding that is not captured by a
model of encyclopedic knowledge that likens retrieval to looking
up meaning in a dictionary. For example, there is evidence that
children’s understanding of what is “alive” undergoes radical con-
ceptual change – a change more fundamental than simply alter-
ing a denotational listing (Carey 1985). We understand the mean-
ing of the concept “alive” in terms of a system of interrelated
concepts. For children to understand what is alive as we adults do
(i.e., for them to make similar predictions or explanations about
the behavior and attributes of living things), they must come to in-
terrelate the various phenomena of living things in terms of the
causal mechanisms that govern the bodily machine. Moreover,
there are complex and nontrivial ways in which children’s under-
standings diverge from those of adults even when they know the
facts relevant to the adult understanding, as is the case in their rea-
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soning about biological inheritance and germ-based illness
(Solomon et al. 1996). There are complex and nontrivial paths by
which children come to reason about living things as do adults in
their culture (Hatano & Inagaki 1994). And there are complex and
nontrivial ways in which reasoning about living things breaks
down, in which the node of encyclopedic knowledge fails to pro-
vide the relevant conceptual information, as we see in other stud-
ies of patients with Alzheimer’s disease (Chan et al. 1997).
Encyclopedic knowledge is the heart of semantics; characteriz-
ing it as a single node, and then largely ignoring it, simply will not
do. If the goal of the endeavor is to capture everyday reasoning
and changes in it with time, development, or impairment, then the
model must be extended so as to take account of conceptual struc-
ture. To be sure, this will require the use of a new set of tasks.
Though the standard neuropsychological tasks (e.g., naming, pic-
ture recognition) were critical in revealing semantic impairment,
they cannot lay bare the underlying conceptual domain. Thus they
cannot address the variety of ways in which the concepts of living
things can be acquired and can break down. The authors, like oth-
ers in the field, make broad claims about their ability to model our
reasoning about living things while looking at only a tiny fraction
of the data.
Researchers in cognitive development have laid out a compre-
hensive picture of the semantic relations normally represented in
this domain from infancy to adulthood. They have a large and well-
established literature utilizing a wide array of well-understood
methods. To date there has been little cross-fertilization between
cognitive developmentalists and neuropsychologists (the work of
Chan is a notable exception). By importing the insights and meth-
ods from research in conceptual development, neuropsychologists
can better address the debate about cognitive architecture. We
worry that the success of the authors’ model, as it stands, is due to
its limited notion of semantic knowledge. It is possible that such
PDP models could be extended successfully to account for rea-
soning about living things, but without a more complete descrip-
tive account of the conceptual domain, we cannot say that the de-
bate has yet been adequately engaged. We are not endorsing PDP;
we are endorsing the debate.
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Abstract: We summarise and respond to the main points made
by the commentators on our target article, which concern: (1)
whether structural similarity can play a causal role in normal ob-
ject identification and in neuropsychological deficits for living
things, (2) the nature of our structural knowledge of the world, (3)
the relations between sensory and functional knowledge of ob-
jects, and the nature of our functional knowledge about living
things, (4) whether we need to posit a “core” semantic system, (5)
arguments that can be marshalled from evidence on functional
imaging, (6) the causal mechanisms by which category differences
can emerge in object representations, and (7) the nature of our
knowledge about categories other than living and nonliving things.
We also highlight points raised in our article that seem to be ac-
cepted.
R1. Sometimes it’s not what you say 
but what you don’t say
Sometimes it’s not what people say but what they don’t say
that makes the interesting point. Our target article, on the
nature of apparent category-specific deficits in neuropsy-
chological populations, had several objectives. These were
(1) to review both the empirical database and the different
theoretical accounts of category-specific deficits within the
literature; (2) to argue that no single account was able to ex-
plain the full pattern of deficits that have been reported;
and (3) to propose that a deficit at one locus of processing
could not explain all cases, and that patients could have im-
pairments at various stages of processing (including deficits
that are more “perceptual” than “semantic” in nature), each
of which could generate a deficit for particular categories
of object. Finally, we attempted to provide an overall pro-
cessing architecture, the Hierarchical Interactive Theory
(HIT) to account for the different deficits that have been
documented. The first main assumption of HIT is that the
stages of processing leading to object naming are hierar-
chical, with (for example) stored perceptual knowledge be-
ing distinct from, and accessed prior to, stored functional
knowledge about objects. The second main assumption is
that the object recognition system is highly interactive, with
re-entrant feed-back activation as well as feed-forward ac-
tivation between the different stages of processing.
The commentators on our article raise many interesting
points, summarised in Table R1. Only Bub & Bukach com-
ment (favourably) on our argument concerning the hetero-
geneity of the disorders, none comment on the evidence for
a hierarchical organisation of the object processing system,
and only Pulvermüller discusses the idea of re-entrant feed-
back in any detail. This silence is important. From it we infer
that there are indeed no major objections to our contentions
on these points; the commentators accept that the functional
deficit can vary across patients (and can include forms of per-
ceptual disorder), and that perceptual knowledge is distinct
(and can be dissociated from) other forms of stored knowl-
edge about objects. From this it follows that category-specific
deficits should not be treated as a unitary phenomenon,
rather the functional locus of the problem should be defined
in each patient and studies need to clarify the particular type
of patient that is being accounted for. This is important be-
cause in previous investigations researchers have assumed
that, because an impairment may be isolated to the same cat-
egory of object in different patients, the locus of the deficit is
the same (typically being thought to derive from a disorder of
semantic memory; e.g., Caramazza 1998). Our argument is
that this assumption is incorrect. If this point is taken on
board in the literature, then we believe that our target article
has been worthwhile, even if the full details of our own ac-
count are not accepted or need further working through. It is
the particular details of our account that commentators have
in the main responded to, and which we answer below.
The major issues that are highlighted by the commenta-
tors are listed in Table R1, along with the commentators in-
volved.
R2. Structural similarity and category effects 
in normal object identification
In our target article, we proposed that, defined across a cat-
egory, living things tend to have more similar perceptual
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structures than nonliving things (one exception being body
parts, which are sometimes classified as “living things” and
which tend to be perceptually dissimilar within their cate-
gory; see Humphreys et al. 1988). Two sets of commenta-
tors, Mahon & Caramazza and Laws, query whether this
is the case. Mahon & Caramazza criticize a paper by
Humphreys et al. (1995), which used similarity ratings on
subsets of living and nonliving things to define the input
representations for simulations of category-effects in both
normal and impaired object identification. They argue that
ratings generated across subsets of objects may be biased
by the objects chosen. Thus, not too much should be made
of the fact that participants rated living things as being more
perceptually similar than nonliving things with the sample
of objects used in that paper. We agree with this point.
However, we are puzzled by the reference to this one pa-
per which used a subset of objects for simulation purposes,
when, in the target article, we mentioned other studies that
have attempted to generate independent measures of per-
ceptual similarity within theoretically-unbiased samples of
object categories. For example, Humphreys et al. (1988) re-
ported results from measures of within-category overlap
across the bounding contours of 76 name-frequency
matched objects depicted in the Snodgrass and Vanderwart
(1980) picture norms. Measured across all the objects de-
picted within the different categories, living things had
higher levels of contour overlap than nonliving things (bar-
ring body parts). Humphreys et al. also had independent
participants list the number of parts present in objects and
reported that living things tended to have more common
parts than nonliving things. These other studies provide in-
dependent support for the argument about differences in
perceptual similarity within classes of living and nonliving
things.
Laws raises a related point to Mahon & Caramazza. In
fact, he argues that nonliving things are structurally more
similar than living things, if similarity is based on the num-
ber of pixels in common across the exemplars in the Snod-
grass and Vanderwart norms. He suggests that this provides
a more valid measure than contour overlap because it is
sensitive to the internal detail in the depictions. The trou-
ble here is that the overlap in the internal detail specified
in line drawings is quite arbitrary and likely to reflect
whether the artist has drawn in a texture. Pixel-level mea-
sures, then, are perhaps less likely than outline contour sim-
ilarity to reflect the perceptual relations between objects in
real life. Indeed, measures of contour overlap have been
shown to predict the degree of naming deficit in at least
some patients with apparent category-specific deficits for
living things (Forde et al. 1997). We also note that other at-
tempts to develop pixel-level measures of similarity do not
agree with Laws’s conclusion. Gale et al. (in press) have
simulated category-specific deficits in object recognition in
which a first stage of object classification was carried out by
means of a Kohonen map (Kohonen 1988). They used
pixel-based input descriptions of photographs drawn from
sets of animals, furniture, musical instruments, and cloth-
ing (35 per category). After training the model they found
that, within the Kohonen map, animals and musical instru-
ments tended to have closely clustered representations,
with individual objects being represented by overlapping
units each activated to a moderate degree. In contrast, in-
dividual items of furniture and clothing tended to be rep-
resented by fewer units with sharp peaks of activation.
Identification in the model was assessed by training a fur-
ther module to assign names to the individual objects. Gale
et al. found that it was more difficult for the model to learn
basic names for animals and musical instruments than for
furniture and clothing, reflecting the overlap in the repre-
sentations for animals and musical instruments within the
Kohonen map. The interesting point about this simulation
is that the categorical differences emerged despite the
model not being provided with any explicit information
about object categories. This provides independent, theo-
retically-neutral evidence for similarity being higher for at
least one major class of living thing (animals) than for two
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Table R1. Issues raised by the commentators on our target article
Issues:
Structural Perceptual Sensory- Semantic Imaging Underlying Other
similarity knowledge function knowledge mechanisms categories
relations
Commentators:
Laws Arguin & Cree & McRae Bub & Bukach Bub & Bukach Arterberry Thioux et al.
Saumier
Leek & Pothos Arterberry Lambon Ralph Coslett & Coslett & Barrett Pulvermuller
& Garrard Saffran Saffran
Mahon & Davidoff Leek & Pathos de Almeida Mahon & Lamberts
Caramazza Caramazza
Graf & Mahon & Pillon & Tyler & Moss Lambon-Ralph
Schneider Caramazza Samson & Garrard
Mahon & Pillon & Tyler & Moss Tanaka
Caramazza Samson
Saffran & Zaitchik & Zaitchik &
Coslett Solomon Solomon
classes of nonliving thing (furniture and clothing). It is also
interesting that, for the model, musical instruments tended
to be treated more like animals than to the other nonliving
things. In the neuropsychological literature patients with
problems in identifying living things often also have prob-
lems with musical instruments (e.g., Warrington & Shallice
1984; see also Leek & Pothos). Gale et al.’s simulations
suggest that this is due to inherent differences in percep-
tual similarity across these object classes.
An experimental approach to the same issue has also
been reported by Lamberts and Shapiro (in press). They
had normal participants perform a task requiring access
only to perceptual information about the stimuli – simple
same-different matches with living and nonliving stimuli,
with items on “different” trials being paired at random
within each category. Living things were matched more
slowly than nonliving things, consistent with them having
higher levels of perceived similarity.
Laws also queries whether normal participants show an
advantage for identifying nonliving over living things, as
might be expected if living things have greater levels of per-
ceptual similarity across category members. There are a
number of points to be made here. One is that the argu-
ment is based on studies by Laws and colleagues with a rel-
atively small set of items which tended to be low in famil-
iarity and name frequency. In other experiments measuring
the speed of normal object naming, perceptual similarity
has been found to vary with name frequency, with the
largest effects being found on items with high frequency
names (Humphreys et al. 1988). We have argued that this
is because of competition from perceptual neighbours for
items from categories with high perceptual similarity, which
counteracts the advantage for objects with high frequency
names. Hence studies using low frequency items are un-
likely to be sensitive to the most telling effects of percep-
tual similarity. In the data of Laws (1999) category was also
found to interact with gender – males tending to show an
advantage for nonliving things and females for living. Again
this may reflect the low familiarity of some of their nonliv-
ing things for the female subjects. In addition, on our ac-
count it is perceptual similarity, rather than category, which
should be important for normal participants. Laws and col-
leagues have only varied category. Humphreys et al. varied
perceptual similarity and so included body parts within
their perceptually dissimilar items. Manipulations of cate-
gory alone may cut across some variations in perceptual
similarity. Laws et al. further suggest that the data from
Humphreys et al. could have been due to variations in fac-
tors such as the familiarity and complexity of the items.
However, when these data are re-analysed with familiarity,
complexity, and other factors such as name and image
agreement and individual name frequency as co-variates,
then both the effect of category and the category x fre-
quency interaction remain (F(1,67) 5 9.51 and F(1,67) 5
6.50, both p , 0.025). One other study reporting an ad-
vantage for structurally dissimilar over similar living things
in normal object naming was reported by Snodgrass and Yu-
ditsky (1996), using a considerably larger set of items from
the Snodgrass and Vanderwart norms than any other study.
Again re-analysis of the data across all categories with struc-
turally similar and dissimilar items (taking the categories
from Humphreys et al. 1988 – a set of 216 items in total)
reveals that the category effect remains even with name and
image agreement, familiarity, complexity, and individual
name frequencies filtered out (F(1,209) 5 4.51, p , 0.04).
These prior results do not seem to have been due to the ef-
fects of covarying factors.
The results of the studies by Laws and colleagues nev-
ertheless indicate that it is important to understand the cir-
cumstances in which apparent category effects can occur
for normal participants. In some of the studies by Laws
(e.g., Laws & Neve 1999), living things were better identi-
fied than nonliving things under brief presentation condi-
tions. Gerlach (in press) has replicated this advantage for
living things when objects are degraded by lateralised stim-
ulus presentations. However, using exactly the same items,
Gerlach found the opposite advantage (for nonliving
things) under unlimited presentation conditions. Gerlach
used an object decision task and reported that the nonliv-
ing advantage increased as the specificity of the information
required for object decision increased (e.g., as the non-
objects became more object-like). This last result is consis-
tent with perceptual similarity having an impact when ob-
servers conducted a detailed assessment of stored visual
knowledge to discriminate objects from non-objects under
normal viewing conditions. Under degraded presentation
conditions, though, several factors may act against nonliv-
ing things including: the loss of high spatial frequency com-
ponents, increased variation in base-level exemplars which
makes their perceptual structures less reliable when de-
graded (see Laws & Neve 1999, for this argument), and the
dependence of living things on global shape properties for
their identification. At present it is unclear which (if any) of
these factors is crucial, though it is clearly important to un-
derstand which perceptual factors determine the efficiency
of identification, and under what conditions, if we are to de-
rive a full account of why effects of object category emerge
even with normal observers. Nevertheless, we propose that
important forms of perceptual similarity are high amongst
many categories of living thing, and that perceptual simi-
larity has a deleterious effect on normal object identifica-
tion under standard viewing conditions. This is further sup-
ported by evidence that some patients with apparent
category-specific deficits for living things also fare badly
when asked to name perceptually similar sets of nonliving
things (Forde et al. 1997); by evidence on the clustering of
visual and semantic errors when normal subjects make
naming errors to objects (Vitkovitch et al. 1993); and by the
evidence on “category differences” emerging when nonhu-
man primates have to learn individual responses to living
and nonliving things (Gaffan & Heywood 1993).
R2.1. The nature of our perceptual knowledge 
and the necessity and sufficiency of access 
to different knowledge representations
In our target article, we distinguished between stored
structural knowledge about objects (which we termed our
stored structural descriptions) and our knowledge about
inter-object associations and object function. This distinc-
tion was derived from neuropsychological data indicating
that patients could have intact visual access to structural
knowledge (as indicated by good performance on difficult
object decision tasks), as well as impaired access to seman-
tic knowledge ( judged by poor ability to match associa-
tively related objects). As we indicated in the article (n. 3),
we are not committed to our structural knowledge of
objects taking a particular form of representation – for ex-
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ample, this knowledge could explicitly represent the parts
of objects and their inter-relations or it could be more holis-
tic, without explicit part decomposition. Although the term
“structural description” can imply a parts-based represen-
tation (e.g., Biederman 1987), in our hands this is not the
case, and we used the term primarily to maintain consis-
tency with earlier articles in which the distinction between
perceptual and other forms of stored knowledge was de-
rived (e.g., Humphreys et al. 1988). Graf & Schneider dis-
cuss whether structural knowledge is holistic or parts-
based. They are quite correct to point out that evidence on
the limits of view-invariance in object recognition goes
against many part-based accounts of structural knowledge,
though it may be possible to salvage a parts-based account
using implicit coding, as they suggest. However this work
on view invariance goes beyond the scope of our target ar-
ticle.
Nevertheless, arguments about the nature of our stored
perceptual knowledge do have an impact on the debate
concerning category-specific deficits. Let us begin by con-
sidering knowledge of object form, before discussing the
representation of other perceptual attributes (colour, size,
etc.). As far as form information is concerned, it may be that
stored knowledge differs in kind for contrasting object cat-
egories. For example, parts-based decomposition may be
more important for the recognition of nonliving things than
the recognition of living things, and that representations
that code the relative positions of parts may mediate the
recognition of nonliving but not living things. For animate
objects, at least, parts may move with respect to one an-
other, making a representation dependent on relative posi-
tion coding unreliable. On the other hand, for inanimate
objects the spatial relations between the parts can dictate
the functions of the stimuli (e.g., a handle in the correct re-
lation to a blade), and so may be strongly weighted in the
identification process. Davidoff mentions some data com-
patible with this. He noted evidence from Davidoff and
Warrington (1999) on a patient who could name animals
but could not discriminate their parts, consistent with a
parts-based description not being necessary for these stim-
uli. In order to advance the debate on category-specificity
further, theories need to specify in more detail the nature
of the perceptual representations for different object types.
Arguin & Saumier make a somewhat different point.
They discuss the arguments in our article concerning the
role of action-based knowledge in the identification of non-
living things, and suggest that “the role of action-related
functional knowledge in the processing of nonliving things
is directly analogous to that of visual structural knowledge
. . . (in) the recognition of living things.” If this is a debate
about the relative “weighting” of action and structural
knowledge in the identification process, then Arguin &
Saumier’s statement does capture our point. We argue that
action knowledge is strongly weighted for the identification
of nonliving things. Nevertheless, we continue to think that,
in the main part, access to structural knowledge is necessary
in order to identify both types of stimulus1 and, contrary to
Arguin & Saumier’s inference, we hold that there are rep-
resentations of structural knowledge for nonliving things. It
is simply that structural representations may differ for dif-
ferent stimuli (see above), and that structural knowledge
plays a lesser role in determining the efficiency of object
identification for nonliving things than for living things.
Arterberry in fact criticises our distinction between
structural knowledge of nonliving things and knowledge
about their functions (e.g., how such objects are used). She
points out that some theorists maintain that “visual/per-
ceptual information cannot be dissociated from function (or
action) information” (e.g., Gibson 1979). Our take on this is
slightly different. We propose that perceptual knowledge
can be directly linked to associated body actions indepen-
dent of contextual knowledge or knowledge about inter-
object associations, as highlighted by Saffran & Coslett in
their commentary. Such perception-action linkages will op-
erate for nonliving things in particular, which serve as the
implements for our actions, rather than for living things
which are animate in their own right.
However, although we argue that there is differential
weighting across categories for various forms of knowledge
about objects, the jury is open on whether access to par-
ticular forms of knowledge is sufficient to enable identifi-
cation to occur. In his commentary, Davidoff interprets
our argument as being that “only sensory knowledge . . .
has a strong (direct) access to the phonological lexicon,” as
if access to perceptual knowledge were sufficient for ob-
ject naming. This possibility is also discussed by Pulver-
müller as one of the “paths through the network” that may
exist. However, we are not advocating a direct path from
perceptual knowledge to names. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no strong evidence to indicate that access to
sensory/perceptual knowledge is sufficient for the naming
of living things (for example), in the sense that patients 
can name these items without retrieving any other form of
knowledge. We are also not convinced that there are direct
links between sensory properties such as colour and object
names (see Humphreys & Price 2001). It seems more that
sensory knowledge must combine with other forms of
functional and associative knowledge to enable name re-
trieval to take place. But within this combination process,
sensory/perceptual knowledge is weighted strongly for liv-
ing things.
One other relevant point here concerns the relations be-
tween structural and other forms of perceptual knowledge
about objects, such as their colour. Again, we were relatively
neutral on this issue in our target article, though we think it
is likely that structural knowledge about objects is repre-
sented independently of knowledge about (for example)
colour – as evidenced by patients who show good access to
structural knowledge along with impaired access to col-
oured knowledge about objects (see Price & Humphreys
1989 for discussion), or impaired colour knowledge without
problems in accessing shape knowledge for object identifi-
cation (Luzzatti & Davidoff 1994; see Davidoff). This also
relates to the debate about which properties are necessary
and which are sufficient for object identification to take
place. Within a system with separate representations of dif-
ferent perceptual attributes, identification may be contin-
gent on access to some but not other forms of representa-
tion. We suggest that identification does depend in large
part on access to stored structural knowledge about objects,
since shape is diagnostic of object identity (though not nec-
essarily uniquely diagnostic, see n. 1). Other forms of per-
ceptual representation may not be necessary (indeed, we
can recognise objects from line drawings with no colour in-
formation present), but they may still contribute. Access to
forms of functional knowledge, on the other hand, may be
necessary in addition to access to stored structural knowl-
edge.
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We have also argued that damage to visual knowledge
about objects can differentially impair the recognition of
living things. This can be one cause of an apparent category-
specific impairment. The evidence favouring this comes
from studies of patients with perceptual rather than se-
mantic impairments in object processing (e.g., Riddoch &
Humphreys 1987) and from evidence that deficits for living
things can be enhanced by increasing the difficulty of per-
ceptual processing (Humphreys et al. 1999). Tangental to
this point, Mahon & Caramazza argue that visual deficits
cannot necessarily cause difficulties with living things be-
cause there are patients with deficits in visual knowledge
without having greater deficits with living things. In our
view, the patient data on this point are not particularly
strong and one needs to be cautious in making inferences
from small databases. Nevertheless, we discussed the point
in our target article, where we summarised simulations that
showed that either differential or similar deficits could
emerge for living and nonliving things depending on how
damage was inflicted on visual representations. In simula-
tions with randomly fluctuating noise, for instance, we
found that deficits for living things were not significantly
greater than for nonliving things. Such simulations show
that, at least in principle, category-specific deficits are not
a necessary consequence of visual damage. The nature of
the visual/perceptual impairment may also be important if
the role of parts versus overall shape differs across cate-
gories (see above). Nevertheless it is important to reiterate
that these points do not rule out the argument that impair-
ments in visual processing and representation can be suffi-
cient to generate these deficits. Necessity and sufficiency
should not be confused here.
R2.2. Sensory-functional relations
A further argument made in our article was that category-
specific deficits could also be determined by contrasting
patterns of correlation between the sensory/perceptual
properties of objects and knowledge about object functions,
and also by there being different types of functional knowl-
edge that characterise contrasting object types (e.g., knowl-
edge of how to perform actions with objects vs. knowledge
of biological functions). Several authors respond to this
point, some in agreement and others who disagree that dif-
ferent patterns of correlation underlie some forms of cate-
gory-specific deficit. Mahon & Caramazza argue that
subjects list visual and functional/associative properties to
the same degree when asked to generate property norms,
inferring that these properties are weighted equally for the
different object types. On the other hand Cree & McRae
and Lambon Ralph & Garrard both argue that norma-
tive feature listings do vary across object categories – for ex-
ample, the number of distinctive functional features being
greater for artefacts than for living things. In addition, Lam-
bon Ralph & Garrard point out that shared features are
more prominent for living things than for nonliving things.
Both differences may contribute to category-specific def-
icits emerging in patients. Cree & McRae and Pillon &
Samson further note that some attributes may be more
central to the representation of some objects than others,
and this too may be important. One of the difficulties here,
raised by Cree & McRae, is that a simple separation into
sensory and functional features fails to pick up on finer-
level variations in both types of knowledge that may prove
to be important. We tried to make essentially this point in
our target article when discussing the contrasting forms of
“functional” knowledge that are often lumped together in
studies. We suggested that contrasting types of functional
knowledge may be differentially involved in the recognition
of living and nonliving things. However, this is difficult to
gauge from existing data because authors have used the
term “functional knowledge” (and indeed the term “sen-
sory knowledge”) to refer to widely different types of in-
formation. This is highlighted by the different properties
used to probe “sensory” and “functional” knowledge in rel-
evant papers in the literature (see Table R2). In general, we
disagree with those commentators who seemed to con-
clude that we were presenting a “standard” view that the
distinction between sensory and functional features in gen-
eral will be sufficient to account for all patients (Mahon &
Caramazza, Leek & Pothos). Our view on this is more
in line with the argument made by Cree & McRae, who
suggest that a sub-division into eight knowledge types is
needed to capture the variance in normative listings. Irre-
spective of the validity of this particular proposal, we be-
lieve that attempts to provide finer-grained characterisa-
tions of our knowledge about objects will help to give a
fuller account of the neuropsychological data. Does such a
finer-grained breakdown mean that our knowledge is do-
main-specific, as suggested by Mahon & Caramazza? We
say no. Note that, in Cree & McRae’s analysis of eight
knowledge types, musical instruments clustered with crea-
tures and nonliving food stuffs with fruit and vegetables.
This clustering is dependent on detailed analysis of differ-
ent knowledge types rather than object category. Note also
that, in HIT, any differences in knowledge representation
are linked to proposed variations in processing efficiency
which are not domain-specific (e.g., due to differences
in perceptual similarity). We hold that both differential
weighting of knowledge types, and variations in processing
as a function of different forms of similarity, are important
in explaining the range of category effects reported in both
normality and pathology, and that fine-grained category-
specific impairments arise naturally from the view (ex-
pressed in HIT) that categories have different weightings
across a range of knowledge stores.
In fact it may be that fine-grained breakdowns are more
difficult for views such as the “domain specific theory” of
semantic knowledge (e.g., Caramazza & Shelton 1998). On
this account, more domain-specific systems would need to
be posited to explain increasingly finer-grained deficits. In
Caramazza and Shelton (1998), for example, three domains
of knowledge were specified: animals, plants, and man-
made objects. However, following the report of a patient
with a selective sparing of the category body parts (along
with impaired naming of other categories of object), Shel-
ton et al. (1998) suggested that body parts formed a fourth
domain-specific category of knowledge. Warrington and
McCarthy (1987) reported an even finer-grained distinc-
tion between manipulable and nonmanipulable objects.
Following the domain-specific account we might presume
that there are separate systems for the recognition of these
two classes of object, and so forth. This seems unparsimo-
nious and unconstrained.
Mahon & Caramazza also assert that the main assump-
tion of the sensory-functional account of category deficits
has been refuted by patients who show impairments for liv-
ing things but equivalent levels of performance with “func-
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tional” and “sensory” questions. A problem here, though,
again concerns the different ways in which the terms “func-
tional” and “sensory” knowledge are operationalised across
different papers (see Table R2), and even the different stim-
uli classed as living or nonliving (e.g., animals vs. plants and
objects, Caramazza & Shelton 1998; animals vs. manmade
objects, Lambon Ralph et al. 1998; animals and plants vs.
man-made objects, Samson et al. 1998). For HIT, the differ-
ent kinds of sensory and functional properties may be stored
in different systems (colour knowledge, knowledge of shape,
encyclopaedic knowledge, knowledge of characteristic ac-
tion, etc.), so that tests of different properties should not be
thought to address a common knowledge store.
R2.3. Do we need semantic representations?
Another issue discussed in our target article is whether we
need to posit a core semantic system that “processes,
stored, and retrieves information about the meaning of
words, concepts, and facts,” distinct from forms of percep-
tual and motor knowledge about objects. We speculated
that this concept of core semantic knowledge may be a 
victim of the more detailed specification of knowledge
types that we are advocating. On this view, “semantic mem-
ory” emerges from the inter-connections between different
perceptual and action-based representations, perhaps aug-
mented by encyclopaedic knowledge held in verbal long-
term memory. This proposal is supported in the commen-
tary of Coslett & Saffran.
Several other commentators argue differently and hold
that the notion of a core semantic system should be main-
tained. Tyler & Moss, for example, suggest that perceptual
knowledge is represented not only within modality-specific
perceptual recognition systems (including a structural de-
scription system for object forms), but also within semantic
memory. They ask “how are correlations among the per-
ceptual and functional properties of objects captured if
these properties are stored independently in modular sub-
systems?” Pillon & Samson similarly argue that a seman-
tic system, separated from perceptual and motor knowl-
edge, is needed to integrate information across the more
peripheral knowledge stores. Bub & Bukach suggest that
contextual contiguity may be important in our knowledge
representations, and we suppose that this too may rely on
some form of (semantic) abstraction beyond perceptual
knowledge. Zaitchik & Solomon argue that semantic rep-
resentations will need to be incorporated into theories
when processes involved in reasoning must be taken into
account, and de Almeida proposes that semantic repre-
sentations are not decomposable into more primitive fea-
tures (shape attributes, colours, smells), and hence seman-
tic representations may be distinct from other forms of
(decomposable) knowledge. These arguments all have
some weight, but they are also difficult to resolve empiri-
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Table R2. Properties used in tests of the “sensory-functional” account of category-specific disorders
Living things Non-Living things
Sensory knowledge









Samson et al. (1998) constituent parts constituent parts (mast?)
overall shape overall shape
Functional Knowledge
Caramazza & Shelton (1998) biological functions (breathes?) use for humans (protects?)
habitat (live in water?)
associated action (flies?)
other (buy frozen?)
Lambon Ralph et al. (1998) habitat physical properties (glass?)
use for humans use for humans
associated action used by whom (sailors?)
sound made context of use
attributes of temperament (fierce)
food source (eats cheese?)
Samson et al. (1998) habitat place where used (urban?)
human use (transport?) use for humans
associated action context of use
taste
food source
cally. One approach, which we are sympathetic to, would be
to start with the presumption that all our knowledge is ei-
ther perceptuo-motor in nature or verbalised encyclopae-
dic information, and to see how far such an account can
stand up to the empirical results. For example, in detailed
simulations of this approach, can links be established be-
tween the different knowledge systems that incorporate our
“semantic” knowledge about perceptual-action relations,
contextual relations between objects and so forth? The rel-
atively small-scale simulations that have been conducted to
date are probably insufficient to know if other (core se-
mantic) forms of representation are needed (e.g., Devlin et
al. 1998; Durrant-Peatfield et al. 1997). Within the distrib-
uted approach we are suggesting (with no core semantic
system), our notion is that the different knowledge systems
are modular in the sense that they can be selectively dam-
aged, but they are also highly interactive – for example, per-
ceptual knowledge stores may need to be consulted to re-
trieve knowledge about the biological functions of animals.
Hence, unlike Tyler & Moss, we do not see in principle
why correlations between perceptual and functional prop-
erties could not be based on links between the different
knowledge stores. It would be good to find a way of putting
this to the test.
R2.4. What can we learn from functional brain imaging?
In presenting our argument, we drew not only on neu-
ropsychological cases but also on data from functional brain
imaging. Bub & Bukach, Mahon & Caramazza and
Tyler & Moss all respond to this. Bub & Bukach and Ma-
hon & Caramazza make a similar point, which is that it is
difficult to argue the direction of causation from imaging
data. Let us suppose that regions of the brain normally as-
sociated with processing the visual properties of objects are
active when subjects must make a decision about the bio-
logical function of animals. Bub & Bukach and Mahon &
Caramazza point out that such evidence is not sufficient for
us to argue that these visual properties need to become ac-
tivated to answer these questions – such activations may
simply be a by-product of retrieving all forms of knowledge
about a stimulus, but they may play no causative role in re-
trieving functional knowledge. This point is reasonable and
well taken. It can be problematic to make causal inferences
from imaging data. Nevertheless, the imaging data with
normal subjects add to the weight of evidence that should
be taken into account when assessing the roles of different
types of knowledge in the recognition and naming of par-
ticular classes of item. For example, if visual knowledge
areas are more activated when answering functional ques-
tions about living things than nonliving things (see Thomp-
son-Schill et al. 1999, for this argument), then some form
of account of this needs to be given (are all forms of knowl-
edge only retrieved as a by-product for living things?). Also,
when functional imaging is combined with neuropsychol-
ogy, then even stronger arguments can be marshalled. For
example, as Coslett & Saffran highlight, some imaging
studies have been conducted on semantic dementia pa-
tients with damage to anterior temporal cortices. Unlike
normal subjects, these patients do not activate regions of
posterior temporal cortex, associated with high-level visual
processing, in associative matching tasks (Mummery et al.
1999), even though the posterior temporal regions were not
structurally damaged in the patients. Thus there can be
functional changes in neural processing distant to the site
of damage. In the relevant studies the investigators did not
distinguish effects with different object classes, but if the
impact of reduced posterior activation were associated with
poor performance with some object classes (e.g., living
things), then the argument for a causative link would be
strengthened.
Tyler & Moss are concerned with a different point,
namely whether there is any evidence from functional
imaging studies for regional specialisation in processing dif-
ferent object types, once nuisance variables have been
taken account of. We agree with Tyler & Moss that there is
a good deal of inconsistency across the reported imaging
studies, and we discussed this point in our target article. In
an attempt to assess if there are category effects in imaging
normal subjects, Devlin et al. (in preparation) have recently
re-analysed all the PET data from Price’s laboratory in
which category was a factor, to evaluate if some common ar-
eas do arise across studies. Interesting to note, they do find
some consistent areas across studies that vary with object
category, with the anterior temporal lobes being more acti-
vated for living things and the middle temporal region for
tools. This last result is consistent with action knowledge
being recruited by tools, since the middle temporal lobe
may be part of a circuit involved in action retrieval (Martin
et al. 1995; Phillips et al., submitted). Devlin et al. interpret
the anterior temporal activation as reflecting the integra-
tion of perceptual knowledge within this region, perhaps
akin to the notion of a convergence zone (Damasio 1989;
see Fig. 4 in our target article). Whatever the valid inter-
pretation, the evidence suggests that there is some neuronal
specialisation involved.
R2.5. Underlying mechanisms
One other major theme raised in the commentators is how
category effects may emerge. Here it is illuminating to note
the suggestions of researchers whose main research inter-
ests are not in neuropsychology. Lamberts, for example,
discusses the contribution that exemplar theories can make
in this field, since such models provide comprehensive ac-
counts of data in other areas (e.g., studies of normal cate-
gorisation times). He suggests that such theories make the
interesting prediction that patients with poor naming of liv-
ing things may be better able to categorize these items than
they can categorize nonliving things. Lamberts also notes
some data consistent with this approach, though it is not
clear that investigators have controlled for factors such as
the frequency of the category names or the familiarity of the
categories when these comparisons have been made. We
look forward to studies that assess categorisation using
matched categories.
Tanaka suggests that one reason why category differ-
ences may emerge is due to differences in expertise with
different object types. He points out that experts tend to list
more perceptual features than non-experts, even when the
same perceptual features are available to all of us, because
experts pay greater attention to the distinctive properties of
objects. We accept this point, and we agree that repre-
sented “object properties are not only determined by the
intrinsic features of an object but also by the experience and
motivation of the categorizer.” Tanaka’s point, though,
does raise quite a complex set of issues concerning the ef-
fects of object familiarity on recognition. Familiarity has
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typically been considered a nuisance variable that experi-
menters need to control out. However, as Lambon Ralph
& Garrard also remark, familiarity can also interact with
category, and it may be one of the factors that contributes
to gender differences in object identification (Laws 1999).
According to Tanaka’s hypothesis, increased familiarity
could lead to the differential weighting of distinctive attri-
butes of objects, making these items less vulnerable to dam-
age. That is, rather than simply being a nuisance variable,
familiarity may change the nature of the representations
involved. Similarly Lambon Ralph & Garrard suggest that
familiar items occupy more semantic space.” Clearly the in-
teraction between familiarity and category needs to be ex-
plored in more detail rather than controlled away – though,
as noted in our target article, familiarity cannot be every-
thing, given that patients can show deficits on objects that
they were expert on pre-morbidly (e.g., patient Michelan-
gelo; Sartori & Job 1988).
Several other commentators discuss the role of evolu-
tion and learning in determining category-effects. Bar-
rett, for example, argues that, from an evolutionary point
of view, the perceptual features of living things may be
strongly weighted in any representation because percep-
tual traits are passed on from parents to offspring. This is
a slightly different “take” on the evolutionary perspective
than that given elsewhere (e.g., Caramazza & Shelton
1998), because it emphasises that weighting of perceptual
features may be primary and lead to category effects in
adulthood. Arterberry also discusses work from develop-
mental psychology which suggests that attention to per-
ceptual properties, such as motion, forms the foundation
for category effects that emerge in knowledge representa-
tion (see Zaitchik & Solomon too). This evolutionary per-
spective is in line with the HIT framework, which holds
that variations in particular kinds of perceptual and func-
tional knowledge, coupled with on-line processing differ-
ences, lead to the effects of object category in both patients
and normal adults. As Zaitchik & Solomon also stress, we
look forward to the convergence between developmental
psychology and other strands of cognitive neuroscience in
helping us answer questions about how apparent category
effects arise (indeed see chapters in Forde & Humphreys,
in press).
R2.6. Other categories of knowledge
Our target article dealt with neuropsychological disorders
affecting the recognition of living and nonliving things, and
not with disorders affecting other categories of knowledge.
Thioux et al. discuss neuropsychological disorders of num-
ber processing, and highlight the contrasting arguments
that have been offered to account for such deficits. These
arguments parallel some of those found in the literature on
differences between living and nonliving things. For in-
stance, Thioux et al. compare a “true categorical account”
(numbers are represented independently of other types of
knowledge because they are subject to distinct semantic op-
erations) with accounts that stress the fundamental role of
other factors – such as visuo-spatial processing or magni-
tude estimation abilities based on location codes for ob-
jects. This mirrors the arguments about whether biological
category is crucially important for the living/nonliving dis-
tinction, or whether a more basic difference is caused by
the contrasts between perceptual and/or functional knowl-
edge in differentiating objects for identification. HIT is
aligned with the last position.
Pulvermüller also discusses the role that action-related
brain processes may play in the lexical access of words that
refer to actions, and he highlights work on impaired lexical
access in patients with lesions to motor and adjacent pre-
frontal areas of the right hemisphere. He suggests that re-
entrant, action-related information (supported by these re-
gions of the right as well as the left hemisphere) contributes
to lexical access for action words. This approach is entirely
consistent with our own concerning the processing of living
and nonliving things more generally. We hope that some of
the predictions that emerge from our account, and some of
the issues it raises, can help to provide definitive answers as
to why category effects arise in neuropsychology.
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NOTE
1. There may be some exceptions to this, as when a particular
stimulus has a particularly diagnostic texture (e.g., a carpet) or a
particular pattern of movement.
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